Tiara Yachts, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 24-1223, __ F. 4th __, 2025 WL 1453273 (6th Cir. May 21, 2025) (Before Circuit Judges Murphy, Davis, and Bloomekatz)

Allegations of opaque and self-dealing fee schemes have long been part of ERISA pension litigation. More recently, as plan sponsors and others begin to peel back the layers of health care fee and reimbursement structures, litigation challenging these practices has followed. This case involves one such suit.

Tiara Yachts, a boat manufacturing company that sponsors a self-funded ERISA healthcare plan for its employees, contracted with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) to administer the plan. Under the contract, BCBSM was responsible for nearly all aspects of plan administration, including interpreting plan terms, calculating benefits, deciding whether to grant or deny claims, and ultimately paying claims from an account that Tiara Yachts periodically funded. Tiara Yachts’ authority was limited to contesting paid claims within 60 days and requesting audits from BCBSM for the preceding 24 months.

Tiara Yachts terminated its relationship with BCBSM in 2018, and several years after that filed this action alleging that BCBSM breached its fiduciary duties regarding several of its payment practices. Specifically, Tiara Yachts challenged a practice referred to by the parties as “flip logic” under which BCBSM improperly paid out-of-state providers whatever they charged rather than the far lower allowed amount such providers would be paid by the Blue Cross entity in their states. Moreover, Tiara Yachts alleged that the claims processing platforms used by BCBSM contained processing errors that allowed providers to improperly code their claims and overbill for services.

Rather than correct these problems BCBSM profited from them, according to Tiara Yachts, by recouping overpayments through a “Shared Savings Program” (SSP) under which BCBSM retained 30% of recovered amounts (and amounts that it prevented itself from overpaying in the future). Tiara Yachts alleged that these practices constituted fiduciary breaches and self-dealing, and “sought damages, restitution, disgorgement, and a declaratory judgment that BCBSM had breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA.”

The district court, however, granted BCBSM’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court found that “Tiara Yachts had not plausibly alleged that BCBSM acted as an ERISA fiduciary, either when paying providers based on flip logic or when paying itself through the SSP.” The district court further held that ERISA did not provide the relief that Tiara Yachts requested.

The Sixth Circuit reversed. It reasoned, first, that because Tiara Yachts had the power of the checkbook with regard to the payment of claims, it had “control” over plan assets and was therefore a fiduciary under ERISA. Thus, the court of appeals concluded that “BCBSM acted as a fiduciary when it controlled – and then ‘fail[ed] to preserve’ – Plan assets.”

The court rejected the district court’s reasoning that the claims processing issues were not actionable under ERISA because they were matters of contract. To the contrary, the court of appeals noted that plan administrators “often operate under contract,” and can and sometimes do breach their fiduciary duties by breaching their contracts. “The same goes here,” according to the Sixth Circuit. Indeed, quoting the Secretary of Labor’s amicus brief, the court held that a contrary rule “that an administrator like BCBSM insulates itself from ERISA liability because a contract governs its relationship with its customer would ‘gut ERISA’s fiduciary provisions.’”

The court likewise rejected BCBSM’s argument that its practice of “systematically overpaying providers did not give rise to ERISA fiduciary status” because it was a system-wide business decision that it applied to all plans, not just the Tiara Yachts plan. Again, the court recognized that accepting this argument would “yield untenable results” by immunizing fiduciary breaches so long as they were widespread enough.

In so holding, the court distinguished a prior Sixth Circuit decision in which it had held that negotiating reimbursement rates for a wide array of healthcare consumers did not constitute plan management or administration. Unlike in that case, the court reasoned that “Tiara Yachts’ complaint focuses on BCBSM’s wasting Plan assets in its role ‘making discretionary eligibility determinations’ and paying out claims, not on any actions it took as a ‘distributor of health-care services.’” The court also distinguished a decision from the First Circuit holding that Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts did not act as a fiduciary in engaging in the mechanical act of writing checks as a third-party administrator for a healthcare plan where the plan sponsor, and not the Blue Cross entity, had the final authority to decide claims.

The court then turned to the question whether BCBSM acted as a fiduciary with respect to the SSP. As an initial matter, the court addressed and rejected BCBSM’s assertion that the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) was applicable. The Court reasoned that “Tiara Yachts does not need to plead that BCBSM acted fraudulently here, as the elements of common law fraud do not overlap with elements of an ERISA self-dealing claim.”

On the merits of the fiduciary status issue, the Sixth Circuit noted that “if a contract grants a plan administrator discretion as to its compensation, using that discretion is a fiduciary act.” The Court then found it clear under the facts alleged “that BCBSM exercised discretion in setting its compensation for the SSP,” because “BCBSM controlled the number and amount of overpayments the Plan made because under the ASC, BCBSM decided which claims to pay, determined how much to pay for them, and then wrote the checks. In short, BCBSM’s control over the claims-processing apparatus meant it also exercised discretion in setting its compensation under the SSP.”

Finally, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court that Tiara Yachts could not recover under either ERISA Section 502(a)(2) or under Section 502(a)(3). To the contrary, the appellate court held that both offered appropriate channels of relief.

First, although the complaint did not specify that it sought recovery for the plan, the court concluded that Tiara Yachts “did specify that it sought recovery in its capacity as the Plan’s sponsor” for losses to the plan. Indeed, the court noted that the “crux of the complaint is that BCBSM breached its fiduciary duties to the Plan by squandering assets, then wrongfully kept a portion of overpaid Plan assets as administrative fees,” and found that “the complaint alleges harm both to Tiara Yachts and to the Plan.”

Similarly, the court found that “two forms of relief that Tiara Yachts seeks – restitution and disgorgement – both were typically available in courts of equity.” Thus, the court concluded therefore that “Tiara Yachts seeks ‘equitable relief’ under § 1132(a)(3).”

The court did caution that “Tiara Yachts cannot recover under § 1132(a)(3) for BCBSM’s overpayments to providers that BCBSM never clawed back – that is, for funds that providers still possess.” In this regard, the court agreed with BCBSM that “to receive equitable relief ‘in the universe of transferred assets,’ a plaintiff generally must be able to trace the award ‘back to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.’” Thus, the court concluded that “to the extent that Tiara Yachts seeks restitution of funds BCBSM overpaid and never subsequently recovered, those funds are not in BCBSM’s possession and thus are not recoverable under § 1132(a)(3).”

In contrast, the court noted that it had not “expressly held that claims for disgorgement must satisfy the traceability requirement.” In any event, the court found that “Tiara Yachts has alleged that BCBSM retained specific funds it collected for the SSP.” Thus, the court concluded that “[n]one of BCBSM’s arguments convince us that this relief is unavailable.”

All in all, it looks like Tiara Yachts was able to flip the district court’s logic and, at least for the time being, it is blue skies and smooth sailing ahead.

Below is a summary of this past week’s notable ERISA decisions by subject matter and jurisdiction.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Fourth Circuit

Bokma v. Performance Food Grp., Inc., No. 3:24-cv-686 (DJN), 2025 WL 1452042 (E.D. Va. May 20, 2025) (Judge David J. Novak). In this putative class action, the participants of the Performance Food Group, Inc.’s ERISA-governed welfare plan allege that Performance Food Group breached its fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty and violated ERISA Section 702(b) by imposing a discriminatory tobacco surcharge on plan participants. Defendant sought dismissal of plaintiffs’ class action complaint, but in this decision the court denied its motion. As a preliminary matter, the court discussed defendant’s standing argument. The company argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege a concrete injury because they did not attest that they participated in, or would have participated in, the tobacco cessation program the plan offered. The court disagreed with this framing. Instead, it found that defendant caused the plaintiffs, and others like them, a monetary loss by imposing an allegedly unlawful $600 annual tobacco surcharge, and that this injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct “because absent Defendant’s alleged administration of its non-compliant wellness program, Plaintiffs would not have had to pay an unlawful surcharge.” Moreover, the court held that “the monetary harm suffered by Plaintiffs and similarly situated class members constitutes a redressable injury, as the requested relief under ERISA can remedy that harm.” The court therefore found that plaintiffs sufficiently established Article III standing, and therefore proceeded to analyze the merits of their claims as challenged by Performance Food Group. In large part, defendant argued that plaintiffs’ complaint fails because they are alleging violations of Department of Labor regulations, which it believed the court was free to disregard in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The court was not persuaded by this argument, particularly at this early stage of litigation. It stated that defendant’s reading of Loper Bright was far too broad, and did not see Loper Bright as standing for the proposition that all regulations promulgated by federal agencies are to be tossed aside and disregarded. “At this stage in the litigation, Defendant identifies no valid reason why the Court must determine that the applicable DOL regulatory requirements, which have existed without amendment for more than a decade, should no longer apply.” Having found that Loper Bright does not warrant dismissal, the court proceeded to review the fiduciary breach claims. It determined that plaintiffs plausibly alleged fiduciary acts in connection with administering the plan and managing plan assets related to the tobacco surcharge, and also that in performing those fiduciary acts defendants allegedly breached their duties under ERISA. “Plaintiffs allege that Defendant collected and held Plan assets, in the form of unlawful tobacco surcharges, ‘in its own accounts’ and failed ‘to contribute as much of its own assets to the Plan.’ Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant ‘prioritiz[ed] its financial interests over the interests of plan participants’ by retaining the surcharges without administering retroactive refunds.” The court further found that plaintiffs sufficiently pled a loss to the entire plan by alleging that the members of the class lost millions of dollars in the form of unlawful surcharges that were deducted from their paychecks. Finally, the court agreed with plaintiffs that the complaint plausibly outlined violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)’s anti-discrimination provision by failing to provide a full retroactive reward through reasonable alternatives to the wellness program, and by failing to provide the required notice of a compliant reasonable alternative standard. Based on the foregoing, the court determined that plaintiffs adequately stated all three of their claims, and thus denied defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Ninth Circuit

Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, No. 22-16268, __ F. 4th __, 2025 WL 1463295 (9th Cir. May 22, 2025) (Before Circuit Judges Berzon, Miller, and VanDyke). Plaintiff-appellant Winston R. Anderson brought this putative class action under ERISA against the trustees and fiduciaries of the Intel Corporation’s 401(k) Savings Plan and the Intel Retirement Contribution Plan. Mr. Anderson alleged that defendants breached their duty of prudence by investing the funds’ assets in poorly performing and costly hedge funds and private equity funds, and that they breached their duty of loyalty by steering retirement funds to companies in which Intel’s venture capital arm, Intel Capital, was investing. The district court dismissed Mr. Anderson’s claims. It concluded that he failed to plausibly allege a breach of the duty of prudence because he did not provide a sound basis for comparison of investments with the same risk strategy. Further, the district court concluded that Mr. Anderson had not stated a claim of disloyalty, but simply presented the potential for conflicts of interest, with nothing more. Mr. Anderson appealed the district court’s dismissal. In this order the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel stressed that ERISA’s duty of prudence “is a standard of conduct rather than results,” and thus the actions of fiduciaries are properly evaluated prospectively, based on the methods the fiduciaries employed, rather than in hindsight. The court of appeals noted that the complaint suggests that the fiduciaries’ choices “had their intended effects.” The fiduciaries adopted a strategy designed to mitigate risk which they always knew would not have very high returns during periods when the markets were performing well. The decision stated that “the district court correctly determined that Anderson did not plausibly allege that Intel’s funds underperformed other funds with comparable aims.” Mr. Anderson countered that the aims themselves were problematic and not designed with the best interests of the participants. He also offered that there are no good comparators for the fiduciaries’ decision here because the approach the Intel trustees adopted “was unusual, if not unparalleled.” He contended that it was wrong for defendants to give up the long-term benefit of investing in equity, which delivers superior returns. But both the district court and the court of appeals rejected these arguments. The courts responded that ERISA fiduciaries are not required to increase returns by adopting “a risker strategy,” and held that ERISA fiduciaries are not violating the duty of prudence by seeking to minimize risk. Mr. Anderson, however, insisted that what he is challenging here is not a strategy of risk minimization in general, but the implementation of the strategy the Intel fiduciaries adopted specifically. He argued that hedge funds and private equity funds are actually inherently risky and that prudent investors with the same aims would not have invested in them, especially not in the proportions these trustees did. He maintained that it was imprudent to invest in these investment options when contemporaneous reports showed they had poor returns and exorbitant expenses, and that other fiduciaries recognized these well-documented risks. The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded. It stated that Mr. Anderson’s challenge to the hedge funds and private equity investments overlooked how these investments related to the portfolio as a whole and that the individual riskiness of particular investments can be managed through the diversification of investment assets. Notably, the Supreme Court rejected this proposition in its decision in Hughes v. Northwestern. The highest court decisively held that a fiduciary cannot neutralize imprudent investment options in a plan by also offering prudent investment options with reasonable fees and performance results alongside them. Putting this issue aside, the Ninth Circuit added that Mr. Anderson simply failed to offer anything other than “general arguments about the riskiness and costliness of hedge funds and private equity funds without providing factual allegations sufficient to support the claim that the investments that were actually made were ill-suited to the Intel funds.” And while the appellate court acknowledged that there is no heightened pleading standard for ERISA fiduciary breach claims beyond Rule 8’s notice pleading, it nevertheless adopted its own heightened pleading standard by reasoning that ERISA plaintiffs have access to extensive disclosures and annual report information which gives them the opportunity to use that data to show that a prudent fiduciary in like circumstances would have acted differently. The Ninth Circuit added that it is appropriate for district courts to extensively pick apart differences between the challenged investments and the plaintiff’s chosen comparators even at the pleading stage. The court of appeals therefore agreed with the district court’s dismissal of the breach of the duty of prudence claim. It did so for Mr. Anderson’s breach of the duty of loyalty claim as well. Spending considerably less energy on this count, the court of appeals breezily affirmed the district court’s holding that Mr. Anderson failed to plausibly allege that defendants acted disloyally while discharging their fiduciary duties. It agreed with the lower court that Mr. Anderson presented only evidence of the potential for conflicts of interest. For these reasons, the panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal. Circuit Judge Berzon also offered her own concurring opinion. Judge Berzon wrote separately to clarify that investment-to-investment comparisons are not the only way to plead plausible claims of fiduciary breaches. Judge Berzon stated that a plaintiff could instead directly show that a fiduciary’s method, process, or objectives were imprudent or could alternatively plead that the inherent risk of the category of the underlying investment was so severe as to be obviously imprudent. By way of example, Judge Berzon said a plaintiff could “almost certainly plead a duty-of-prudence claim” attacking a process where a fiduciary picked investments entirely at random by writing the ticker symbol for each publicly traded U.S. company on a bingo ball and then drawing ten to invest in at random. Judge Berzon also suggested that allocating a significant portion of the plan’s assets in a new type of security backed by lottery tickets would also be plausibly imprudent. However, Judge Berzon’s examples are so extreme as to be disconnected from reality. Plan fiduciaries are simply not investing plan assets in lottery ticket securities, nor are they selecting investments entirely at random by drawing bingo balls. The concurring opinion also stated that courts could infer imprudence not only from meaningful investment-versus-investment comparisons but also from plan-versus-plan comparisons. And while these examples are not exhaustive, Judge Berzon wished to convey that just as there are multiple ways to skin a cat, there are multiple ways for a plaintiff to plausibly support an inference that a fiduciary acted imprudently or disloyalty that are sufficient at the pleading stage. Here, though, Judge Berzon was in agreement with the rest of the panel that Mr. Anderson failed to plead facts that support his claim any which way, either directly or inferentially.

Eleventh Circuit

Roche v. TECO Energy, Inc., No. 8:23-cv-1571-CEH-CPT, 2025 WL 1446379 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2025) (Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell). Plaintiff Alejandro Roche worked for TECO Energy, Inc. for approximately 33 years and was a participant in its pension plan. As a grandfathered participant, Mr. Roche was entitled to benefits under an older formula for calculating benefits and could choose to receive his pension in the form of a life annuity or lump sum. In early September 2022, Mr. Roche requested an estimate of his pension benefits and requested information about the specific methodology the plan used to calculate lump sum payments. His employer informed him that if he retired on December 1, 2022, his lump sum payment would be $482,970.55, but if he retired just one month later, on January 1, 2023, his lump sum payment would be $396,600.67 – about $82,000 less. Mr. Roche elected a lump sum payment and selected the December 1st retirement date. However, adhering to the policy in the plan that a retirement application must be received at least 90 days before the start of retirement benefits, TECO concluded that Mr. Roche’s retirement date was in January 2023, and therefore Mr. Roche received the much lower lump sum payment. Based on this harm, Mr. Roche sued his former employer and the retirement plan under ERISA Sections 102 and 404 on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated retirees. In an order dated August 28, 2024, the court dismissed Mr. Roche’s original complaint. The court found that Section 102 does not require the summary plan description to disclose the method of calculating benefits to warn plan participants about the effect of rising interest rates. The court dismissed this claim with prejudice as it found amendment would be futile. Next, the court concluded that TECO did not breach its fiduciary duty under Section 404(a) by failing to include the method of calculating lump sum benefits in the summary plan description. Instead, the court observed that the complaint needed to allege that TECO misled Mr. Roche, despite knowing of his confusion, or made some sort of other misrepresentation to him. The court dismissed count two without prejudice. Mr. Roche subsequently amended his complaint. Instead of focusing on the summary plan description, he revised his fiduciary breach claim to assert that TECO had an affirmative obligation to disclose information to him under two theories. First, Mr. Roche argued that his communications with TECO put it on notice of his confusion about the plan. Second, he argued that it had an affirmative duty to warn plan participants about material information that could reduce their benefits and to proactively allow them to maximize their benefit outcomes. Defendants filed a renewed motion to dismiss Mr. Roche’s complaint. In this order the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, this time with prejudice. The court addressed Mr. Roche’s first theory first. Although Mr. Roche argued that TECO only resolved his confusion after it was too late for him to choose an earlier retirement date, rendering TECO’s explanations belated, the court pointed out that by the time he inquired about his benefits it was already too late for him to choose a 2022 retirement date. “Accordingly, this theory does not state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.” The court then discussed Mr. Roche’s other theory about TECO’s affirmative duty to warn participants about circumstances that might reduce their benefits. While sympathetic to the circumstances Mr. Roche found himself in, the court was unwilling “to expand the fiduciary duty of an ERISA plan administrator so far beyond its current state.” Mr. Roche’s position, the court concluded, was akin to individualized advice which “seems to equate plan administrators with investment advisors.” The court added that the material information at issue here was not even a feature of the plan itself, but an external factor – rising interest rates. Accordingly, the court determined that the amended complaint failed to allege that defendants made misrepresentations or misleading communications to the putative class members or that they were on notice of the need to disclose under the circumstances at issue here. Thus, the court concluded that Mr. Roche failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Section 404(a) and therefore granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Disability Benefit Claims

Third Circuit

Gavin v. Eaton Aeroquip Inc. Short Term Disability Plan, No. 23-433, 2025 WL 1479509 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2025) (Judge Kelley B. Hodge). Plaintiff Troy Gavin suffered a stroke and was hospitalized from April 29, 2021 to May 1, 2021. After he was discharged from the hospital he submitted a claim for short-term disability benefits under the benefit plan offered by his employer and administered by Sedgwick Claims Management Services. Although Sedgwick approved benefits at first, it terminated Mr. Gavin’s benefits beyond August 9, 2021, meaning he did not receive the maximum short-term disability benefits under the plan which would have extended until the end of October. After exhausting his administrative appeals process, Mr. Gavin commenced this action against the plan to challenge its decision to terminate his benefits. Mr. Gavin moved for summary judgment on his wrongful denial of benefits claim. Because the plan grants Sedgwick with discretionary authority, the court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. The court denied Mr. Gavin’s motion for summary judgment because it identified at least two genuine disputes of material facts as to whether Sedgwick arbitrarily and capriciously terminated Mr. Gavin’s short-term disability benefits: (1) whether Sedgwick’s reviewer sufficiently considered Mr. Gavin’s job description and medical documents in its decision to deny benefits, and (2) whether Sedgwick’s examination did, in fact, consider appropriate evidence and attribute the appropriate weight to certain medical and non-medical documents.

ERISA Preemption

Second Circuit

Cigna Health and Life Ins. Co. v. BioHealth Lab., Inc., No. 3:19-CV-01324 (JCH), 2025 WL 1450727 (D. Conn. May 20, 2025) (Judge Janet C. Hall). Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company filed suit against a group of three toxicology labs in Florida – defendants Epic Reference Labs, Inc., BioHealth Medical Laboratory, Inc., and PB Laboratories, LLC – alleging that they had engaged in improper billing practices and performed medically unnecessary services in order to enrich themselves. The case proceeded to an eight-day jury trial, and on November 4, 2024, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Cigna and against the labs. The jury awarded $2.4 million in damages to Cigna against each of the three defendant labs. One month later, on December 4, 2024, the labs moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). Defendants had two pending defenses to Cigna’s unjust enrichment claim, which the court had determined it would decide after the jury trial. First, the labs asserted that the unjust enrichment claim is time-barred under the doctrine of laches. Second, to the extent Cigna seeks to recoup payments it made to the labs under ERISA-governed benefit plans, the labs alleged that Cigna’s claim is preempted by ERISA. Upon review of the labs’ motion, the court observed that it did not mention either of the labs’ pending defenses of laches or ERISA preemption. The court instructed the labs to submit additional briefing if they wished to assert these defenses, and failure to do so would lead the court to deem the defenses abandoned. The labs filed additional briefing on ERISA preemption, but not in response to their laches defense. As a result, in this decision the court concluded that the labs abandoned their previously asserted defense of laches. The court further found that ERISA preemption doesn’t bar Cigna’s unjust enrichment claim. The court agreed with Cigna that its claim is not preempted by ERISA because it is not premised on the terms of the ERISA plans, but instead on the labs’ misconduct. Beginning with its examination of whether Cigna’s claim has an impermissible “connection with” ERISA-governed plans, the court explained “that Cigna’s claim does not endanger the national uniformity of plan administration,” as it does not affect the core entities that ERISA governs, but rather involves a dispute between out-of-network providers and a health insurance company. The court then discussed the “reference to” prong of Section 514. Although the court noted that “the nature of its proof renders it a close question in this case,” because Cigna consistently argued that it was not just unfair or inequitable for the labs to retain these payments but also that the services were not covered under the terms of its plans, the court nevertheless ultimately held that Cigna’s unjust enrichment claim doesn’t depend on the written terms of Cigna’s ERISA plans. The jury in fact reached its verdict without referencing the terms of the ERISA plans. Accordingly, the court agreed with Cigna that the language of the ERISA plans was not a critical factor in establishing liability here. Thus, the court concluded that Cigna’s unjust enrichment claim was not preempted by ERISA. The court also addressed the labs’ remaining arguments that Cigna lacked standing and that it could not prove damages, and explained why it found both without merit. For these reasons, the court denied the labs’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, and by extension, upheld the verdict of the jury.

Seventh Circuit

Northwestern Memorial Healthcare v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield LLC, No. 24 C 2777, 2025 WL 1455823 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2025) (Judge LaShonda A. Hunt). Plaintiff Northwestern Memorial Healthcare sued Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield in state court for breach of implied contract and quantum meruit for failing to fully reimburse it for medical services it rendered to participants under benefit plans it administers. Anthem removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and then filed a motion to dismiss Northwestern’s complaint as preempted by ERISA. The court granted the motion to dismiss in this decision. The court fundamentally agreed with Anthem that Northwestern is attempting to recoup payments for claims that were denied as medically unnecessary, and that these claims cannot be resolved without reference to the terms of the ERISA benefit plans the patients have with Anthem. The court stressed that “whether Northwestern is entitled to damages depends on what benefits and payments for medically necessary services are owed under the ERISA-governed benefit plans.” Moreover, the court adopted the Ninth Circuit’s logic from Bristol SL Holdings, Inc. v. Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co., 103 F.4th 597 (9th Cir. 2024), to conclude that Northwestern’s state law claims have an impermissible connection with ERISA. “Like the claims in Bristol, Northwestern’s theories of liability would legally bind an insurer to make payment every time a plan administrator verifies coverage in routine pre-treatment communications. This ‘Catch-22,’ where administrators must abandon either their plan terms or their preauthorization programs, functions as a regulation of ERISA plans…because it binds plan administrators to particular choices and precludes uniform administrative practice. This proposed binding enforcement regime is the exact kind of intrusion on plan administration that ERISA’s preemption provision seeks to prevent.” Accordingly, the court found that the state law claims Northwestern asserts impermissibly “relate to” and have a “connection with” the ERISA-governed benefit plans, and are therefore conflict-preempted by Section 514. The court disagreed with Northwestern that its action is better understood as a “rate of payment” case than a “right to payment” one. Rather, the court concluded that Northwestern’s claims involve the “right to payment” under ERISA plans because the claims were either denied or underpaid after Anthem deemed them medically unnecessary under the patients’ healthcare plans. Thus, the court explained, “the crux of this dispute hinges on Northwestern’s entitlement to payment for covered services under an ERISA plan, not whether HealthChoice remitted the correct discounted rate under the Contract.” Accordingly, the court agreed with Anthem that both Northwestern’s breach of implied contract and quantum meruit claims are preempted by ERISA and the court therefore granted Anthem’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and granted Northwestern leave to file an amended complaint consistent with this ruling.

Staffing Services Assoc. of Ill. v. Flanagan, No. 23 C 16208, 2025 WL 1475493 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2025) (Judge Thomas M. Durkin). Several temporary staffing agencies and trade associations brought this action against the Director of the Illinois Department of Labor to enjoin the enforcement of several amendments made to the Illinois Day and Temporary Labor Services Act (“DTLSA”) as preempted by ERISA. Plaintiffs asked the court to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of the new Sections 42(b) and (c). Because the court found that plaintiffs cannot show they are likely to succeed on the merits it denied their motion for a preliminary injunction in this order. Broadly speaking, the challenged amendments, signed into law in 2023, are aimed at enhancing protections for the labor and employment rights of temporary workers in the state of Illinois. “Section 42 guarantees temporary workers ‘[e]qual pay for equal work’ and covers both wages and benefits.” Section 42(b) requires an agency to provide temporary workers benefits that are substantially similar to those of directly hired employees or pay the hourly average cash equivalent to the cost of those benefits. Section 42(c) requires third party clients to timely disclose all necessary information related to job duties, working conditions, pay, seniority, and benefits it provides to the similarly situated directly hired employees so that agencies can meet their obligations under Section 42. Before the court engaged with the agency plaintiffs’ arguments about preemption, it held that they did not have standing to challenge Section 42(c), as it imposes no obligation on them. The court thus considered only whether plaintiffs made an adequate showing that ERISA preempts Section 42(b). It found that they did not. Plaintiffs argued that Section 42(b) is preempted by Section 514 in four ways: (1) it references ERISA plans by tethering the statutory obligation to the value of ERISA plans; (2) it connects with ERISA plans by impeding the agencies’ ability to administer their plans in a uniform way; (3) it imposes the creation of an ERISA plan by requiring agencies to require an ongoing administrative scheme with individualized decision-making regarding benefits; and (4) it creates an alternative enforcement scheme that competes with ERISA. The court determined that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on any of these bases. To begin, the court disagreed that Section 42(b) ties its statutory obligations to ERISA plans, and found that to the contrary it is indifferent about whether benefits are offered through ERISA plans or not. Next, the court held that Section 42(b) doesn’t require the agencies to structure their plans in any particular way, as they can comply with the statute by paying workers the cash value of the cost of the benefits provided by the client and leave the existing ERISA plans as they are. Although the law guarantees a minimum level of compensation, comprising both wages and benefits, it does not compel any change to what is covered, how beneficiaries are designated, the way benefits are disbursed under ERISA plans, or impose any additional recordkeeping or disclosure requirements on ERISA plans. The court did not agree with plaintiffs that either the statutory language or the factual record show “that the cash option is not a real option.” Thus, the court was not convinced that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their ERISA preemption claim based on an impermissible “connection with” ERISA plans. Nor was the court persuaded that Section 42(b) will create ERISA plans. While there will need to be ongoing administrative schemes in order to comply and provide the cost equivalent of the benefits, the court found that payment of these costs out of an employer’s general assets will not create ERISA plans. Finally, plaintiffs argued that ERISA preempts Section 42(b) because of the ways it can be enforced against agencies. This argument was not well taken by the court given that the present action is a facial preemption challenge and does not present any cause of action arising under the DTLSA. “Whether a cause of action arising under the DTLSA is an ‘end run around’ ERISA’s enforcement scheme will depend on the nature of that cause of action, including who is asserting it and whether it involves an ERISA plan.” Based on the foregoing, the court found that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits, and therefore declined to address the other elements of the preliminary injunction analysis. Instead, it simply denied plaintiffs’ motion.

Pleading Issues & Procedure

Second Circuit

Snyder v. Neurological Surgery Practice of Long Island, PLLC, No. 24-CV-06911 (JMW), 2025 WL 1434032 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2025) (Magistrate Judge James M. Wicks). Plaintiff Brian J. Snyder, M.D. is a neurosurgeon who was employed at Neurological Surgery, P.C. d/b/a NSPC Brain & Spine Surgery (“NSPC”). Dr. Snyder brought this action against his former employer seeking to recover payment of benefits under its Employee Stock Ownership Plan (“ESOP”) which he was allegedly deprived of by wrongful termination after his stage-four lung cancer diagnosis. Dr. Snyder seeks damages and declaratory relief and alleges claims for violations of ERISA Sections 502 and 510, along with state law breach of contract claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. In this decision the court granted the motion, dismissing the ERISA claims with prejudice and the state law claims without prejudice. The court began with the ERISA claims. It concluded that the complaint adequately makes its case that defendants engaged in conduct that Section 510 of ERISA was designed to prevent. However, the court went on to state that, “[n]otwithstanding Plaintiffs’ adequate pleading of the ERISA claims, there is an impenetrable obstacle that was created by Dr. Snyder himself that prevents him from seeking relief under ERISA.” This obstacle was that Dr. Snyder was not a participant in the plan by virtue of his decision to receive a $3.4 million payout when he sold his shares and made a 1042 election. The court stressed that the plan and the U.S. Tax Code both clearly prevent plan participation once a 1042 election is made. Moreover, the court disagreed with Dr. Snyder that there is any clear evidence in either his amended complaint or moving papers that defendants intentionally waived the express language of the ESOP that entitles him to receive plan benefits. And because the court found that Dr. Snyder was not a plan participant, it agreed with defendants that irrespective of his otherwise well-pleaded ERISA claims, he is barred from bringing such claims both under 26 U.S.C. § 409(n) and § 3.9 of the ESOP, and the claims under ERISA must be dismissed. The court accordingly granted the motion to dismiss the ERISA claims, and as this deficit is not curable, the court dismissed the ERISA causes of action with prejudice. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of action, and instead opted to dismiss them without prejudice to Dr. Snyder filing a complaint in state court.

Eleventh Circuit

Smith v. Corteva, Inc., No. 5:25-cv-00030-TES, 2025 WL 1462569 (M.D. Ga. May 21, 2025) (Judge Tilman E. Self, III). Dorothy Jean Morton was an employee of DuPont. On or about August 22, 2000, Ms. Morton submitted a beneficiary designation for her 401(k) plan identifying four charities, United Way of Delaware, Inc., the Salvation Army, CARE, and Peninsula-Delaware Conference of the United Methodist Church, as her four intended beneficiaries. Ms. Morton later died, and on January 27, 2025, plaintiff Bonnie Michelle Smith filed this action acting as the administrator of her estate against Corteva, Inc. arguing that the beneficiary form is invalid because it existed only as to Ms. Morton’s plan with DuPont, not with its successor company, Corteva. Under Ms. Smith’s theory, Ms. Morton did not have a valid beneficiary form with the Corteva Plan, and her estate is the proper beneficiary, not the four charities listed on the DuPont designation form. Corteva responded to Ms. Smith’s action by filing a motion to dismiss. It argued that Ms. Smith lacks standing under ERISA as she is not a participant or beneficiary. The court agreed. It explained, “There is no requirement – at least that the Court can find – that ERISA requires a new beneficiary form each time a plan is transferred to a new administrator. Plaintiff does not contend that Morton ever attempted to change the beneficiaries she named – rather, Plaintiff argues that the plan transfers changed the beneficiary designations sua sponte. But, Plaintiff failed to point to any law to support that logic. Instead, it makes much more sense that once a plan participant completes a beneficiary-designation form, that form controls through plan transfers unless the participant specifically revokes that designation or changes the designation through the process required by the plan. That didn’t happen here, and Plaintiff’s arguments otherwise are unavailing.” Under this logic, the court agreed with Corteva that Ms. Smith does not have standing to sue under ERISA, and therefore the court granted the motion to dismiss the complaint, closing the case.

Provider Claims

Second Circuit

Abira Med. Lab., LLC v. Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co., No. 24-2837, __ F. App’x __, 2025 WL 1443016 (2d Cir. May 20, 2025) (Before Circuit Judges Calabresi, Parker, Jr., and Nardini). Plaintiff-appellant Abira Medical Laboratories, LLC brought this suit against Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company alleging that Cigna systematically failed to reimburse laboratory services Abira provided to insured patients. Originally, Abira asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, equitable and promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, violations of Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Practices Act and Connecticut’s Unfair Insurance Practices Act, a claim under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”), violation of the CARES Act, and finally, a claim for payment of benefits under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B). The district court dismissed Abira’s claims with prejudice. Abira concedes that a recent decision out of the Second Circuit forecloses its FFCRA and CARES Act claims. Additionally, Abira withdrew its fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims. Accordingly, Abira’s appeal challenges only the district court’s dismissal of its ERISA and remaining state law claims. To begin, the Second Circuit concluded that Abira failed to allege that it formed either an express or implied agreement with Cigna. Abira’s failure to allege contract formation defeated its breach of contract, Connecticut Unfair Trades Practices Act, Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act, and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of these claims. And, for a similar reason, it also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Abira’s promissory estoppel claim, as a fundamental element of such a claim is the existence of a clear and definite promise, which the Second Circuit determined that Abira failed to allege. As for the laboratory’s unjust enrichment claim, the court of appeals held that in the health insurance context, providers cannot bring unjust enrichment claims against insurance companies based on healthcare services provided to its insureds. Finally, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Abira’s ERISA claim because Abira did not challenge the district court’s finding that it failed to adequately allege any valid assignment of claims from its patients. Abira’s only remaining argument was that the district court improperly dismissed its action with prejudice. However, the court of appeals found this argument unpersuasive given Abira’s failure to file a formal motion requesting leave to amend and its failure to provide details regarding what new facts it would allege to cure the pleading deficiencies identified by the district court. As a result, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court acted within its discretion to dismiss the complaint without leave to amend. For these reasons, the appeals court affirmed the judgment of the district court in its entirety.

Healthcare Justice Coalition DE Corp. v. Cigna Health and Life Ins. Co., No. 3:23-cv-01689 (KAD), 2025 WL 1424905 (D. Conn. May 15, 2025) (Judge Kari A. Dooley). Plaintiff Healthcare Justice Coalition DE Corp. is a corporate debt collector which works with emergency healthcare providers to pursue unpaid or underpaid insurance claims from insurance companies. In this action Healthcare Justice Coalition alleges that Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company has violated the terms of Connecticut’s Surprise Billing Law and avoided paying over $5.3 million in payments to two out-of-network hospitals which assigned plaintiff their reimbursement rights. Plaintiff asserts claims against Cigna under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, premised on these violations, as well as for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and declaratory relief. The court previously granted Cigna’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s original complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint. And Cigna once again filed a motion to dismiss. It argued that the claims are preempted by ERISA, and moreover, that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief. The court addressed the issue of ERISA preemption first. Cigna maintained that ERISA preempts plaintiff’s claims because Cigna’s obligation to pay the healthcare providers can only be determined by reference to the terms of ERISA plans. The court disagreed. It found that ERISA preemption does not apply in this case because the state laws at issue here do not “act exclusively on ERISA plans or require ERISA plans to operate in any particular manner,” and instead “reach a much broader scope of conduct than the administration of ERISA plans.” Additionally, the court noted that none of the state law claims in this action govern a central matter of plan administration, interfere with nationally uniform plan administration, or involve relationships between the core ERISA entities. Rather, the right to payment here derives from state law, namely Connecticut’s Surprise Billing Law, and as a result does not turn on, rely on, or reference the terms of the ERISA plans. For these reasons, the court concluded that plaintiff’s claims are not preempted by ERISA. The court then addressed whether plaintiff plausibly alleged any of its substantive causes of action. Unfortunately for plaintiff, the court found it did not. Its unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims both failed for the same reason: the court concluded that Cigna did not receive a benefit from the hospitals. “Cigna’s duty to its insureds is not to furnish necessaries, i.e. medical care, but to cover the cost of those necessities after the fact. If Cigna had a duty to provide medical care, an unjust enrichment claim would lie – since it has no such a duty, it does not.” As a result, the court concluded that the complaint failed to plead these two claims and therefore granted the motion to dismiss them. The court then discussed the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act claim. As an initial matter, the court referred to a recent decision from the Connecticut Supreme Court which held that a Connecticut Surprise Billing Law violation cannot serve as a predicate for an Unfair Trade Practices Act claim. “Thus, Cigna is correct that if HJC’s CUIPA allegations fail, it ‘cannot fall back on alleged SBL violations to save its CUTPA claim.’” The court then went on to conclude that the allegations did fail because the complaint does not plausibly allege “general business practices,” and instead offers bare assertions and conclusory allegations that Cigna owes it money for treating emergency room patients and has failed to pay up. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss this cause of action too. Finally, the court agreed with Cigna that plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgment cannot survive absent a valid underlying claim of some sort. Thus, the court granted Cigna’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

Ninth Circuit

Fortitude Surgery Center, LLC v. Aetna Health Inc., No. CV-24-02650-PHX-KML, 2025 WL 1432906 (D. Ariz. May 19, 2025) (Judge Krissa M. Lanham). Plaintiff Fortitude Surgery Center LLC brings this action under ERISA and state law against Aetna Health, Inc. and Aetna Life Insurance Company seeking to recover payment for healthcare services it provided to patients insured under Aetna plans. Aetna moved for dismissal of all of Fortitude’s claims. Because the court found that Fortitude failed to identify both the ERISA health plans and the non-ERISA health plans at issue, the court granted the motion to dismiss on that basis, with limited leave to amend. Broadly, the court agreed with Aetna that the complaint as currently stated “provides few meaningful details regarding the basis for Fortitude’s claims.” Notably, it does not detail the individual patients it provided medical care to, the services it provided to them, or information about the healthcare plans they are covered under, let alone the terms of coverage of those plans. Instead, the court concluded that the complaint “consists of vague and conclusory allegations regarding interactions between Fortitude and Aetna,” which it held are insufficient to state plausible claims for relief under either federal or state law. Because the complaint, even viewed in the light most favorable to Fortitude, lacks these necessary details to sufficiently allege claims for relief, the court agreed with Aetna that the vague allegations made by Fortitude could not survive a motion to dismiss in their current form. Nevertheless, as these shortcomings are not clearly incurable through amendment, the court did not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but rather allowed Fortitude the opportunity to amend its claims (except for its claim under Arizona’s Prompt Pay Act, as the statute does not confer a private right of action).

Statute of Limitations

Tenth Circuit

J.H. v. Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Ins., No. 24-4052, __ F. 4th __, 2025 WL 1450609 (10th Cir. May 21, 2025) (Before Circuit Judges Hartz, Moritz, and Rossman). Plaintiff J.H. sued her health insurance provider, Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance Company, under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA to challenge its denial of her claim for benefits for her son’s yearlong stay at a residential mental health treatment center. J.H.’s policy states that legal or equitable actions to recover from the plan must be brought within “three years from the time written proof of loss” must be furnished to Anthem, and also that civil actions under ERISA Section 502(a) must be brought “within one year of the grievance or appeal decision.” J.H. filed her complaint one year and nine months after she exhausted the appeals process. Anthem moved to dismiss J.H.’s action on the ground that her claim for benefits was time-barred under the plan’s one-year limitations period for Section 502(a) actions. The district court agreed and granted Anthem’s motion. It rejected J.H.’s argument that the three-year limitations period also contained in the plan applied. J.H. appealed the district court’s decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. J.H. did not dispute the reasonableness of the plan’s limitations period. Instead, J.H. argued that the plan is ambiguous as to whether the one-year or three-year limitation period applies. Given this ambiguity, she argued, she is entitled to the more generous three-year period because ambiguities must be construed in her favor. The Tenth Circuit was not persuaded. It disagreed with J.H. that the two limitation provisions are contradictory. To the contrary, the appeals court held that J.H.’s Section 502(a)(1)(B) suit was subject to both periods and there is no problem or conflict between the two provisions. “The three-year provision warns the insured to file suit within three years of when the proof of loss had to be furnished to Anthem. The one-year provision simply adds another deadline; it warns the insured to file suit within a year of the grievance or appeal decision. If the insured files suit after either deadline, the claim is barred.” In sum, the appellate court found the provisions to be a both/and situation rather than an either/or situation, stating, “[t]here is no conflict or inconsistency here, because the two deadlines are triggered by different events.” The court added that the two limitations periods are just like any other conditions placed on a claim, and thus all the conditions must be met. “If there are four conditions, the fact that three conditions are met does not mean that the fourth condition can be ignored. Nor does it mean that the fourth condition is inconsistent with the other three.” The bottom line, according to the court of appeals, is that both provisions apply at the same time, and because a reasonable person would have understood that they needed to bring a Section 502(a) action within one year of the appeal decision, there is no ambiguity present. Because J.H. did not file her lawsuit within that one-year window, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that her action was time-barred. Accordingly, the lower court’s dismissal was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.

Venue

Third Circuit

Baker v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-1360, 2025 WL 1456916 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2025) (Judge William S. Stickman IV). Plaintiff Barbara A. Baker filed this putative class action against her former employer, 7-Eleven, Inc., alleging that the annual $720 tobacco surcharge it imposes on employees who use tobacco products violates ERISA. Before the court here was a motion to transfer filed by 7-Eleven. The company sought to move the case to the Northern District of Texas based on the terms of the forum selection clause in its plan. The Northern District of Texas is also where 7-Eleven is headquartered and where it administers its employee benefit plans. The court concluded that the forum selection clause “is reasonable under the circumstances and, therefore, is valid.” The court further held that forum selection clauses are permissible in the ERISA plan context and that they do not make it unduly inconvenient for the plaintiff to litigate or have access to the courts. Finally, the court determined that there is no evidence that the forum selection clause was procured by fraud or undue influence. Thus, the court found the forum selection clause “fundamentally fair” and by extension valid and enforceable. Having determined that the forum selection clause is valid and enforceable, the court quickly addressed whether any extraordinary circumstances were present here which weighed against enforcing it. It found none. To the contrary, the court determined that the Northern District of Texas is in just as good a position as the Western District of Pennsylvania to resolve the federal ERISA issues raised in this putative class action that will apply to plan participants nationwide. For these reasons, the court granted 7-Eleven’s motion to transfer.

Dan C. v. Directors Guild of America – Producer Health Plan, No. 24-3203, __ F. App’x __, 2025 WL 1419920 (9th Cir. May 16, 2025) (Before Circuit Judges Owens, Bennett, and H.A. Thomas)

This week’s notable decision is an appellate victory by Kantor & Kantor in a case involving a troubled child who received intensive mental health treatment. In its decision the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a ruling that the child’s treatment was medically necessary, and in the process offered useful information to future litigants in addressing both standard of review and “full and fair” claim review issues.

The plaintiff was Dan C., who had a son named R.C. (Pseudonyms were used to protect the son, who was a minor.) Dan C. was a participant in the Directors Guild of America – Producer Health Plan, an ERISA-governed self-funded multiemployer welfare benefit plan.

Unfortunately, R.C. had a challenging start to his life. He was born in Haiti, and placed in a orphanage as an infant, where he was malnourished. Dan C. and his wife adopted R.C. when he was three years old. Unfortunately, R.C. had difficulty regulating his emotions, was occasionally violent and destructive, and could not function adequately in school. R.C.’s adoptive parents sought treatment from numerous mental health professionals, who prescribed medication and attempted various types of therapy. These treatments were ineffective, and as a result R.C.’s providers ultimately recommended that R.C. undergo residential treatment.

During this treatment R.C. continued to have problems, including a lack of impulse control, violence, and other negative behavior. Regardless, Anthem Blue Cross, the Plan’s claim administrator, only approved benefits for three days of treatment. After that, Anthem contended that R.C.’s treatment was no longer medically necessary under the Plan and its guidelines.

Dan C. appealed, but to no avail. The benefits committee of the Plan’s board of trustees upheld the decision, and Dan C. was forced to file suit in federal court, alleging two claims for relief: one for plan benefits under ERISA Section 1132(a)(1)(B), and one for breach of fiduciary duty under Section 1132(a)(3).

After briefing and a hearing, the district court granted judgment to Dan C. on both claims under de novo review. On Dan C.’s first claim for benefits, the court ruled that the record showed R.C.’s “risky and dangerous behavior, impaired judgment, and emotional difficulties that could not have been managed without residential treatment, due to his violent and threatening nature and impaired daily functioning.”

The district court further found that Dan C. had not received a full and fair review. It ruled that the Plan disregarded relevant evidence, did not adequately engage with medical records, and failed to consult with R.C.’s treatment providers. Finally, the district court granted judgment on Dan C.’s second claim for relief, ruling that the Plan had breached its fiduciary duty by mishandling his benefit claim. (Your ERISA Watch covered this decision in its April 17, 2024 edition.)

The Plan appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Its primary argument on appeal was that the district court erred by using de novo review. According to the Plan, the district court should have used the more deferential abuse of discretion standard of review because the plan documents gave the board of trustees discretionary authority to make benefit determinations.

However, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Dan C. that de novo review was appropriate because the board “did not unambiguously ‘delegat[e] its discretionary authority’ to the Board’s Benefits Committee, which made the final decision at issue here.” The court stated that although “the Plan delegates the task of ‘determining claims appeals’ to the Committee and provides that the Committee ‘will have discretion to deny or grant the appeal in whole or part,’ this language falls short of the unambiguous delegation contemplated by our precedent.” This was because “[n]one of the Plan’s provisions expressly ‘grant [the Committee] any power to construe the terms of the plan[.]’”

Next, the Plan argued that the district court erred by evaluating “clinical criteria” instead of using the Plan’s definition of medical necessity. However, the Ninth Circuit observed that the district court simply examined the reasons offered by the Plan in denying Dan C.’s benefit claim, which involved a discussion of clinical criteria. Furthermore, those criteria were directly relevant to the two most contested medical necessity elements, i.e., whether R.C.’s “continued residential treatment was (1) inconsistent with generally accepted medical practice and (2) not the most cost-efficient.”

The Ninth Circuit further ruled that because the record demonstrated R.C.’s continued struggles during residential treatment, “[i]t…was not clear error for the district court to find, on the administrative record before it, that R.C. did pose a danger to himself and others and did experience serious problems with functioning ‘that could not have been managed without residential treatment.’”

Moreover, the appellate court ruled that even if the abuse of discretion standard of review applied, Dan C. did not receive a full and fair review because of the Plan’s “fundamental failure to explain to Plaintiff that the Plan’s operative definition of medical necessity required attempting lower levels of care – namely, an intensive outpatient program (‘IOP’) or partial hospitalized program (‘PHP’) – before residential treatment.” The Ninth Circuit ruled that the Plan’s “inadequate notice” regarding this requirement “deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to ‘answer[] in time’ the Plan’s questions about lower levels of care, to engage in ‘meaningful dialogue’ on the issue of medical necessity, and to receive a ‘full and fair’ review of the denial of his claim.”

As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of judgment in Dan C.’s favor on his claim for plan benefits. It was not a complete success for Dan C., however, as the appellate court reversed the district court’s entry of judgment in his favor on his breach of fiduciary duty claim. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court did not award any relief under that claim that was distinct from the relief it granted to Dan C. under his first claim for payment of plan benefits. Thus, “[b]ecause Plaintiff’s ‘claim under § 1132(a)(1)(B) … afford[ed] adequate relief’ for his injury, ‘relief is not available [to him] under § 1132(a)(3).’”

As the court acknowledged, however, this reversal was largely inconsequential because it “does not impact Plaintiff’s recovery” and would not “have any material impact” on his simultaneously pending request for attorney’s fees. Thus, the appeal was a resounding success for Dan C., whose benefit claims for his son’s treatment will now be approved on remand.

(Plaintiff Dan C. was represented on appeal by Kantor & Kantor attorneys Glenn R. Kantor and Your ERISA Watch co-editor Peter S. Sessions. In the district court Dan C. was represented by David M. Lilienstein and Katie J. Spielman of DL Law Group.)

Below is a summary of this past week’s notable ERISA decisions by subject matter and jurisdiction.

Attorneys’ Fees

Tenth Circuit

M.S. v. Premera Blue Cross, No. 2:19-cv-199-DAK, 2025 WL 1370215 (D. Utah May 12, 2025) (Judge Dale A. Kimball). This action was brought by the parents of a minor child with autism seeking coverage for the treatment of their child under the family’s healthcare plan. The family sued their plan, the plan sponsor, Microsoft, and the claims administrator, Premera Blue Cross, alleging claims for payment of benefits, violation of ERISA’s mental health parity provisions, and for statutory penalties for failure to produce documents under which the plan was established or operated in violation of ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(A), (c). At the summary judgment stage the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the benefits claim, but in favor of plaintiffs on both their Parity Act and statutory penalties claims. It also awarded plaintiffs attorneys’ fees totaling $69,240 and costs of $400. Defendants challenged the district court’s ruling, to the extent it was unfavorable to them, in an appeal to the Tenth Circuit. In its decision the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs on their Parity Act claim and remanded to the district court to dismiss the claim for lack of standing. However, the Tenth Circuit’s decision was not all bad news for the plaintiffs. The court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs on their statutory penalties claim, holding that defendants were not required to provide the family with certain medical policies, but were statutorily required to provide them with the administrative services agreement between the plan sponsor, Microsoft, and Premera Blue Cross, the claims administrator. The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s full award of $123,100 in statutory penalties. It also reviewed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs and affirmed the award in full. (You can read Your ERISA Watch’s full coverage of the Tenth Circuit’s decision, featured as the case of the week, in our October 9, 2024 issue). On remand from the Tenth Circuit, plaintiffs moved for an additional award of attorneys’ fees and costs for the time and effort incurred on appeal. In this decision the court followed the direction of the Tenth Circuit to dismiss plaintiffs’ Mental Health Parity Act claim for lack of standing, and granted plaintiffs’ motion for “reasonable fees and costs on appeal in the amount of $38,700.00” pursuant to Section 502(g)(1). Defendants argued that plaintiffs did not achieve “some degree of success” on appeal because the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court on the Parity Act claim and part of the statutory penalties claim. They further argued that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the Tenth Circuit’s Cardoza factors. The court, however, did not agree with defendants. Contrary to their assertions, the court held that plaintiffs concluded the appeal with the same judgment award in their favor and therefore achieved the requisite degree of success on appeal to seek attorneys’ fees on appeal. In addition, the court found that the Cardoza factors support an award of additional attorneys’ fees for the appeal. It concluded that defendants had some degree of culpability for failing to turn over the administrative services agreement “because it was plainly in the universe of documents that were required to be provided upon request. The refusal to turn over the document and subject itself to statutory penalties is more than mere procedural deficiencies or irregularities. The statutory penalties demonstrate culpability on Defendants’ part, and this factor weighs in favor of an award of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs.” Further, there was no question that defendants could satisfy an award of fees. The court also wished to incentivize defendants and other insurers and plans to produce administrative services agreements in similar circumstances, and thus this factor too weighed in plaintiffs’ favor. Plaintiffs, the court added, also resolved a significant legal question on appeal by obtaining a ruling of first impression from the Tenth Circuit establishing clearly that administrative services agreements are required to be produced under 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4). The last Cardoza factor concerns the relative merits of the parties’ positions, and the court was confident that plaintiffs achieved enough success on appeal to have the judgment award undisturbed. The court thus found that this factor too supported an award of attorneys’ fees on appeal. Defendants did not challenge the $600 hourly rate of attorney Brian King or the 64.5 hours incurred on appeal. The court agreed that the billable hourly rate and amount of time spent on appeal were reasonable. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiffs’ fee motion and awarded them their full requested fees and costs on appeal.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Seventh Circuit

Lard v. Marmon Holdings, Inc., No. 22 cv 04332, 2025 WL 1383269 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2025) (Judge Jeffrey I. Cummings). In this breach of fiduciary duty action seven participants of the Marmon Employees’ Retirement Plan allege that its fiduciaries mismanaged the plan, acted imprudently, and failed to monitor one another by selecting and retaining costly and underperforming proprietary Marmon target date funds as investment options in the plan in lieu of superior commercial alternatives. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Their motion to dismiss was granted by the court in this decision. The court agreed with defendants that the allegations in the complaint fail to plausibly support the idea that the fiduciaries breached their duties by selecting and retaining the investments in question. Attached to the second amended complaint was an exhibit which showed that the relevant Marmon target date funds outperformed many of the comparator funds. The court stated that the depiction of performance shown in this exhibit “controls over the contrary allegations in the SAC itself.” Furthermore, the court agreed with defendants that the period of underperformance plaintiffs highlighted – two years – is simply too short to demonstrate sustained issues which a prudent fiduciary would have obviously investigated. Simply put, the court held that short term performance is not a reliable indicator of overall performance or a predictor of future performance. The court added that to the extent plaintiffs showed underperformance as compared with their closest comparator funds, such underperformance was de minimis, approximately two percent. Plaintiffs also alleged that the retention of the target date funds was imprudent because it ran afoul of certain provisions of the plan’s investment policy statement (“IPS”). But the court was not persuaded, noting the quoted portion of the IPS describes benchmark indices for the plan’s existing investment funds and “does not speak to the selection of funds.” The court thus found that plaintiffs failed to properly allege their claims for fiduciary breach. Absent an underlying viable fiduciary breach claim, the court also dismissed the derivative failure to monitor claim. Accordingly, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, although its dismissal was without prejudice to plaintiffs amending their complaint.

Class Actions

First Circuit

Monteiro v. The Children’s Hospital Corp., No. 1:22-cv-10069-JEK, 2025 WL 1367413 (D. Mass. May 12, 2025) (Judge Julia E. Kobick). Four participants of the Children’s Hospital Corporation Tax-Deferred Annuity Plan filed this putative ERISA class action against the plan’s fiduciaries alleging they breached their fiduciary duties by retaining imprudent investments and permitting excessive plan costs. Following extensive discovery, the parties participated in private meditation. In April of 2025 the parties executed a settlement agreement with a proposed settlement of $3 million. Pending before the court was plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for preliminary approval of that class action settlement. In this decision the court granted the motion, preliminarily certified the proposed class, preliminarily approved of the proposed settlement, approved of the proposed notice, appointed class counsel and class representatives, and scheduled the final approval fairness hearing. To begin, the court held that plaintiffs sufficiently satisfied the requirements of Rule 23. Because the class of participants and beneficiaries during the class period consists of over 20,000 people, the court concluded that joinder of all members is impracticable and Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement was satisfied. The court further determined that there are many questions of law and fact that are common to all class members including whether the defendants breached certain fiduciaries duties owed to the plan and, if so, whether the plan suffered losses because of those breaches. Moreover, the court found that the named plaintiffs are typical of the other class members as their claims concern the same conduct that forms the basis of claims of the absent class members. The court was also confident that the representative parties would adequately protect the interests of the class because the plaintiffs’ interests are not in conflict with those of any of the class members’ and because counsel at Miller Shah LLP and Capozzi Adler, P.C. have “properly and vigorously” represented the class with their “extensive experience litigating ERISA cases.” Finally, the court found that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) are satisfied because breach of fiduciary duty actions like this one, affecting the members of a large class of beneficiaries, are the classic example of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) cases. For these reasons the court preliminarily certified the class. It then approved preliminarily the terms of the $3 million settlement. The court agreed with plaintiffs that the settlement was the result of an informed arm’s length negotiation, and that the settlement amount provides adequate relief to the class when compared to the costs, risks, and delays of continued litigation. The court was additionally satisfied that the proposed settlement will treat class members equitably because each member’s allocation of the settlement will be proportional to their investments in the plan. The court found no issue with the contents or proposed method of distribution of the settlement notice and therefore approved it. Finally, the named plaintiffs were appointed class representatives, their counsel was appointed class counsel, and the parties’ desired professional claims administrator, Strategic Claims Services, was appointed the settlement administrator.

Disability Benefit Claims

Sixth Circuit

Goodwin v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 24-3321, __ F. 4th __, 2025 WL 1403640 (6th Cir. May 15, 2025) (Before Circuit Judges Thapar, Nalbandian, and Davis). Plaintiff-appellant Brandi Goodwin worked as a nursing assistant at a hospital until she contracted COVID-19 and needed to stop working. Ms. Goodwin applied for short-term disability benefits, citing shortness of breath and chest pain as her disabling symptoms. Unum Life Insurance Company of America approved Ms. Goodwin’s short-term disability claim and paid her benefits for the maximum period available under the short-term policy. Ms. Goodwin’s medical issues persisted. At the Cleveland Clinic she was diagnosed with postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (“POTS”), and it was the opinion of her treating neurologist that Ms. Goodwin couldn’t return to work. Nevertheless, Unum denied Ms. Goodwin’s claim for long-term disability benefits. It concluded that her vertigo diagnosis was a pre-existing condition, excluded from coverage under the policy, and that her remaining health problems did not render her disabled, as defined by the policy. Unum’s reviewing professionals referred to normal pulmonary function test results and chest X-ray results to observe that Ms. Goodwin had improved and was no longer functionally impaired from performing the duties of her work. Given these results, Unum’s reviewers determined that Ms. Goodwin’s chest pain, shortness of breath, and related post-COVID complaints were not borne out by the medical testing. Ms. Goodwin challenged Unum’s denial during an administrative appeal, but Unum upheld its decision, which prompted her to pursue litigation. The parties each moved for judgment on the administrative record. The district court concluded that Unum had not abused its discretion in denying the claim and therefore upheld its decision and granted judgment in its favor. Ms. Goodwin appealed. In this decision the Sixth Circuit concluded that Unum’s denial was both procedurally and substantively sound and thus affirmed the district court’s judgment. To begin, the Sixth Circuit addressed Ms. Goodwin’s procedural arguments. She maintained that Unum cherry-picked only the evidence in her file which supported its position, without considering all the evidence that cut against its denial. The appeals court disagreed, saying, “Unum and its file reviewers did engage with that evidence. They noted the reports of Goodwin’s irregular heart rates, exercise stress test results, POTS diagnosis, shortness of breath issues, and cognitive impairment.” Ms. Goodwin next argued that Unum failed to explain why it approved her short-term disability benefit claim but denied her claim for long-term disability benefits. Although Unum did not expressly state it was changing its disability determination, the Sixth Circuit nevertheless concluded that its decision to do so was permissible given new test results which justified the change. Ms. Goodwin also contended that Unum ignored the opinions of her treating providers. The Sixth Circuit responded to this argument by noting that one of the providers who evaluated Ms. Goodwin in person, a nurse practitioner, actually advised that she could return to work. Moreover, to the extent the rest of her treating doctors believed Ms. Goodwin was disabled, the court stressed that Unum was not required to defer to those opinions, so “this factor doesn’t cut against Unum.” As for her last procedural argument, Ms. Goodwin posited that Unum’s decision to deny benefits was the result of its conflict of interest. However, the Sixth Circuit was not receptive to this argument as it was not tied to any concrete or direct evidence that the conflict materially affected Unum’s decision. For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit was confident that Unum’s decision to deny Ms. Goodwin’s long-term disability benefits was procedurally reasonable. The court therefore moved on to consider whether it was also substantially so. It found it was. “Substantial evidence in the administrative record supports Unum’s decision to deny Goodwin long-term disability benefits. The numerous treatment records cited by Goodwin’s file reviewers documenting her exercise, normal test results, and normal performance on physical examinations are the most obvious examples. The professional opinions of Goodwin’s file reviewers bolster this finding.” Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit determined that Unum’s denial was both procedurally and substantively reasonable, and thus affirmed.

Ninth Circuit

McDermott v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., No. C23-5676 BHS, 2025 WL 1360300 (W.D. Wash. May 9, 2025) (Judge Laura M. Provinzino). Plaintiff Courtney McDermott brought this action against Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada to challenge its denial of her claim for long-term disability benefits. Ms. McDermott, a clinical pharmacist, began experiencing unpredictable seizures and other severe symptoms like facial spasms, sweating, and hallucinations in early 2021. To try and reach a diagnosis Ms. McDermott went to the Cleveland Clinic, saw a host of doctors, and underwent various diagnostic tests and scans. The doctors could not conclusively say what was wrong with her. Some thought that functional neurological disorder (“FND”) was the most likely cause of her symptoms, others thought they were autoimmune related, while still more maintained that they could not rule out a neurological etiology. Sun Life latched on to the FND diagnosis, which is defined as a mental illness under the DSM-5-TR. Under the policy, if a condition is even partly psychological, it is a mental illness. Moreover, the policy requires psychological illnesses to be treated by psychiatric specialists. Specifically, the policy requires claimants to be under the continuing care of a physician with the “most appropriate specialty” to evaluate, manage or treat that individual’s condition. Given these provisions of the plan, Sun Life denied Ms. McDermott’s claim. Although it recognized that Ms. McDermott was not able to work due to her FND, the insurer nevertheless found that she was ineligible for benefits because she was being treated by a naturopath, not a mental health professional. Following an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Ms. McDermott brought this action seeking judicial review of Sun Life’s decision. Ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the record under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, the court concluded that Ms. McDermott failed to carry her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to the benefits under the policy. The court concluded that Ms. McDermott’s disability is caused in substantial part by a psychological disorder and that she was not entitled to the benefits because she did not receive continuing care from the most appropriate specialist for her illness. The court noted that Ms. McDermott was thoroughly evaluated by a team of doctors for nearly two years and those doctors believed her symptoms to be caused, at least in part, by FND. Thus, the court determined that her disabling condition is at least partially psychological. Moreover, the court agreed with Sun Life that Ms. McDermott’s primary treating provider was not the appropriate specialist for the treatment of her psychiatric illness. For these reasons, the court found that Ms. McDermott failed to meet the policy’s conditions for payment of benefits, and accordingly upheld the denial and entered judgment in favor of Sun Life.

Mendoza v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 3:24-cv-00834-H-VET, 2025 WL 1393871 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2025) (Judge Marilyn L. Huff). In January of 2021 plaintiff Siam Mendoza was hospitalized for COVID-like symptoms, including inflammation of the lungs, severe hypoxia with saturation levels as low as 70%, and ventricular systolic dysfunction causing his heart to pump blood ineffectively. Eventually doctors stabilized Mr. Mendoza, and following surgical procedures his cardiac issues improved. But many of Mr. Mendoza’s issues persisted. Despite returning to his work as a senior insurance underwriting consultant in November 2021, Mr. Mendoza was still not doing well. He had problems at work which he attributed to his continuing symptoms. Ultimately, Mr. Mendoza stopped working and applied for disability benefits. After exhausting short-term disability benefits, he applied for long-term disability benefits. Defendant First Unum Life Insurance Company denied his claim, stating that its reviewing doctors did not believe that the record supported that he was precluded from performing his sedentary job duties for the entirety of the elimination period. After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Mr. Mendoza brought this action to challenge First Unum’s denial. The parties filed cross-motions for judgment under Rule 52 based on the administrative record. Mr. Mendoza argued that he was entitled to the benefits because he lacked the physical stamina and cognitive capacity to perform the occupational demands of his job. First Unum responded that its decision to deny benefits during this time period was correct and it is entitled to judgment in its favor. In this decision the court conducted a de novo review and determined that Mr. Mendoza could not meet his burden of proving entitlement to long-term disability benefits. The court broke down its analysis into four parts: (1) whether any physical symptoms including cardiac issues prevented Mr. Mendoza from performing the duties of his work; (2) whether his psychiatric symptoms, insomnia, and headaches did; (3) whether he could not work due to fatigue; and (4) whether cognitive impairments including brain fog and concentration deficits were disabling under the policy. To begin, the court held that Mr. Mendoza’s cardiac function was normalized following his surgical procedures and therefore it would not preclude sedentary work capacity. Next, the court found there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that major depressive disorder, anxiety, insomnia, and headaches prevented Mr. Mendoza from performing the essential requirements of his occupation. As for fatigue, the court concluded that Mr. Mendoza’s narrative of his exhaustion was not well supported by other evidence in the record and he could offer no explanation for this apparent inconsistency. And, although Mr. Mendoza complained consistently of cognitive deficits of long COVID, the court zeroed in on the results of neuropsychological evaluations performed by his treating neurologist which found that his processing and comprehension skills were average and within normal limits. In light of these results the court could not say that cognitive issues prevented Mr. Mendoza from performing the material and substantive duties of his occupation. Finally, the court addressed Mr. Mendoza’s remaining arguments. He argued that First Unum approved his short-term disability benefits for largely the same time frame as the elimination period in question but failed to distinguish this decision with its denial of his long-term disability benefit claim. The court concluded that the two plans were governed by different terms which could explain the different outcomes in the respective claims. Mr. Mendoza also emphasized his personal narrative that he submitted with his appeal speaking to the severity of his fatigue, memory loss, and forgetfulness. In response the court stated that the personal narrative could not overcome the fact that there was insufficient medical evidence of functional disability within the administrative record. Finally, Mr. Mendoza maintained that First Unum improperly relied on reviewing physicians that never examined him in person to support its denial. The court replied that its review was de novo and therefore not reliant on First Unum’s decision. For these reasons the court granted First Unum’s motion for judgment and denied Mr. Mendoza’s motion for judgment.

ERISA Preemption

Fifth Circuit

Prime Healthcare Serv. Mesquite v. Cigna Healthcare of Tex., Inc., No. 3:25-CV-0316-D, 2025 WL 1397165 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2025) (Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater), Prime Healthcare Serv. Mesquite v. Cigna Healthcare of Tex., Inc., No. 3:24-CV-3213-D, 2025 WL 1397208 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2025) (Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater). The plaintiffs in these two actions are a group of acute care hospitals in Dallas, Texas. The hospitals filed two lawsuits against Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company in state court. In the first action Prime Healthcare is seeking to recover payments for their out-of-network services provided to 100 patients insured under healthcare plans issued or administered by Cigna. In the second action, it seeks to recover payments for their out-of-network services provided to 67 different patients with healthcare plans insured or administered by Cigna. Cigna removed both actions to federal court when it realized that a substantial percentage of the claims in each lawsuit related to ERISA-governed healthcare plans. In response to Cigna’s removal, plaintiffs amended their complaints and voluntarily removed the state law claims of those patients whom Cigna identified as receiving their health insurance through ERISA-governed plans. The hospitals further stipulated that to the extent there were any further patients with ERISA plans whom they missed, they would not pursue those claims either. Instead, for both lawsuits, the hospitals strictly chose to pursue state law claims for reimbursement relating to plans not governed by ERISA. Plaintiffs then moved to remand their actions against Cigna back to state court. In two nearly identical decisions issued this week the court granted plaintiffs’ motions to remand. The court recognized that under the well-pleaded complaint rule the hospitals are permitted to choose not to pursue recovery on any claims that involve ERISA-governed health benefit plans in order to avoid federal jurisdiction. Because the hospitals removed the claims involving ERISA plans from their complaints, the court agreed with them that ERISA preemption no longer applies. Moreover, the court saw no reason to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, finding instead that remand would best promote the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. For this reason, the court granted the hospitals’ motions to send their actions back to state court.

Tenth Circuit

Long v. Blue Shield of Cal., No. 24-cv-03352-PAB-CYC, 2025 WL 1397581 (D. Colo. May 14, 2025) (Magistrate Judge Cyrus Y. Chung). Pro se plaintiff Jacob C. Long receives health insurance under a policy with Blue Shield of California governed by ERISA. Mr. Long received medical care for which he paid out of pocket. He then submitted claims to Blue Shield for reimbursement. Although Mr. Long eventually received reimbursement checks from defendant for some of his claims, others were never processed and remain unpaid. As a result, he commenced this action seeking payment of those claims. Mr. Long asserted three state law causes of action against Blue Shield: breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and bad faith denial of insurance claim. Blue Shield moved for dismissal, contending that these state law claims are preempted by ERISA. Magistrate Judge Cyrus Y. Chung issued this report and recommendation recommending the court dismiss the claims as preempted, but without prejudice so that Mr. Long may replead to assert causes of action under ERISA Section 502(a). Magistrate Chung’s discussion of preemption was short and straightforward. Because there is no question that Mr. Long’s plan is governed by ERISA, and no dispute that he seeks payment of benefits under that plan, it was obvious to Judge Chung that his state law causes of action are preempted by the federal statute. Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge disliked defendant’s suggestion that Mr. Long’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice. Doing so, he wrote, “would undermine the purposes of ERISA.” Instead, Judge Chung recommended the court grant Mr. Long the opportunity to assert claims under ERISA.

Life Insurance & AD&D Benefit Claims

First Circuit

Slim v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 24-1162(GMM), 2025 WL 1413973 (D.P.R. May 15, 2025) (Judge Gina R. Méndez-Miró). Plaintiff Jack Slim is a general manager at the El Conquistador Resort and is employed by Royal Blue Hospitality, LLC. As part of his employment with Royal Blue, Mr. Slim was eligible to elect certain employee benefits for himself and his family, including the opportunity to enroll in a voluntary spouse life insurance plan for his wife Stephanie. Mr. Slim enrolled Stephanie in the plan and elected to increase coverage up to the maximum of $250,000. Under the plan, supplemental coverage elections beyond the guaranteed issue amount of $30,000 require documentary submission of “evidence of good health.” Mr. Slim did not comply with the plan’s insurability requirement. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, Life Insurance Company of North America (“LINA”), accepted the premiums that Royal Blue deducted from Mr. Slim’s earnings for his wife’s supplemental life insurance coverage. Sadly, Stephanie died on February 16, 2023. After her death, Mr. Slim submitted a claim for voluntary supplemental insurance benefits in the amount of $250,000. LINA ultimately paid Mr. Slim just the $30,000 in guaranteed benefits. It denied his claim above and beyond that amount for failure to submit the required evidence of good health. Mr. Slim sued both LINA and Royal Blue to challenge the lower payment of life insurance benefits. Although he originally asserted claims for benefits and fiduciary breaches, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the fiduciary breach claims. Before the court here were the parties’ motions for judgment on the administrative record on the remaining cause of action under Section 502(a)(1)(B). As an initial matter, the court concluded that the plan grants LINA discretionary authority to adjudicate claims for benefits. “Hence, the Court must determine whether LINA’s decision, as the Claim Fiduciary, is arbitrary and capricious or, looked at from another angle, whether that decision is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence on the full record.” With the standard of review set, the court began by assessing Mr. Slim’s claim as to LINA. The court began by stating “that to obtain the supplemental coverage the Plan unequivocally requires proof that the spouse satisfies the Insurability Requirement.” Here, there was no dispute that Mr. Slim did not meet this requirement. In fact, the record clearly showed that it was only after Stephanie’s death that LINA received a copy of an evidence of insurability form. Thus, the court was forced to agree with LINA that, however unfair, Mr. Slim was not entitled to supplemental coverage because he failed to provide evidence of insurability as required by the plan. The court further disagreed with Mr. Slim that LINA waived the requirement of evidence of insurability through its collection of premiums. “Unfortunately for Slim, such contention finds no support in the Administrative Record, nor in the applicable law.” To the contrary, the court explained that established precedent cuts against Mr. Slim’s waiver argument. Instead, the sole remedy for LINA’s action is a refund of the premiums that were deducted, not a finding that the denial of benefits under the clear terms of the plan was arbitrary and capricious. The court therefore entered judgment in favor of LINA. It then quickly took a look at the claim as to Royal Blue. Without much fuss the court concluded that Royal Blue was not the proper defendant to his wrongful denial of benefits claim, as it played no role in the decision making. Instead, LINA made all eligibility determinations as to Mr. Slim’s requested spousal supplemental coverage. Therefore, Royal Blue was dismissed as a defendant. Finally, because the court affirmed the administrative decision to deny benefits, it denied Mr. Slim’s motion for judgment.

Medical Benefit Claims

Ninth Circuit

Pessano v. Blue Cross of Cal., No. 1:24-cv-01189-JLT-EPG, 2025 WL 1419743 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) (Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean). Shortly after she was born, Calliope Pessano-Maldonado required emergency air ambulance transportation for medical treatment. In this ERISA action, the now two-year-old’s mother, Emily Pessano, sued Blue Cross of California to pay for the cost of that transportation. Luckily, the parties were able to reach a settlement wherein Blue Cross will pay the costs to the air ambulance company, REACH, plus Ms. Pessano’s attorneys’ fees and costs. Ms. Pessano therefore filed an unopposed petition for approval of minor’s compromise. The presiding district court judge referred this petition to the magistrate judge to prepare a report and recommendation. In this report and recommendation Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean recommended the court grant Ms. Pessano’s petition. Upon review, and under the circumstances, Judge Grosjean concluded that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in Calliope’s best interests. “Notably, Plaintiffs’ complaint only sought coverage for Calliope’s air transportation costs, and under the settlement, Defendant will pay a sufficient amount to more than cover the amount that REACH currently seeks, which has been lowered from the original billed amount after negotiation with Plaintiffs’ counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiffs will receive everything that they could have hoped for as far as legal relief.” Judge Grosjean was thus satisfied that the settlement represents a just and favorable outcome because the family will not have to pay the air ambulance bill. Judge Grosjean therefore recommended the court approve the petition for approval of minor’s compromise and direct Blue Cross of California to pay the settlement amount.

Pleading Issues & Procedure

Third Circuit

Muhammad v. Shelton, No. 24-3178, __ F. App’x __, 2025 WL 1409475 (3d Cir. May 15, 2025) (Before Circuit Judges Restrepo, Freeman, and Nygaard). In late 2023, Lukunda Muhammad filed a pro se complaint naming the Living Trust of Lukunda Muhammad as the sole plaintiff alleging claims against several individuals and entities in connection with certain pension benefits he did not receive. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, explaining to Mr. Muhammad that an entity cannot represent itself and that he needed to secure counsel. The district court warned that failing to do so would result in dismissal with prejudice. Mr. Muhammad did not heed the district court’s warning, and after more than six months had elapsed from the court’s initial order of dismissal, the court issued a final order dismissing the case with prejudice. Mr. Muhammad appealed. The Third Circuit summarily affirmed in this decision. The court of appeals stated that the “District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Muhammad’s complaint with prejudice. It is well-settled that ‘artificial entities’ like corporations and trusts ‘may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.’” Thus, the Third Circuit found that the lower court appropriately advised Mr. Muhammad that he needed to find an attorney to assume control of the litigation. Mr. Muhammad did not do so, therefore the appeals court held that the district court committed no error by dismissing the case with prejudice.

Provider Claims

Second Circuit

Guardian Flight LLC v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 3:24-cv-00680-MPS, 2025 WL 1399145 (D. Conn. May 14, 2025) (Judge Michael P. Shea). Six out-of-network air ambulance companies brought this action against Aetna Life Insurance Company, Aetna Health and Life Insurance Company, and Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company to enforce Independent Dispute Resolution (“IDR”) determinations under the No Surprises Act. In addition, plaintiffs also allege violations under ERISA and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court denied defendants’ motion, except with respect to plaintiffs’ claim for equitable relief under ERISA Section 502(a)(3). Beginning with the No Surprises Act, the court found that the statute creates a private cause of action to enforce IDR award payments as “[a]ny other interpretation would render IDR awards meaningless.” Next, the court discussed plaintiffs’ claims for benefits under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B). The court held that plaintiffs have constitutional Article III standing to pursue their claim under Section 502(a)(1)(B) as assignees, and also that they stated a plausible claim for wrongful denial of benefits under this provision. The court agreed with the air ambulance companies that the No Surprises Act is not “some separate or standalone obligation,” and that it does not “create an independent payment obligation untethered to ERISA or ERISA regulated health plans.” The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss the Section 502(a)(1)(B) claim. However, it did dismiss the equitable relief claim under Section 502(a)(3). The court determined that plaintiffs’ requested relief requiring defendants to comply with ERISA and the No Surprises Act by paying all future IDR awards within thirty days, was “in essence, a claim for monetary compensation” which “falls comfortably within the scope of § 502(a)(1)(B).” Accordingly, the court dismissed the claim for equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3). Finally, the court determined that plaintiffs stated a viable claim under Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, and that this cause of action was neither preempted by the No Surprises Act nor by ERISA. Defendants argued that this claim related to ERISA plans because the ERISA plans were an essential part of the state law claim. But the court disagreed. The court stated that this claim did not derive from any particular rights or obligations established by any ERISA-governed plan, and that it would not interfere with the relationships among any core ERISA entities, or attempt to control their functions. As a result, with the exception of plaintiffs’ Section 502(a)(3) claim, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss their complaint.

Eighth Circuit

Keith Feder, M.D., Inc. v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 24-cv-4236 (LMP/SGE), 2025 WL 1371891 (D. Minn. May 12, 2025) (Judge Laura M. Provinzino). Plaintiff Kevin Feder, M.D., Inc. brought this action as a provider assignee to recover benefits due under the terms of a patient’s ERISA-governed health plan sponsored by defendant U.S. Bancorp. The claims at issue cover a range of medical services, including surgery, which Feder provided to the patient over a nearly three-year period. The U.S. Bank Medical and Wellness Plan paid just a fraction of the billed expenses for these services, and largely denied the claims. Feder sent numerous appeal letters to the claims administrator, United Healthcare Services, Inc., along with a copy of the assignment that Feder obtained from the patient which transferred the patient’s right to receive benefits from the plan to Feder. The assignment document sent to United during the appeals process told the insurance company that if the plan had an anti-assignment provision the plan should inform Feder. Neither U.S. Bancorp nor United Healthcare ever informed Feder of the plan’s anti-assignment provision. But the plan does contain such a provision. Therefore, U.S. Bancorp moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, alleging the healthcare provider could not sue under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) in light of the valid anti-assignment provision. Feder did not contest the existence of the plan’s prohibition on assignments, but asserted instead that U.S. Bancorp waived enforcement of the anti-assignment clause by failing to raise it during the claims appeal process, despite his express request it do so. Ruling on the enforceability of the anti-assignment clause, the court noted that federal courts have adopted different approaches to evaluating waiver in the context of anti-assignment clauses in ERISA health plans. Although the Eighth Circuit has not yet defined the contours of waiver with any specificity, it has suggested that a plan may waive an anti-assignment clause through its conduct. The court was willing to assume that the conduct alleged in the complaint substantively pleads waiver, just not against U.S. Bancorp. As U.S. Bancorp points out, the document containing the request to confirm the existence of an anti-assignment provision was sent to United, the claims administrator, not directly to U.S. Bancorp. “Because Feder did not send the assignment notice to U.S. Bancorp directly, it cannot show waiver based ‘on the actions of the party against whom waiver [is] sought’ – here, U.S. Bancorp.” The court added that the complaint currently contains no factual allegations demonstrating that United was U.S. Bancorp’s agent for the purposes of administering the provider’s claims or responding to its inquiries regarding the existence of the anti-assignment provision. Therefore, the court agreed with U.S. Bancorp that Feder fails to plead waiver based on U.S. Bancorp’s own actions. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to dismiss the complaint because Feder is not authorized to bring its claim for benefits under ERISA. However, the court granted Feder leave to amend its complaint as the court did not find the deficiencies it identified necessarily incurable. As a result, the complaint was dismissed without prejudice.

Statute of Limitations

Fourth Circuit

Messer v. Garrison Investment Grp. LP, No. 1:24-CV-00037, 2025 WL 1399215 (W.D. Va. May 14, 2025) (Judge James P. Jones). Plaintiffs are former employees of a manufacturing plant operated by Bristol Compressors International, LLC who won a class-action money judgment of many millions of dollars against Bristol Compressors for failure to give proper notice of the plant’s closing in violation of the WARN Act and for failure to validly eliminate a severance plan prior to their terminations in violation of ERISA. Because the plaintiffs have been unable to collect their damages awarded against Bristol Compressors, they now bring a lawsuit against Garrison Investment Group, LP, Bristol’s alleged parent company, and multiple other related companies and various individuals, based on alter ego or veil-piercing theories. Defendants moved for dismissal. Relying on Supreme Court precedent in Peacock v. Thomas holding that federal courts do not have “ancillary jurisdiction over new actions in which a federal judgment creditor seeks to impose liability for a money judgment on a person not otherwise liable for the judgment,” the court ruled that it was required to grant defendants’ motion. The court stressed that neither ERISA nor the WARN Act contain an independent cause of action to pierce the corporate veil and that there must be an underlying violation of the statutes to sustain subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs argued that Peacock didn’t apply because the complaint includes ERISA violations and defendants have liability by refusing the pay the severance owed by declaring the plan was terminated when it was not. “The plaintiffs’ argument, in other words, appears to be that Garrison violated ERISA and Peacock was found to not have done so, so Peacock does not apply.” However, the court explained that the statute of limitations has run for any ERISA or WARN Act claim the plaintiffs may have against any of the named defendants. Under the WARN Act plaintiffs had two years to bring their claim, and because the plant closed in 2018, the court found that the statute of limitations has run. As for the ERISA claims, the court concluded that plaintiffs had actual knowledge of their claims on October 19, 2018, the date when they filed their first lawsuit. Even accommodating COVID-19 tolling, the court found the three-year limitations period has passed. Moreover, the court plainly stated that the liability of the named defendants in this action was not decided in the class action against Bristol Compressors. “Because the defendants here are ‘not already liable’ for the previous judgment, this court does not have the claimed subject-matter jurisdiction.” For the foregoing reasons, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice.

Venue

Fourth Circuit

International Painters & Allied Trades Industry Pension Fund v. Miller Painting Co., Inc., No. ELH-24-3441, 2025 WL 1382900 (D. Md. May 13, 2025) (Judge Ellen Lipton Hollander). The fiduciaries of two multi-employer funds, the Southern Painters Welfare Fund and the International Painters and Allied Trades Annuity Plan, banded together to bring this ERISA action against Miller Painting Co., Inc. seeking millions of dollars in unpaid contributions. Miller Painting moved to transfer venue from Maryland to the Southern District of Georgia. As a threshold issue, the court considered whether venue was proper in Maryland, plaintiffs’ chosen venue. The problem was that the two funds maintain their principal places of business in and are administered in two different places: Maryland and Tennessee. To deal with this fact, plaintiffs argued that the court should apply the pendent venue doctrine because the issues, claims, and law are all the same as to both funds. But the court did not agree. It concluded that ERISA does not carve out this exception advanced by plaintiffs. “In sum, venue in Maryland is proper as to the IUPAT Plaintiffs. But, nothing in the ERISA statute permits the SP Plaintiffs to lodge their claims in Maryland merely because the IUPAT Plaintiffs can properly assert venue in Maryland, and the claims of the SP Plaintiffs happen to involve the same defendant, the same documents, and the same audit.” Because of this holding, the next question was what to do about the claims for the two sets of plaintiffs. The court considered whether the interests of justice were better served by severing the case or transferring the entire case to a jurisdiction where there is proper venue as to all plaintiffs, the relief sought by defendant Miller. In the end the court chose the latter option. The court stated that “plaintiffs make a compelling argument for litigating this case in one action,” making severance unappealing given that it would result in the burden of two separate civil litigations a few hundred miles apart. On the other hand, the court liked the idea of transferring the case to the Southern District of Georgia, where Miller is incorporated and transacts business. Not only is the Southern District of Georgia less congested than the District of Maryland, but it is the one venue which is proper for the entirety of the case because it is where the defendant resides and where the alleged breach took place. As a result, the court was convinced that the interests of justice will be served by keeping the case intact and transferring the whole of it to defendants’ proposed venue. The court therefore granted Miller’s motion to move the case to the Southern District of Georgia.

BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee v. Nicolopoulos, No. 24-5307, __ F. 4th __, 2025 WL 1338242 (6th Cir. May 8, 2025) (Before Circuit Judges Kethledge, Larsen, and Mathis)

Fertility rates have been declining in the United States for decades and have reached historic lows in the past several years. It is no wonder that state insurance regimes have begun to address fertility treatment, although, as with most state insurance matters, far from uniformly. This case presents the intersection of two such state regimes with federal preemption under ERISA.

BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee is both the insurer and claims fiduciary for an ERISA-governed group health plan sponsored by PhyNet Dermatology, a Tennessee-based company with employers in many states. In 2020 and 2021, B.C., a PhyNet employee and plan participant, submitted claims for fertility treatment, which BlueCross denied because the plan expressly excluded such treatment.

This exclusion was allowed under Tennessee law, but not under New Hampshire law, which mandates insurance coverage for fertility treatment. Because of this mandate, the Insurance Commissioner for New Hampshire reached out to BlueCross to inform it that, as the issuer of a group policy that covers employees in New Hampshire, it must follow New Hampshire mandates with respect to such employees. BlueCross nevertheless persisted in its refusal to cover B.C.’s fertility treatments. 

In response, the Commissioner issued a show cause and hearing order. This order also requested that BlueCross be ordered to pay a penalty of $52,500 and cease and desist from offering health insurance to people in New Hampshire. BlueCross then filed suit in federal court in Tennessee. BlueCross argued that ERISA’s broad preemption provision, Section 514, barred the New Hampshire proceeding.

Eventually, after the parties agreed to stay the state administrative proceedings, the district court denied BlueCross’ motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner, concluding that its state-law proceeding was saved from ERISA preemption under the insurance savings clause in Section 514(b)(2)(A).

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit viewed the “crux” of the matter to be “whether the Commissioner brought the Show-Cause Order against BlueCross in BlueCross’s capacity as an ERISA fiduciary or as an insurer.” The Court agreed with the Commissioner that it was the latter.

As an initial matter, however, the court disagreed with the Commissioner that BlueCross waived the argument. The court noted that, to the contrary, Blue Cross had “consistently framed the Show-Cause Order as one targeting BlueCross for actions it took as a fiduciary.”

Turning to the merits, the court pointed out that the “capacity question matters because ERISA’s saving clause permits states to enforce their insurance laws against insurers.” The Court relied on the provisions of ERISA itself to help it “discern the nature of the New Hampshire proceeding against BlueCross,” noting that, because the Commissioner was not a participant or beneficiary of the Plan, “he cannot challenge BlueCross’s fiduciary-capacity determination of B.C.’s benefits.” But again, pointing to ERISA’s insurance savings clause, the court noted that the Commissioner was permitted to “enforce New Hampshire’s insurance laws against insurers.” And the show cause order itself underscored that the Commissioner was doing so, expressly “directing BlueCross to cease and desist from providing health insurance in New Hampshire,” and assessing a penalty for violation of New Hampshire insurance law.

The court conceded that the administrative proceeding was initiated as a reaction to BlueCross’s denial of B.C.’s claims. But the court was persuaded that the claims denial was not the basis for the state administrative proceeding, but instead merely provided evidence to the Insurance Commissioner that BlueCross was violating New Hampshire insurance law.

The court found confirmation of its conclusion that the proceeding was directed at BlueCross as an insurer in Supreme Court case law, which “establishes that fiduciary duties created by the terms of an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan are not an escape hatch from valid state insurance regulations.”

Nor was the court persuaded by BlueCross’s contention that the real question in the case was which state law was saved from preemption: Tennessee law, which did not require fertility coverage, or New Hampshire law, which mandated such coverage. “That framing,” the court insisted, “relies on adopting BlueCross’s factual position – that the Commissioner seeks to regulate BlueCross as a fiduciary,” which the court had already rejected.

The court next rejected BlueCross’ argument that it should prevail because ERISA Section 502(a)(3) provides a viable remedy by allowing plan fiduciaries to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. The court found this true but irrelevant, concluding that Section 502(a)(3) does not allow relief with respect to “state enforcement actions brought against insurers.”

Nor was the court persuaded by the argument that allowing actions such as this will undermine ERISA’s goal of minimizing the administrative and financial burden of potentially having to comply with the laws of 50 states. The court was satisfied that this potential for disuniformity was a natural consequence of the insurance savings clause itself.   

Finally, the court rejected BlueCross’ belated attempt to raise due process concerns, noting that it admittedly had not done so in the district court. The court of appeals thus took “no position on whether [BlueCross] has actually engaged in the practice of insurance in New Hampshire or whether [BlueCross’s] contacts with New Hampshire are enough to subject it to New Hampshire’s jurisdiction,” pointing out that BlueCross could presumably raise these issues as part of the state administrative proceeding.   

Below is a summary of this past week’s notable ERISA decisions by subject matter and jurisdiction.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Sixth Circuit

England v. DENSO International Am., Inc., No. 24-1360, __ F. 4th __, 2025 WL 1300923 (6th Cir. May 6, 2025) (Before Circuit Judges McKeague, Griffin, and Larsen). In this putative class action current and former employees of the automotive part maker DENSO International America, Inc. who participate in the DENSO Retirement Savings Plan allege that the plan’s fiduciaries breached their duties of prudence and monitoring under ERISA by failing to control recordkeeping and administrative costs. Crucially, the plaintiff-appellants contend that the plan paid its recordkeeper, Empower, approximately $71 per participant for its services, more than double what they assert the costs should have been for the standard and fungible bundled recordkeeping and administrative services they received. Relying on the Sixth Circuit’s pleading standards in Smith v. CommonSpirit Health, 37 F.4th 1160 (6th Cir. 2022), the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for failing to set forth “context specific” facts about the type and quality of services provided to render their allegations of overpayment for recordkeeping services plausible under ERISA. (Your ERISA Watch covered that decision in our August 9, 2023 edition). Plaintiffs appealed. In this published decision the Sixth Circuit not only affirmed the district court’s dismissal and upheld the pleading standards it announced in Smith, but expanded upon them in some subtle but significant ways. To begin, the Sixth Circuit doubled down on its stance that assessing the plausibility of allegations like those alleged here “requires identifying the alleged problematic financial metric and then comparing it to a ‘meaningful benchmark.’” Measured against that standard, the court of appeals was adamant that plaintiffs failed to allege the fees were excessive relative to the services rendered. The appeals court noted that the complaint not only lacks specifics about the type or quality of the administrative and recordkeeping services received relative to the comparator plans to which paid less, but indeed acknowledges that there are variations in the level and quality in recordkeeping and administrative services provided to mega plans like DENSO’s. The Sixth Circuit was unwilling to accept plaintiffs’ allegations that these differences are immaterial and that mega plans have the obligation to negotiate favorable rates based on their economies of scale. The appeals court summed up its holding by stating, “there is a distinction between generally alleging that bundled recordkeeping and administrative services provided to mega plans all offer essentially the same thing and alleging that the services offered to and utilized by the Plan here did not justify the cost difference in fees; here, plaintiffs alleged the former, and under Smith, they needed to sufficiently allege the latter.” Plaintiffs attempted to distinguish their action from Smith by asserting that the Smith complaint was dismissed because those plaintiffs compared their plan to averages from industry publications while they compared the DENSO plan to other similar mega 401(k) plans. But the Sixth Circuit was not receptive to this attempted distinction. If there was any ambiguity before, the court of appeals made it explicitly clear here that Smith should not be interpreted to mean that anything other than industry publications is enough. Doing so, the court said, “would limit Smith’s rule to its factual application. That we will not do.” Recognizing that its ruling was in tension with other Circuit Courts and recent decisions out of the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit tiptoed around the Supreme Court’s and the Seventh Circuit’s holdings in Hughes v. Northwestern Univ., and attempted to distinguish the Hughes case by stressing that that lawsuit involved two recordkeepers, not one. “And even were we to accept Hughes’s premise as consistent with our caselaw, lacking here is a specific allegation that Empower’s competitors could have stood in its shoes for less money.” Rather than focus too heavily on Hughes, or on an unpublished decision out of the Third Circuit, Mator v. Wesco Distrib., Inc., the Sixth Circuit instead stated that its pleading standard for these types of excessive fee allegations is in “good company” with “many of our sister circuits,” including the Second Circuit, the Eighth Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit. For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit remained resolute in its pleading standards and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case.

Ninth Circuit

Madrigal v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-05191-MRA-JC, 2025 WL 1299002 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2025) (Judge Monica Ramirez Almadani). Plaintiff Stacey M. Madrigal filed this putative class action against the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (“KFHP”), Southern California Permanente Medical Group, the Kaiser Permanente Administrative Committee, and ten Doe defendants alleging they violated their fiduciary duties and ERISA’s anti-inurement provision, and engaged in prohibited transactions under Section 1106, by utilizing forfeited nonvested employer contributions to reduce their own costs towards future contributions rather than to defray the 401(k) plan’s expenses. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The court granted the motion to dismiss, with leave to amend, in this order. As an initial matter, the court granted plaintiffs’ request that it take judicial notice of the plan’s Form 5500s, as they are a matter of public record and their accuracy cannot be questioned. The court then turned to defendants’ arguments for dismissal. At the outset, the court agreed with defendants that KFHP and Southern California Permanente Medical Group were not carrying out any fiduciary functions with respect to the forfeitures – the basis of Ms. Madrigal’s claims. The court held, “the language of the Plan does not imbue KFHP with the power to allocate the Plan’s assets. This power to allocate assets, which is central to the basis of Plaintiff’s claims, appears to be restricted to the Administrative Committee (as is logical, given that Plaintiff admits the Defendants created the Administrative Committee for exactly this purpose). Although the Plan makes clear that KFHP had some control over the administration of the Plan, KFHP’s status as an administrator is not enough to support Plaintiff’s claims.” Having found that the complaint fails to allege these two defendants acted as a fiduciary of the plan with respect to the conduct at issue, the court dismissed the fiduciary breach claims asserted against them. However, there was no dispute that the Administrative Committee was a fiduciary, managing the assets of the plan. Thus, the court considered whether the complaint stated a claim that the Committee breached its duties of prudence and loyalty by spending the forfeitures in a way that benefited the employer. It found that the complaint failed to do so. Not only did the court view Ms. Madrigal’s central thesis as “a significant departure from previously well-settled law,” a reference to the governing U.S. Treasury regulations, but the court also emphasized that the Committee’s actions and defendants’ use of the forfeitures was in keeping with the language of the plan. “Here, as Defendants point out, there are no allegations in the FAC that Plaintiff failed to receive any benefits that she was contractually owed.” Accordingly, the court granted the motion to dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted against the Administrative Committee. Moreover, absent an underlying fiduciary breach claim, the court agreed with defendants that the derivative failure to monitor claim must also be dismissed. Next, the court dismissed the anti-inurement claim, determining that it was not viable because the complaint fails to allege that any of the forfeited assets at issue ever left the plan. “Plaintiff’s failure to allege that any assets left the Plan is sufficient to foreclose her claim.” Ms. Madrigal’s prohibited transaction claim did not hold up any better. The court concluded that the “the reallocation of assets within the Plan is not enough to trigger § 1106.” Because the court found that Ms. Madrigal failed to identify a transaction that falls under the scope of the prohibited transaction rules, the court agreed with defendants that she failed to state a claim for relief. For these reasons, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, leaving only the issue of leave to amend. In the end, the court decided that granting leave to amend would not be futile and therefore permitted Ms. Madrigal leave to amend her pleading to correct the deficiencies identified herein.

Class Actions

Ninth Circuit

Coppel v. SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment, Inc., No. 21-cv-1430-RSH-DDL, 2025 WL 1346873 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2025) (Judge Robert S. Huie). Five former employees of SeaWorld Parks and Entertainment, Inc. brought this action under ERISA on behalf of SeaWorld’s 401(k) retirement savings plan, individually and as representatives of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan, against the plan’s fiduciaries, alleging they breached their duties by failing to control plan costs, by selecting and maintain underperforming investments, and by incurring losses when they switched the plan’s recordkeeper from Mass Mutual to Prudential. On November 1, 2023, plaintiffs moved for class certification. The court granted their motion and certified a class of all participants and beneficiaries of the plan through the class period, as well as three subclasses: (1) the Mass Mutual subclass; (2) the Prudential subclass; and (3) the injunctive relief subclass of current plan participants. After discovery concluded, the parties engaged in mediation with “a mediator experienced in ERISA class actions lawsuits involving 401(k) plans.” On September 6, 2024, the parties notified the court they had reached a settlement agreement wherein the SeaWorld defendants agreed to pay a gross settlement amount of $1,250,000. “The following will be deducted from the gross settlement amount: (1) attorneys’ fees, not to exceed 35% of the gross settlement amount, or $437,500; (2) Class Counsel costs, not to exceed $273,000; (3) a Class Representative Service Award of up to $7,500 to Plaintiffs; (4) Settlement Administrative Expenses, not to exceed $17,500; and (5) recordkeeper costs.” After these deductions, the net settlement amount will be $483,000, from which each class member will be paid a pro rata share calculated based on the sum of each individual’s account balances. Before the court here was plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. The court granted plaintiffs’ motion. To make its preliminary fairness determination the court assessed the adequacy of representation, whether the negotiation took place at arm’s length, the adequacy of relief compared with the maximum potential recovery, the effectiveness of the proposed method of distribution, and the proposed means and content of the class notice. To begin, the court adopted its conclusions from when it certified the classes to conclude that the adequacy of representation requirement factor is satisfied. Next, the court agreed with plaintiffs that the settlement was the result of an informed, arm’s length negotiation. In evaluating the adequacy of the settlement, the court compared the $1.25 million amount to the potential recovery of approximately $10.8 million. It concluded that 11.5% of the maximum recovery falls within the range that other courts have accepted in similar ERISA class action settlements and appropriately discounts the risks and costs of continued litigation. The court also concluded that the plan of allocation provides for equitable treatment of all class members. Finally, the court determined that ILYM Group Inc. is reasonably suited to administer plaintiffs’ proposed class notice plan, the content of the notice is satisfactory, and that the plan of sending class notice is reasonable, sufficient, and adequate. The court did briefly note its skepticism about the proposed 35% of the common fund allocated for the payment of attorneys’ fees, and the $7,500 class representative service awards to each of the five class representatives, but stated that it would not closely scrutinize them at this time as preliminary approval of the settlement does not hinge on the court’s approval of either of these award amounts. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement, set in motion the notice plan, and set the date of the upcoming fairness hearing.

Disability Benefit Claims

Ninth Circuit

LaLonde v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 2:24-cv-01781-DSF-MBK, 2025 WL 1324139 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2025) (Judge Dale S. Fischer). Plaintiff Rick LaLonde filed this action against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) seeking a judicial order reinstating his terminated long-term disability benefits. Before he was injured in a hit-and-run accident in 2017, Mr. LaLonde was an employee of Providence Health & Services, managing a sterile processing department for medical supplies and equipment. On February 22, 2017, Mr. LaLonde’s life changed drastically after he was badly injured in the accident. His spine was damaged, requiring surgery, and he was left with chronic pain and long-term psychiatric and neurological issues. In a letter dated August 31, 2017, MetLife informed Mr. LaLonde that it was approving his claim for benefits under Providence’s group disability policy. Then, in April of 2019, MetLife learned that Mr. LaLonde had been arrested and charged with attempted murder. He was later convicted and incarcerated. After this, MetLife terminated Mr. LaLonde’s benefits. Its medical reviewers determined that Mr. LaLonde did not have any functional limitations from a physical or psychological perspective and therefore did not qualify for continued benefits. After he was released from jail, Mr. LaLonde appealed MetLife’s decision. He was ultimately unsuccessful with his administrative appeal, which led him to filing the present action. In this order the court made its findings of fact and conclusions of law, conducting a de novo review of the record. Ultimately, the court determined that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Mr. LaLonde’s medical symptoms related to his spinal conditions and chronic pain rendered him disabled under the terms of the policy. The court noted that during his incarceration, the record reflected that Mr. LaLonde continued to suffer from pain and continued mobility deficits, including multiple falls and the use of a walker and wheelchair. Moreover, the court stressed that Mr. LaLonde’s treating providers have consistently reported that he faces functional limitations from his physical conditions which render him disabled. “Against the background of his lengthy treatment history, the Court finds it appropriate to give greater weight to the opinions of LaLonde’s treating physicians, each of whom had a ‘greater opportunity to know and observe’ LaLonde than the MetLife-retained physicians who based their opinions solely on a paper review of LaLonde’s file.” Furthermore, the court expressed its view that MetLife’s consulting doctors failed to meaningfully engage with the totality of Mr. LaLonde’s medical records and selectively focused on certain bits and pieces to suit a certain framework. The court added that it also found it problematic that MetLife failed to discuss why it reached a different conclusion from the Social Security Administration. The court said MetLife’s “decision to completely disregard the SSA’s contrary disability determination is particularly problematic here, where the basis for MetLife’s termination of benefits was its determination that LaLonde did not have any functional limitations from a physical or psychological perspective. Even without the SSDI claim file, it is patently obvious that MetLife’s determination that LaLonde has no functional limitations whatsoever cannot be reconciled with the SSA’s determination that LaLonde satisfies the stringent federal standard for SSDI claims.” For these reasons, the court found that Mr. LaLonde met his policy’s definition of disabled on the basis of his physical conditions, and therefore did not consider the parties’ arguments related to his psychiatric conditions. The court thus found in favor of Mr. LaLonde, and directed him to submit a proposed judgment and meet and confer with MetLife to discuss an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.

Discovery

Sixth Circuit

The W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Sagasser, No. 1:23-cv-742, 2025 WL 1311270 (S.D. Ohio May 6, 2025) (Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman). The Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, Western & Southern Agency Group Long Term Incentive and Retention Plan, and The Western and Southern Life Insurance Company Executive Committee imitated this lawsuit under both ERISA and federal common law to recoup nearly $300,000 in forfeited benefits and taxes paid to or on behalf of defendant Ronald Sagasser, a former employee of Western and Southern who was terminated for violating the company’s policies. After the lawsuit was filed, two intervenor plaintiffs filed an intervenor complaint against both Mr. Sagasser and Western and Southern alleging that while serving as their Western and Southern Financial Representative, Mr. Sagasser misappropriated $185,000 of their funds. The intervenor plaintiffs seek recovery for conversion, embezzlement, misappropriation, theft, fraud, breach of a promissory note, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. All discovery-related motions have been assigned to Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman. Both the Western and Southern plaintiffs and the intervening plaintiffs have repeatedly sought discovery from Mr. Sagasser to no avail. “Despite repeated promises by defense counsel to provide responses, none have been provided.” Mr. Sagasser’s failure to participate in discovery even resulted in the cancellation of his previously scheduled deposition. Furthermore, his counsel did not appear when the presiding judge held a discovery hearing on February 26, 2025. As a result, the court permitted the parties to file formal motions to compel. The plaintiffs and the intervening plaintiffs promptly did so. Mr. Sagasser failed to respond to these motions. Only when the undersigned Magistrate held a telephonic discovery conference on May 6 did counsel for Mr. Sagasser finally make an appearance. Given this history, the Magistrate not only granted both plaintiffs’ and intervenor plaintiffs’ motions to compel Mr. Sagasser to provide responses to all outstanding written discovery requests, but also agreed with them that sanctions against Mr. Sagasser were appropriate given his “wholly unjustified” failure to provide the requested discovery in a timely manner. Judge Bowman additionally warned Mr. Sagasser and his counsel that it would not hesitate to impose further sanctions should his behavior continue. As a result, Mr. Sagasser was ordered to produce all outstanding discovery, and plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs will be paid attorneys’ fees and costs for their time preparing for and appearing at the two telephonic conferences and for their time spent preparing and filing the motions to compel.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Seventh Circuit

Brickler v. Building Trades United Pension Trust, No. 24-CV-491-SCD, 2025 WL 1358554 (E.D. Wis. May 9, 2025) (Judge Stephen C. Dries). Plaintiff Robbin Brickler sued the Building Trades United Pension Trust and its eligibility committee under ERISA alleging they wrongfully suspended his early retirement benefits under the pension plan. The gravamen of Mr. Brickler’s action is that a pension fund trustee advised him, during a telephone call he made to inquire about benefits, that working as a dump truck driver for his then-current employer would not violate union rules and that he would be eligible for early retirement benefits under the plan. Mr. Brickler added that the plan’s website directed all inquiries to this phone number. At first, it seemed the assurances from the phone call were well-founded. The pension fund’s trustees approved Mr. Brickler’s application for early retirement benefits, and paid him for approximately two years. However, defendants ultimately terminated his benefits after they determined that his work as a dump truck driver constituted disqualifying “Plan Related Employment” such that he was subject to the plan’s benefit suspension rules. Mr. Brickler appealed to the eligibility committee, which upheld its previous determination and advised Mr. Brickler that he could appeal its decision to the executive committee, and after that, to bring a civil action. But Mr. Brickler did not file a second-level appeal to the executive committee, and instead went straight to federal court. He filed this action alleging that defendants improperly suspended his pension payments in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 2530.203.3, that they made an arbitrary and capricious decision to suspend his benefits, they breached their fiduciary duties, as a result of their oral assurances they should be estopped from suspending the benefits, and they breached their duty of fair representation. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. They argued that Mr. Brickler failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and in any event, his five claims each fail as a matter of law. Because the court agreed with defendants on the issue of administrative exhaustion it granted their motion for judgment. In fact, Mr. Brickler did not contest that he failed to file a second-level appeal, as required by the plan. Nor did he argue that the court should excuse his failure to exhaust for any reason. The court thus found that there was no dispute that Mr. Brickler failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, and he had not argued that he was excused from doing so. “Accordingly, I find that Brickler’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies bars this lawsuit in its entirety.” Despite this holding, the court continued and discussed the merits of each of Mr. Brickler’s claims. First, the court held that under the Seventh Circuit’s controlling precedent Mr. Brickler could not sustain his claim for improper suspension of his pension payments pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2530.203.3, because the Circuit has read the regulation to exclude claimants who have not attained normal retirement age from its protection. Perhaps the most interesting part of the decision was its discussion of the merits of Mr. Brickler’s claim that defendants made an arbitrary and capricious decision to suspend his early retirement benefits. Under the language of the plan post-retirement employment is disqualifying if three conditions are met: (1) the participants must work in the same industry involving the same business activities as employees covered by the plan; (2) the participant must work in the same trade or craft as is covered under a collective bargaining agreement requiring the employer to contribute to the pension fund; and (3) the work must be performed in Wisconsin. Although the court held that the work Mr. Brickler was performing was unquestionably done in Wisconsin in the same industry as employees who could be qualified by the plan, it held that defendants failed to meet their evidentiary burden to prove the latter portions of the first and second elements, namely that “employees covered by the Plan were employed when benefits commenced’ and that the trade or craft was ‘covered under a collective bargaining agreement requiring the employer to contribute to the Pension Fund.’” The court said the fact that the plan includes such industries does not mean that it had any active collective bargaining agreement within that trade or craft, and that it would not make this “leap in logic.” Therefore, had Mr. Brickler exhausted his administrative remedies, the court was clear that it would deny the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim. However, the same was not true for the remainder of Mr. Brickler’s causes of action. The court agreed with defendants that (1) the fiduciary breach claim was duplicative of the claim for recovery of benefits; (2) the estoppel claim was not viable because the oral misrepresentation could not be grounds for such a claim given the fact the plan language was unambiguous; and (3) federal labor law does not impose a duty of fair representation on defendants because they are not employee representatives. For these reasons, the court concluded that if Mr. Brickler had successfully countered defendants’ exhaustion argument, four of his five claims would fail on the merits. But because he did not mount an exhaustion defense, this was ultimately a moot point. Summary judgment was therefore entered in favor of defendants and the action was dismissed with prejudice.

Plan Status

Sixth Circuit

Shakespeare v. MetLife Legal Plans, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-02250-TLP-atc, 2025 WL 1341897 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 30, 2025) (Magistrate Judge Annie T. Christoff). Pro se plaintiff Tan Yvette Shakespeare sued MetLife Legal Plans, Inc. and Prime Therapeutics LLC asserting claims of breach of contract, bad faith, negligence, and discrimination in connection with the legal representation she received under MetLife’s prepaid legal services plan throughout her divorce proceedings. Defendants moved to dismiss. They argued that Ms. Shakespeare’s state law claims are preempted by ERISA and that she failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for all of her causes of action. Magistrate Judge Annie T. Christoff issued this report and recommendation recommending the court deny the motion to dismiss as to ERISA preemption and failure to state claims of breach of contract, bad faith, and negligence. As for the discrimination claim, the Magistrate found the allegations as currently pled to be entirely conclusory and lacking in factual support, and therefore subject to dismissal. However, rather than recommend dismissal, the court permitted Ms. Shakespeare an opportunity to amend her complaint to remedy these deficiencies, and held the discrimination claims in abeyance pending further action of this court. Regarding ERISA preemption, the court agreed with Ms. Shakespeare that the current record does not support the conclusion that the prepaid legal services plan was endorsed by her employer. Absent clear evidence showing that the legal services plan is governed by ERISA, the court found that ruling on the applicability of the safe-harbor exemption is premature and more appropriately presented for the summary judgment stage. And because the court cannot determine at this juncture whether the plan is governed by ERISA, it also could not comment on whether the state law claims “relate to” the plan for the purpose of judging ERISA preemption.

Pleading Issues & Procedure

Ninth Circuit

Pessano v. Blue Cross of Cal., No. 1:24-cv-01189-JLT-EPG, 2025 WL 1342690 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2025) (Judge Jennifer L. Thurston). Plaintiff Emily Pessano brought this ERISA action on behalf of her minor daughter seeking to compel Blue Cross of California to pay the costs for air ambulance transportation services. Before the court here was Ms. Pessano’s motion to file under seal, or redact, various documents that contain communications between her and her counsel regarding the case and information that reveals, at least potentially, the settlement amount. In this straightforward decision the court granted Ms. Pessano’s motion, agreeing that the communications at issue fall within the attorney-client privilege and should therefore be filed under seal. As for the settlement amount information, the court agreed that it too should be redacted or sealed and permitted the same for any information in the subject filings.

Eleventh Circuit

McKinney v. Principal Financial Services Inc., No. 5:23-cv-01578-HNJ, 2025 WL 1347480 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2025) (Magistrate Judge Herman N. Johnson, Jr.). Dr. Julian Davidson was a participant in an ERISA-governed 401(k) plan associated with his employment by Davidson Technologies, Inc. When Dr. Davidson died, the funds in his retirement account passed to his wife, Dorothy Carolyn Smith Davidson, and were deposited in a beneficiary account under her name. Mrs. Davidson was also a participant in the 401(k) plan with her own separate participant retirement account. Mrs. Davidson designated her three nieces as the beneficiaries of her own participant account. However, she did not designate a beneficiary for the account derived from her husband, and therefore, under the terms of the plan, Mrs. Davidson’s Estate was the default beneficiary. Mrs. Davidson died on May 11, 2021. Following her death Davidson Tech and Principal Life Insurance Company paid the funds from both the participant account and the beneficiary account to the three nieces. In this action plaintiff Rebekah Keith McKinney, in her capacity as personal representation of Mrs. Davidson’s Estate, alleges that under the terms of the plan the funds in the beneficiary account were improperly paid to the nieces and should have been paid to the Estate. She contests the distribution of those funds to the nieces and seeks payment of funds from Davidson Technologies and Principal Life. Ms. McKinney asserts claims for benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under Section 502(a)(3). More than five months after defendant Davidson Tech answered Ms. McKinney’s complaint, it filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint. The proposed third-party complaint asserts a claim for restitution and unjust enrichment pursuant to Section 502(a)(3) against the nieces. Davidson Tech maintains that the nieces “cannot fairly and equitably retain those funds.” It requests the court impose an equitable lien and/or constructive trust on the funds the nieces received. Principal Life supports Davidson Tech’s motion, but Ms. McKinney opposes it. In this decision the court granted the motion and allowed the filing of the third-party complaint. The court held that the third-party complaint against the nieces both satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 and the relevant discretionary factors. In particular, the court agreed with Davidson Tech that the nieces “may bear liability for all or part of Plaintiff’s claims against” Davidson Tech because it may have wrongfully distributed the beneficiary account funds to them. The court thus agreed with Davidson Tech that if Ms. McKinney’s claims are viable, the nieces’ liability to the company will “derive from and be conditional upon the outcome of Plaintiff’s claims against [Davidson Tech].” The court was also confident that at least Davidson Tech’s request for an equitable lien or constructive trust amounted to appropriate forms of equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3), even if its request for a “return of funds” is not. The court further stressed that allowing the proposed third-party complaint will promote judicial efficiency as it will allow the court to resolve all the issues at once. Ms. McKinney argued that she would suffer prejudice through the addition of the third-party complaint and the third-party defendants because this would further delay the proceedings, but the court did not agree. Instead, it viewed Davidson Tech’s proposed third-party complaint as aligning rather than conflicting with the interests of Ms. McKinney’s complaint. For these reasons, the court granted the motion and Davidson Tech was permitted to file its third-party complaint against the nieces.

Remedies

Tenth Circuit

Watson v. EMC Corp., No. 1:19-cv-02667-RMR-STV, 2025 WL 1333806 (D. Colo. May 7, 2025) (Judge Regina M. Rodriguez). Plaintiff Marie Watson sued her late husband’s former employer, EMC Corporation, after she was denied $633,000 in life insurance benefits under his ERISA-governed welfare benefit plan. Ms. Watson asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim against EMC Corp., seeking equitable relief under ERISA Section 502(a)(3)(B). She maintained that EMC breached its fiduciary obligations when it responded to Mr. Watson’s written inquiry about the status of his employment benefits when he was leaving his position under a voluntary separation program. EMC replied that if he continued to pay for his benefits they would remain active during the transition, but neglected to mention that his life insurance coverage under the group policy had already ended and that he needed to convert his coverage to an individual policy, and to do so soon. If EMC had informed Mr. Watson that he needed to convert his life insurance coverage and given him instructions on how to do so, Ms. Watson argued that he would have, and that she would have then been eligible for benefits following her husband’s death. Because EMC did not, the family lost out on those benefits. On summary judgment, the court ruled that even assuming EMC had breached its fiduciary duty to Mr. Watson under ERISA, Ms. Watson was not entitled to equitable relief. Ms. Watson appealed that decision to the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling. It held that the court erred by treating Ms. Watson’s Section 502(a)(3) claim for fiduciary breach as if it were a claim for recovery of plan benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B). The court of appeals remanded to the district court to decide two key issues: (1) whether, under the circumstances, EMC had breached its fiduciary duty to Mr. Watson in response to his benefit inquiry; and (2) whether Ms. Watson is entitled to equitable relief in the form of surcharge pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). (Your ERISA Watch featured the Tenth Circuit’s decision as our case of the week in our February 14, 2024 edition.) In this decision the court resolved those two issues. To begin, the court held that EMC had breached its fiduciary duty to provide complete and accurate information in response to Mr. Watson’s benefit inquiry. “As an ERISA fiduciary, EMC had an obligation to respond to his inquiry with complete and accurate information regarding all benefits, including the information that his life insurance policy would need to be converted in order for him to maintain those benefits.” The court noted that other courts have found a breach of fiduciary duty under similar circumstances, and although Mr. Watson did not specifically inquire about his life insurance benefits, EMC, as the administrator of the plan, nevertheless was aware of his status and the fact that he needed to convert his life insurance benefits or lose coverage. While the inquiry was made after the group life insurance policy coverage had ended, it was still within the eligibility window for converting the coverage to an individual life insurance policy. As a result, the court concluded that a prudent fiduciary would have responded to Mr. Watson’s inquiry with information about how to continue both his health insurance and life insurance coverage. Instead, EMC directed him to simply continue paying his bills. Although Mr. Watson was in possession of documents that explained the end date of his life insurance coverage and the need to convert to an individual policy, the court found that this fact could not relieve EMC of its fiduciary obligation to respond accurately and fully to Mr. Watson’s written inquiry. For these reasons, the court concluded that EMC committed a fiduciary breach. Having so found, the court then considered the appropriate remedy. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cigna v. Amara, the court stated that Ms. Watson was entitled to surcharge because she demonstrated actual harm from EMC’s breach, namely the failure to convert the life insurance coverage which resulted in Ms. Watson losing out on benefits. The court then found that surcharge in the amount of the lost benefits – $633,000 – was appropriate equitable relief under Amara. The court did not find that interest was appropriate equitable relief, although it agreed with Ms. Watson that the surcharge amount should be reduced by the amount of any premiums that would have been required in order to maintain the coverage in order to avoid a windfall. Accordingly, Ms. Watson’s request for equitable relief in the form of surcharge was granted in part, and Ms. Watson was ordered to submit a proposed judgment and a separate motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. (On appeal and on remand Ms. Watson was represented by Kantor & Kantor attorneys Glenn R. Kantor and Your ERISA Watch co-editor Peter S. Sessions.)