It was another slow week in ERISAland. Was it because of a cavalcade of technical disruptions across the country (including most notably federal aviation and Microsoft, but also JPMorgan Chase, United Airlines, and Apple)? Was it because everyone was busy reallocating their portfolios after the downfall of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang? Or is everyone just having trouble concentrating because they are looking forward to eating turkey next week?

Your ERISA Watch soldiers on regardless. See below for this week’s cases, which include (1) a pro se action by a man claiming his 401(k) is not subject to federal taxation because he is a resident of the “Michigan Republic” and not a U.S. citizen (Engel v. FMR, you can guess how that went); (2) a case excluding from evidence a disability insurer’s workup of a claim when it missed its deadline to decide the claim (Coleman v. Continental American); (3) two cases involving medical claims that were bounced at the pleading stage because plan terms foreclosed relief (J.Y. v. BCBS MI, Daniel V.A. v. Anthem); (4) a case where plaintiffs’ counsel got in hot water for violating a protective order in an effort to file a second action against the same defendants (Bangalore v. Froedtert); and last, but not least, (5) the result of a five-day bench trial in which the court ruled that United States Bakery engaged in subterfuge, shenanigans, and fraud by trying to dodge the withdrawal liability of a bakery (Svenhard’s) it was acquiring (Board of Trustees v. United States Bakery).

Hopefully everyone’s email returns to normal so you can continue to receive this scintillating newsletter. We’ll see you next week!

Below is a summary of this past week’s notable ERISA decisions by subject matter and jurisdiction.

Arbitration

Second Circuit

Larkin v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., No. 25 Civ. 7307 (LLS), 2026 WL 3417979 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2026) (Judge Louis L. Stanton). Dennis Larkin and Danielle Gosline brought this putative class action under ERISA against Caremark Rx, doing business as CVS Caremark, the pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) for their health plans. Plaintiffs allege that Caremark denied coverage of the weight-loss drug Zepbound on the ground that it was not medically necessary, and that it did so as part of a scheme of financial self-interest. In an August 26, 2026 opinion, the court denied Caremark’s motion to compel arbitration under the terms of service governing its Caremark.com website, holding that plaintiffs’ claims did not arise from that contract, and partially denied its motion to dismiss. That ruling left standing plaintiffs’ breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty claim, which the court allowed to proceed on behalf of a class spanning all plans for which Caremark acted as PBM. (Your ERISA Watch covered this decision in our September 2, 2026 edition.) Caremark moved for reconsideration of both rulings. In doing so, it also moved for leave to file a supplemental declaration describing how Caremark.com lets beneficiaries access their benefits and how plaintiffs used its messaging feature to communicate about the coverage decisions at issue. At the outset, the court denied leave to file the declaration. When a party offers new evidence on reconsideration, courts weigh the strength of its explanation for not submitting the evidence earlier. Caremark argued that the court had “sua sponte imposed a relational requirement, which neither party raised,” but the court rejected this. The Federal Arbitration Act reaches only disputes arising out of the contract containing the arbitration provision, plaintiffs had invoked that requirement in opposing arbitration, and Caremark’s own briefing had acknowledged a nexus requirement and offered evidence of one. That Caremark “misconstrued the type of nexus required” did not justify new evidence. As for the motion for reconsideration, the court ruled that Caremark had identified no change in law or new evidence, and concluded that its motion “amounts only to disagreement with the Court’s application of controlling law.” Caremark “does not cite any controlling authority supporting its view of the required nexus.” Even under arbitration agreements covering “any dispute,” “courts of this Circuit have only compelled arbitration for claims that arise out of or sufficiently relate to the underlying contract.” Nor did Caremark identify any evidence the court had overlooked. Moving on to the duty of loyalty claim, the court found that Caremark merely repeated its argument that ERISA limits class claims to the plans in which the named plaintiffs participate. The court again stated that Caremark “points to no controlling law requiring its interpretation, which is in fact contrary to the bulk of persuasive authority on the subject.” While the Second Circuit “has not explicitly decided whether ERISA plaintiffs may assert claims on behalf of a class containing plans they are not members of,” the Circuit’s test “mirrors the rationale of circuits that have decided the issue and, in each case, reached the same conclusion as the August 26 Order.” The court also rejected Caremark’s argument that it was not acting as a fiduciary in deciding that Zepbound was not medically necessary. Caremark’s original motion admitted that it is a fiduciary when deciding “initial claim adjudication and appeals,” plaintiffs’ allegation of a financial self-interest scheme did not convert those adjudications into “formulary-management,” and by Caremark’s own logic (i.e., that coverage is available only when a drug is both on the formulary and medically necessary), a medical necessity determination goes beyond formulary management. The court thus denied Caremark’s motion for reconsideration.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Sixth Circuit

Engel v. FMR LLC, No. 26-cv-11558, 2026 WL 3522394 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2026) (Judge Robert J. White). Jason Engel participated in his employer’s 401(k) plan, which was serviced by FMR LLC, d/b/a Fidelity Investments. After his employment ended, Engel disputed Fidelity’s withholding of roughly $3,200 in taxes from his retirement funds. He submitted a Form W-8BEN (an IRS form used by foreign individuals to certify that they are not U.S. citizens or residents), on which he “identified his country of citizenship as ‘Michigan Republic’ and listed a residential address in Dearborn Heights, Michigan, with ‘USA’ as the country. [] He claimed a zero-percent withholding rate based on the Constitution and his asserted status as a private citizen.” In three phone calls in 2025, Fidelity representatives allegedly told him they had his W-8BEN and that it was properly completed. However, in a follow-up letter, Fidelity declined to update his account because the form is “only for non-U.S. citizens,” the address on the form did not match the U.S. address on file, and processing it required a non-U.S. address. Engel then wrote to Fidelity’s legal department, asserting that “Fidelity disregarded his claimed non-U.S. status and improperly presumed that he possessed ‘Fourteenth Amendment commercial citizenship,’ which he maintained he had never consented to or contracted into.” He further contended he had repudiated his U.S. citizenship. Engel subsequently brought this pro se action and applied to proceed in forma pauperis. The court granted that application, granted his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, and treated that pleading as operative. The complaint asserted five counts: breach of fiduciary duty and improper plan administration (Count I), benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) (Count II), breach of contract and plan-related obligations (Count III), equitable accounting and restitution (Count IV), and equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) (Count V). The court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). On Count I, the court assumed that Fidelity acted as a fiduciary, but held that Engel had not plausibly alleged an actionable breach. His challenge to the withholding and account classification failed because Form W-8BEN is for establishing foreign status and its instructions say U.S. persons should not use it, and “a declaration of exclusive state citizenship” does not establish an exemption from federal taxation. Having alleged no valid basis for being treated as a non-U.S. person, Engel could not show that Fidelity breached a duty by refusing that classification or withholding the funds. His claim that Fidelity failed to explain or account for the withholding fared no better. Engel identified nothing missing from, or misleading about, the letter from Fidelity, and he described his other inquiries only generally as requests for “explanation, correction, and reconciliation.” As for the phone calls, he did not allege any action he took or refrained from taking in reliance on the representatives’ statements, so he had not alleged detrimental reliance. The court added that to the extent Engel sought surcharge, the lack of reliance was not independently dispositive, but the claim still failed because he alleged no facts showing that those statements caused the withholding or any of his claimed injuries. Moving on to Count II, the court dismissed it because Engel offered no basis for concluding that the $3,200 remained payable as a plan benefit rather than subject to tax withholding, and he alleged no calculation error, denial of a requested distribution, or other failure to honor a plan right. Count V failed for a related reason. Section 502(a)(3) does not authorize equitable relief “in the abstract,” and a plaintiff must first establish a violation of ERISA or the plan. Count V rested on the same conduct as Counts I and II, so his requests for an accounting, correction of records, and surcharge could not stand alone. Count IV failed to the same extent it sought relief under ERISA. Having dismissed the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in Counts III and IV, and dismissed them without prejudice as well.

Disability Benefit Claims

Eighth Circuit

Coleman v. Continental American Ins. Co., No. 26-cv-0522 (ECT/DJF), 2026 WL 3458557 (D. Minn. Nov. 13, 2026) (Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster). Elisha Coleman was hired by Ecolab, Inc. in December 2022 and became insured under its long-term disability plan, which was insured and administered by Continental American Insurance Company (better known as Aflac). After a deer tick bite in July 2023, Coleman developed disabling symptoms attributed to suspected Lyme disease. Coleman resigned in 2024. In 2025, he and his counsel contacted Aflac to initiate short-term and long-term disability claims. Aflac replied that he was ineligible for short-term benefits and sent a letter about Family and Medical Leave Act eligibility that did not address the long-term claim. Coleman submitted proof of loss on October 7, 2025, but his counsel could not get any information about the claim despite multiple calls. On November 13, 2025, counsel wrote that Coleman would deem the claim exhausted if Aflac did not respond within seven days. Aflac did not respond, and Coleman brought this action seeking plan benefits under ERISA in January 2026. Aflac opened its review only after the lawsuit began and issued a formal denial on April 15, 2026. It then sought to include in the administrative record the post-litigation documents generated in that review, including internal claim notes, emails with Ecolab, medical record requests, and the denial letter. Coleman moved to exclude those post-exhaustion documents. The court denied the motion from the bench at a September 29, 2026 hearing but later vacated that ruling. In this order, on sua sponte reconsideration, the court concluded that its earlier order “was erroneous.” The court began with ERISA’s claims procedure regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1. A disability claim decision is due within 45 days absent a properly noticed extension, and if the plan fails to “strictly adhere” to that requirement, the claimant is deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies, the claim is deemed denied without the exercise of discretion, and de novo review applies unless the violation is de minimis. Aflac never sought an extension, so its decision was due by November 21, 2025, at the latest, and as of that date the claim was exhausted, deemed denied, and subject to de novo review. The de minimis exception did not apply. Aflac’s delay and repeated failures to respond prejudiced Coleman, and because Aflac did not begin its review until after suit or request additional information, the violation did not occur in the context of an ongoing, good faith exchange of information. Aflac “has not seriously contested any of the above conclusions,” but it argued that there was “nonetheless good cause to expand the record to include the post-litigation documents.” The court acknowledged its authority to do so, but noted that the Eighth Circuit focuses largely on whether the party seeking to add evidence had an opportunity to present it during the administrative proceedings, and “[a]n opportunity and failure to present the additional evidence shows a lack of good cause.” Here, Aflac had ample opportunity to investigate and failed to do so. Asked at the hearing why no decision was made within the regulatory timeframe, its counsel conceded: “There is no good explanation, Your Honor. There is really no explanation. The information was submitted to Continental. It failed to act on the information. I’ll concede that point.” Aflac argued that the de novo standard of review supported its arguments, but the court stated that “the fact that review is de novo is not alone a sufficient justification to expand the administrative record.” Aflac also argued that exclusion “would leave the Court to resolve a fact-intensive disability determination on a record lacking information on which the benefits decision was based.” The court called that statement “simply untrue,” because the denial was effective pursuant to the regulation on November 21, 2025, and “[t]he post-litigation documents are unnecessary to understand the basis for that decision.” The existing record, which Aflac did not dispute, already contained extensive information, including the policy, Coleman’s job and resignation documents, medical records, claim forms, and other documents, which was sufficient to decide the claim on the merits. As a result, the court granted Coleman’s request to exclude Aflac’s post-litigation documents.

Jackson v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 4:26-cv-00225-JAR, 2026 WL 3438837 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 12, 2026) (Judge John A. Ross). Lynette Jackson, a former employee of American Water, participated in the company’s ERISA-governed short- and long-term disability benefit plan, which was administered by Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company. She alleged that she became disabled in October 2019 because of “panic attacks, anxiety, PTSD symptoms, and migraine-related impairments,” and that she was under continuous psychiatric treatment. Hartford approved short-term disability benefits through October 2020. When they expired, Jackson applied for long-term disability benefits, which Hartford denied because “Plaintiff did not have LTD coverage based on employer representations.” She alleges in this pro se action that Hartford neither independently verified her eligibility nor evaluated the medical evidence. She seeks past-due and future benefits, interest, and fees and costs under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The case was Jackson’s third attempt at pleading her claims; in its last dismissal the court ruled that she had failed to specify the nature of her disability. (Your ERISA Watch covered that decision in our February 11, 2026 edition.) Jackson also moved to proceed in forma pauperis, for appointment of counsel, and for expedited rulings. The court granted the in forma pauperis motions and proceeded to screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court first held that Jackson failed to plead exhaustion. The court stated that a participant’s ERISA claim does not accrue until the plan issues a final denial, which requires exhausting the plan’s internal remedies. Although ERISA contains no express exhaustion requirement, the Eighth Circuit has construed it to require exhaustion, and exhaustion bars suit where a participant “fails to pursue and exhaust administrative remedies that are clearly required under a plan.” Jackson’s allegations that she received short-term benefits, applied for long-term benefits, and was told she lacked coverage, constituted “the entirety of her pleadings that could plausibly be construed to relate to administrative exhaustion. But Hartford’s alleged wrongful denial of LTD benefits alone does not permit this Court to assume or infer that Jackson exhausted Hartford’s internal appeal procedures before filing a lawsuit. This alone defeats her claim.” Alternatively, the court held that Jackson’s complaint failed to state a claim. In her new complaint Jackson had adequately described her disabling conditions, but this was not enough. “Jackson’s conclusory assertion that Hartford wrongly denied LTD benefits, without factual pleadings identifying specific terms that entitle her to LTD benefits under the plan for her conditions, is insufficient to state a claim under ERISA… The Court therefore finds that Jackson has failed to allege facts stating a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).” Finally, the court declined to appoint counsel. The issues – whether Jackson exhausted Hartford’s appeal procedures and whether her conditions qualified for benefits under the terms of an identified plan – were “not complex,” and Jackson “has had numerous past opportunities to cure the deficiencies in her pleadings.” The action was dismissed without prejudice.

Medical Benefit Claims

Sixth Circuit

J.Y. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 26-cv-11173, 2026 WL 3438159 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2026) (Judge Robert J. White). J.Y. participated in an ERISA-governed health benefit plan, the Simply Blue HRA Group Benefits Plan, which Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) administered and insured. In 2023, J.Y.’s minor child, G.T., was suffering from ADHD, anxiety, depression, panic attacks, insomnia, and ideations of self-harm. J.Y. admitted G.T. to Summit Achievement, an out-of-network residential treatment facility in Maine, and G.T. also underwent psychological testing by Dr. Todd Corelli, an out-of-network provider. BCBSM rejected Summit’s claims because the facility was a non-participating provider and paid Dr. Corelli’s claims only up to an “approved amount,” leaving J.Y. responsible for the balance. Administrative appeals failed, so J.Y. and G.T. brought this action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) for the denied benefits and for violation of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act. BCBSM moved to dismiss. Because the plan did not clearly grant BCBSM discretionary authority, the court reviewed the plan document de novo. It also held that the absence of the administrative record was no barrier to deciding the motion. It called coverage of Summit’s services “a straightforward question.” The plan expressly excluded non-emergency services at non-participating psychiatric residential treatment facilities, and the complaint acknowledged that Summit was not a participating provider. Plaintiffs argued that Summit should be treated as in-network because the plan lacked adequate participating facilities, but the plan covered out-of-state non-participating facilities only in “limited circumstances,” and “‘BCBSM or its representative’ must preapprove those services ‘before they occur.’” Plaintiffs conceded that J.Y. did not obtain preapproval, and thus they were not entitled to reimbursement. Plaintiffs’ alternative theory, raised for the first time in their response brief, was that the plan’s “Case Management Program” covered the services. But that program required a signed case management contract and rested in BCBSM’s sole discretion, and BCBSM never decided whether G.T. qualified or approved the non-contractual services. As for the treatment provided by Dr. Corelli, the plan paid out-of-network providers the lesser of the billed charge or a “maximum payment level,” meaning either the rate BCBSM pays participating providers or a rate negotiated with the provider. BCBSM did not negotiate a rate with Dr. Correlli, and the participating-provider rate was a predetermined sum unrelated to the testing performed, so the underpayment claim failed. The court turned next to the Parity Act claim. It noted that the Sixth Circuit has not decided whether the Act has a private right of action, but that the First and Tenth Circuits have assumed one. Using that assumption, the court applied the Tenth Circuit’s four-part test requiring plausible allegations that (1) the Act governs the plan, (2) identify a specific treatment limitation on mental health benefits, (3) identify an analogous medical or surgical benefit, and (4) identify a disparity between the two. It rejected the facial challenge, which argued that the plan imposed a preapproval requirement on out-of-network psychiatric residential facilities without a corresponding requirement for out-of-network skilled nursing facilities. The plan conditioned skilled nursing facility coverage on a physician’s “written confirmation indicating that skilled care is needed,” and while that language did not mirror the residential treatment formula, “the effect is the same.” The as-applied challenge rested on a “network disparity” theory, under which too few in-network residential facilities forced members out of network and produced more frequent denials. The court rejected it for three reasons. First, the complaint alleged that the plan had only three participating intermediate residential inpatient providers but said nothing about the number of participating skilled nursing facilities or hospices. Second, even assuming a network disparity, it was not alone a “treatment limitation,” and the complaint did not trace it to BCBSM’s application of any of the nonquantitative treatment limitation standards in the regulation. Third, nothing supported an inference of more frequent denials; the theory was “too speculative to be plausible.” Finally, plaintiffs requested leave to amend if the court found the complaint lacking in specificity. The court held that “[t]hat avenue is now foreclosed” because “a bare request” in an opposition is not a sufficient motion for leave to amend, and in any event plaintiffs did not “propose the specific factual amendments that would support their entitlement to relief.” BCBSM’s motion to dismiss was thus granted.

Ninth Circuit

Daniel V.A. v. Anthem Blue Cross Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 26-cv-02330-JST, 2026 WL 3522396 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2026) (Judge Jon S. Tigar). Daniel V.A. is an employee of Gilead Sciences, Inc. and a participant in its ERISA-governed health plan. The plan is self-funded; Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance Company provides claim processing and provider contracting services. Daniel V.A.’s minor child, J.K.A., received twelve weeks of treatment at blueFire Wilderness Therapy, an outdoor behavioral health program for adolescents. Anthem denied the claims for this treatment because blueFire was not an in-network provider; the services were “excluded as non-emergency out-of-network services received without prior authorization.” The denial left the family responsible for more than $58,000 in out-of-pocket costs for J.K.A.’s treatment. Plaintiffs brought this action, asserting a claim for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) and a claim under the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act. Anthem moved to dismiss, and in its ruling the court considered the plan benefit booklet, which Anthem attached to its motion, and which was incorporated by reference into the complaint. On the benefits claim, the plan excluded services provided by a nonparticipating provider “without an authorized referral, except emergency services or urgent care,” and plaintiffs did not allege that blueFire was in-network or that they obtained prior authorization. They offered two theories, and the court rejected both. First, they argued that the plan’s “post-service review” process would have allowed them to obtain the needed authorization after the fact. However, the plan defined “authorized referral” and “precertification” as distinct processes. An authorized referral turns on the availability of an appropriate in-network provider and must be obtained from the claims administrator “before services are rendered,” whereas precertification is a medical necessity review. Post-service review is available when “a needed precertification was not obtained” and nothing in the plan suggested that this cured the absence of an authorized referral. The theory therefore could not save a claim that was “otherwise clearly excluded from the Plan’s coverage.” Second, plaintiffs argued that a factfinder could conclude that blueFire provided “urgent care,” relying on J.K.A.’s serious diagnoses, “extreme and self-harming behavior patterns,” and the intensive nature of the treatment. The court observed that the complaint contained none of those details, and that even if it had, they would not suffice. The plan defined urgent care as services to prevent serious deterioration of health resulting from an “unforeseen” illness or condition “for which treatment cannot be delayed.” The complaint alleged that J.K.A. had suffered from insomnia, obsessive compulsive disorder, anxiety, and depression for years before her admission and had previously been treated by several mental health professionals, so her conditions were not unforeseen. Nor did the complaint allege that treatment could not be delayed. Plaintiffs’ Parity Act claim fared no better. Plaintiffs argued that “the absence of participating wilderness therapy programs violates the Act given the existence of at least one participating skilled nursing, hospice, or rehabilitation facility.” Anthem responded that blueFire’s services could have been covered had plaintiffs sought an authorized referral. The court held, as a preliminary matter, that the complaint did not plead that the authorized referral requirement itself violated the Act. It alleged that J.K.A.’s treatment was excluded based on geographic location, provider specialty, or similar criteria, but acknowledged that the exclusion actually rested on plaintiffs’ failure to obtain an authorized referral, a requirement that applies to all out-of-network providers of both mental and physical health services. The court added that even had plaintiffs pleaded that theory, it was not clear they could have succeeded without alleging that authorized referrals for wilderness programs are denied, because the Act focuses on limitations that result in denials of coverage. They also had not argued that the higher administrative burden of seeking a referral was itself a violation. As a result, Anthem’s motion to dismiss was granted, but the court granted plaintiffs leave to amend “solely for the purpose of addressing the deficiencies identified herein.”

Pleading Issues & Procedure

Fourth Circuit

Pincelli v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 3:23-cv-3548-SAL, 2026 WL 3409795 (D.S.C. Nov. 10, 2026) (Judge Sherri A. Lydon). Ann Pincelli filed this action in 2023 against Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company after it denied her claim for ERISA-governed long-term disability benefits. In August of this year, the court vacated Reliance’s decision and remanded the case to Reliance for further proceedings, and it entered a judgment to that effect. Pincelli then moved to alter or amend the remand order. She asked the court to direct Reliance to complete its review within a set time, to retain jurisdiction over the matter, and to consider her motion for attorney’s fees in the interim. Reliance opposed, arguing that the motion was largely moot. The briefing revealed that Reliance’s review was already underway when Pincelli filed her motion, so the court ordered the parties to file a joint status report on the outcome. In November, the parties reported that Reliance had completed its review and denied Pincelli’s claim again. They also submitted a proposed schedule for filing an updated administrative record and managing the case going forward. The court found that much of the relief Pincelli sought was unnecessary because Reliance had “expeditiously reviewed and decided her claim,” and the short delay was one the parties had agreed to so that Pincelli could submit additional information. The court also saw “no real dispute” that it retained jurisdiction over post-remand issues. The court thus denied as moot Pincelli’s motion “to amend the order to either set a deadline for Reliance Standard’s review or to affirmatively retain jurisdiction of this matter.” The court did, however, revisit its judgment. Because further review was necessary, the judgment was “in tension with that further review and could create confusion as to finality.” The court accordingly vacated the judgment and stayed the case “until it is ripe for further review.” As for attorney’s fees, Pincelli had filed a separate motion, which the court said it would resolve in a separate order. The court also indicated it will enter a scheduling order governing the case going forward.

Seventh Circuit

Bangalore v. Froedtert Health, Inc., No. 20-cv-893-PP, 2026 WL 3417917 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 4, 2026) (Judge Pamela Pepper). Nitish Bangalore filed this putative ERISA class action in 2020 against Froedtert Health, Inc., its board of directors, and its benefit plan committee, alleging breach of the duty of prudence and a derivative failure to monitor based on excessive recordkeeping fees in the Froedtert Health 403(b) plan. (Your ERISA Watch has covered several orders in this case, including the court’s January 2022 and July 2025 rulings on defendants’ unsuccessful motions to dismiss.) On April 15, 2026, the court entered the parties’ stipulated protective order, which bars the use or disclosure of designated material “for any purposes whatsoever other than preparing for and conducting the litigation in which the information, documents, or other material were disclosed.” On April 23, plaintiff’s counsel emailed defense counsel that “based on the documents produced, we have a substantial forfeiture claim against Froedtert now,” which he proposed to bring in an amended complaint or a separate case. Defense counsel warned that a separate suit would violate the protective order. On June 10, plaintiff’s counsel sent a draft complaint for a new case, which defense counsel objected to. Plaintiff’s counsel then sent a revised version and immediately filed an expedited motion to remove the confidentiality designations on plan documents, summary plan descriptions, participant disclosures, Forms 5500, and audited financial statements. The next day he filed the proposed complaint, which challenges the plan’s allocation of plan forfeitures. Defendants moved to enforce the protective order and for sanctions, to restrict documents, and to reassign the new case to this court. The court observed that it was “remarkable that a dispute over a protective order could lead to eight motions, but that is exactly what has happened here.” First, the court denied the motion to remove the designations. The court’s local rules require two-way communication in a genuine effort to avoid judicial intervention, and “[a] single email sent a few hours before filing a motion, without waiting for a response or calling opposing counsel to determine whether he’d received the email, does not satisfy the Civil L.R. 37 certification requirement.” The court noted that had plaintiff waited, defendants would have voluntarily resolved two of the five challenged designations. It also granted defendants’ motions to restrict, finding the redactions narrowly tailored despite the disfavor of secrecy in judicial proceedings. On the motion to enforce the protective order, the court held that Rule 37(b) and its inherent authority permit sanctions for violating a protective order. It found the order to be “unambiguous,” requiring a party who wished to challenge the designations to proceed with that challenge and wait for a ruling. Plaintiff’s counsel “knew that filing another case using designated confidential documents from Bangalore would violate the Bangalore protective order.” His “eleventh-hour attempts to challenge the designations and revise the complaint do not make his actions any less a violation.” Because he offered “no justification for his conduct other than his post hoc attempts to scrub the record of any violations,” the court awarded defendants their reasonable fees and costs on all of the motions addressed in the order, to be paid by plaintiff’s counsel. However, the court declined to order withdrawal of the new complaint, because “dismissal – even without prejudice – requires a finding of willfulness or bad faith.” The filed complaint “suggests that the plaintiff tracked down information from the named plaintiffs and other publicly available sources,” such as Forms 5500, and nothing showed that discovery from this case had been shared with the plaintiffs in the new case. The court observed that a protective order is “designed to protect the privacy of information, not immunity from suit.” In the end, the court concluded that plaintiff’s counsel “made poor decisions” but that it would “not penalize the plaintiffs [in the new case] for their attorney’s poor judgment,” and warned that future violations would bring additional sanctions, “up to and including dismissal.” Finally, the court denied defendants’ request to reassign the new case to the court. The cases did not arise from substantially the same transaction or events, because this case concerns recordkeeping fees dating to 2014 and the new one concerns forfeitures beginning in 2020. The plaintiffs differ and the defendants only partly overlap. In short, “the violation of the court’s protective order in this case does not make [the new case] a related case that must be decided by this court.”

Provider Claims

Fifth Circuit

ER Addison LLC v. Cigna Healthcare of Texas, Inc., No. 3:24-CV-01828-N, 2026 WL 3438162 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2026) (Judge David C. Godbey). Four free-standing emergency centers – ER Addison, ER Hulen, ER Coit, and ER NearMe Plano – provide emergency care out of network to Cigna subscribers. They allege that three Cigna entities underpaid 2,055 claims for services provided between February 24, 2019, and June 30, 2022. Their second amended complaint asserts a claim for violation of ERISA payment obligations (Count I), breach of contract as to “non-self-funded ERISA plan claims” (Count II), negligent misrepresentation (Count III), unjust enrichment (Count IV), and attorney’s fees under ERISA (Count V). Cigna moved to dismiss all counts under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court noted at the outset that another judge in the district (Sidney A. Fitzwater) had decided “a very similar case” only months earlier, in which several of the same centers brought “almost identical claims,” “often with word-for-word parity between the pleadings.” (Your ERISA Watch covered that decision, in which Aetna was the defendant, in our April 15, 2026 edition.) The court noted that the Aetna decision was not binding on it, and it “exercises its own judgment.” However, “it finds the Aetna court’s reasoning highly persuasive” and followed it throughout. Beginning with Count I, the court denied the motion, rejecting Cigna’s three arguments. First, Cigna argued that ER identified no plan provisions entitling it to reimbursement. The court responded that Fifth Circuit plaintiffs are not held to a burden of identifying particular plan provisions, because plan documents can be difficult to obtain, and that representative allegations suffice when other facts support a plausible inference of liability. ER alleged that Cigna “has violated the plain terms of its plans” by underpaying out-of-network claims, “at the usual and customary level that its plans require,” and that it had requested plan documents on multiple occasions. The court found that these allegations distinguished the case from dismissals where no attempt to obtain plan documents was pleaded. Second, Cigna argued that the Texas emergency care statutes and the Affordable Care Act were inapplicable or created no private right of action. The court held that disagreement over ER’s interpretation of those statutes did not render the claims implausible and could be resolved later. Third, Cigna argued that ER lacked standing because many of its plans contained anti-assignment provisions. However, ER pleaded estoppel, contending that during a “multi-year” course of dealing Cigna never invoked any anti-assignment provisions, which was sufficient for the court at the pleading stage. On Count II, the court followed the Aetna case and distinguished between post-2019 and pre-2020 services. For post-2019 services, ER lacked standing as the patients’ assignee because the Texas Emergency Care Statutes shield insureds from balance billing. The relevant patients therefore suffered no Article III injury from the alleged underpayment, “there is no concrete financial injury,” and no cause of action existed to be assigned. For pre-2020 services, ER’s allegations were limited to Cigna’s obligations under its own plans and did not conflict with Texas law, but because of ERISA preemption “[o]nly those breach of contract claims not based upon benefits claims related to an ERISA plan survive[] the motion to dismiss.” The court dismissed Count III (negligent misrepresentation). As in Aetna, the alleged misrepresentations occurred after the insureds had bought their policies, received emergency services, and submitted claims, so no justifiable reliance by the insureds was plausibly pleaded. To the extent ER asserted its own claim, it showed no harm from any misrepresentations, only that the claims were denied. The court also dismissed Count IV (unjust enrichment) because “quasi-contractual claims are unavailable when a valid, express contract governing the subject matter of the dispute exists.” Alternative pleading is available only when a party disputes the contract’s existence, which was not the case with Cigna’s plan documents. Finally, Cigna argued that a four-year limitations period barred claims accruing before July 17, 2020. ER did not respond to this argument in its briefing. The court generally agreed that claims accruing outside the limitations period will be dismissed but noted that no specific claims had been presented. Thus, “because it cannot dismiss discrete claims based on specific facts, it denies Cigna’s motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations at this stage.”

Retaliation Claims

Second Circuit

Martin v. Google LLC, No. 3:25-CV-587 (SVN), 2026 WL 3458571 (D. Conn. Nov. 13, 2026) (Judge Sarala V. Nagala). Peter Martin, a Google Cloud sales representative, spent years pursuing the Otis Elevator account based on his managers’ alleged oral promise that his compensation for acquiring it would be based on a lucrative commission plan. In July 2023, he was diagnosed with Stage 4 colon cancer and told his supervisors. In December 2023, he closed a $35 million contract with Otis, but Google paid him no commissions on it. In early 2024, Google demoted him and lowered his performance rating, and in May 2024 it told him he would be terminated effective July 28, 2024. Martin alleges in this action that he was terminated on July 31, 2024, to eliminate near-certain liability under Google’s ERISA-covered life insurance plan, which would have paid his spouse a $2 million death benefit plus 50 percent of his annual earnings for ten years if he died while employed. In March of this year, the court dismissed Martin’s amended complaint but gave him leave to amend. (Your ERISA Watch covered this ruling in our March 11, 2026 edition.) His second amended complaint asserted twelve counts, including ADA, Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, ERISA, wage law, and common law claims. Google moved to dismiss all but the Connecticut discrimination counts. The court denied the motion as to the ADA claims, finding it plausible that a May 29 termination notice was not “definite” given the mixed messages Google sent in July, so that his EEOC charge was timely measured from his July 31 termination. On Martin’s first ERISA claim, for plan benefits, the court held that Martin failed to state a claim. The complaint alleged that life insurance benefits were triggered only by his death during employment, and it offered no factual basis for his assertion that he was owed some “vested percentage.” Martin’s briefing recast the claim as one for “interference with the right to maintain coverage,” but he cited no authority recognizing such a claim under § 502(a)(1)(B). At oral argument, Martin’s counsel effectively conceded that he was pursuing only a § 510 interference claim, so the court turned to that claim next. Under § 510, a plaintiff must show that the employer was “at least in part motivated by the specific intent to engage in activity prohibited by § 510,” which requires “more than the incidental loss of benefits as a result of a discharge.” Thus, Martin had to plausibly allege a “minimal inference” of discriminatory motivation, and the court found he had not. First, the complaint did not plausibly allege that Google appreciated the severity of his diagnosis. Martin alleged that he “never missed a day of work due to his treatment,” which undermined any inference that Google knew how serious his condition was; he alleged only that Google “knew or should have known” of the low survival rate of his cancer. Second, Martin did not plausibly allege that Google was even partly motivated to terminate him because of having to pay the life insurance benefit. The timing also did not support Martin because he was terminated a full year after disclosing his diagnosis. In the end, the court stated, “Plaintiff alleges only that the unavailability of benefits was a consequence of his termination – not a motivating factor behind it.” The court also dismissed Martin’s state law claims. Although the court found a clear and definite oral promise plausibly alleged, the parol evidence rule barred the oral promise because the compensation agreements were written and integrated. Thus, the promissory estoppel, implied-in-fact contract, implied covenant, wage law, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment claims failed. The negligent misrepresentation claim failed for lack of allegations that Google knew its promise was false. The court thus granted most of Google’s motion, including its motion to dismiss the ERISA counts.

Withdrawal Liability & Unpaid Contributions

Ninth Circuit

Board of Trustees of the Bakery & Confectionery Union and Industry International Pension Fund v. United States Bakery, No. 3:21-cv-617-SI, 2026 WL 3408540 (D. Or. Nov. 10, 2026) (Judge Michael H. Simon). The Bakery and Confectionery Union and Industry International Pension Fund is a multiemployer pension plan. Svenhard’s Swedish Bakery, whose Oakland employees were represented by a Bakery Union local, was in severe financial difficulty by 2013. In March 2014 Svenhard’s approached United States Bakery (USB) about a sale, and USB’s CEO, Bob Albers, proposed separate purchases of Svenhard’s Exeter facility, equipment, and intellectual property so that USB would “not be liable for [Svenhard’s] unfunded Bakers pension amount.” The deals were stretched into a five-year plan under which Svenhard’s kept operating on leases and licenses until USB took over. During this time USB insisted on secrecy, telling Svenhard’s to “keep the emails to a minimum and have mainly phone calls instead.” When Svenhard’s closed its Oakland facility in December 2015, it withdrew from the plan and was assessed more than $50 million in withdrawal liability, payable at $162,941 monthly for 240 months, plus $514,847.67 in delinquent contributions. USB kept Svenhard’s afloat with loans, required it to forward every communication from the Pension Fund, and joined strategy meetings on the liability. Negotiations between Svenhard’s and the Pension Fund continued throughout this time, during which Svenhard’s never disclosed that it had sold its intellectual property to USB and was operating under a soon-to-expire license. In 2019 Svenhard’s signed a settlement agreement with the Pension Fund calling for $12,500 monthly for 240 months on the withdrawal liability and $8,580.80 monthly on the delinquent contributions. Svenhard’s CEO knew when he signed that USB would shortly take over. After USB did so on November 4, 2019, Svenhard’s, which had made six payments, missed its first payment after the takeover and filed for bankruptcy on December 19, 2019. The Pension Fund sued USB and its subsidiaries, Mountain States Bakeries and Central California Baking, as successors to Svenhard’s and under ERISA’s “evade or avoid” provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c). Defendants asserted waiver and discharge based on the settlement agreement. This order represented the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law after a six-day bench trial on liability. On the issue of successor liability, defendants did not dispute substantial continuity of business operations, and their counsel conceded that they “‘probably’ took over operations in a manner that showed substantial continuity.” This was because defendants used the same plant, recipes, trademark, and customers, and more than 90 percent of the workforce was rehired. The evidence of actual notice of the withdrawal liability was “overwhelming,” as defendants were “active, albeit secret, participants” in the settlement negotiations. On fairness, which “primarily turns on notice,” the court found that USB could have negotiated a steeper price discount or bought Svenhard’s through bankruptcy, and that the risk of its “convoluted” scheme was “better placed on Defendants than on the Pension Fund.” Indeed, “Permitting Defendants to avoid successor liability to Svenhard’s pension obligation would result in harm to the pensioners and other employers and a windfall to Defendants, contrary to the purpose of ERISA[.]” The court then turned to the settlement agreement, which defendants argued “effectively discharged Svenhard’s ERISA liabilities.” The court disagreed, ruling that the settlement agreement was voidable for (a) fraudulent inducement under Maryland law, which governed the agreement, and (b) violation of ERISA’s “evade or avoid” provision. On fraud, the court noted that Svenhard’s signed the settlement agreement representing that it needed the reduced payments to stay in business and could keep paying them. However, at that point Svenhard’s had already sold its intellectual property, was operating under a license about to expire, knew USB would take over within months, at which time it would stop operating and could not pay. It also hid this information from the Pension Fund, at USB’s direction, to keep USB from being pursued as a successor. Under the “evade or avoid” provision, the court found that the settlement agreement was “the culmination of a years-long plan” to keep the Pension Fund in the dark, and avoiding withdrawal liability was “a principal purpose” of the agreement. As a result, the transaction was void under Section 1392(c). In the end, the court concluded that USB was a successor employer to Svenhard’s under ERISA, and that all defendants were jointly and severally liable for Svenhard’s withdrawal liability and delinquent contributions. The court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding the next phase of trial: damages.

It was another slow week in ERISAland as the federal courts digested the results of last week’s blockbuster midterm elections.

There were several interesting decisions, however, including: (1) a case allowing a disability plan participant to sue the plan’s insurer for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to tell him he might be eligible for benefits (Ramos v. Standard); (2) a case allowing a medical plan participant to sue her insurer for breach of fiduciary duty for misleading her into believing her surgery would be covered (Robinson v. Health Care Serv. Corp.); and (3) a curious case allowing a plaintiff to proceed based on a theory that the defendants “treated similarly situated claimants differently,” even if the life insurance denial at issue wasn’t an abuse of discretion (Richards v. LifePoint).

Finally, on this Veterans Day Your ERISA Watch would like to thank all who have served or are serving our country. Here’s a list of unusual and thought-provoking places to reflect, including the Polar Bears Memorial in Troy, Michigan, and the Grave of Sinbad the Dog in Barnegat Light, New Jersey.

Below is a summary of this past week’s notable ERISA decisions by subject matter and jurisdiction.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Seventh Circuit

Ramos v. Standard Ins. Co., No. 26-cv-01477, 2026 WL 3320290 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2026) (Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman). Raul Ramos, a machine operator for G&W Electric, participated in the company’s ERISA-governed short-term and long-term disability plans, both administered by Standard Insurance Company. Although Standard administers claims under both plans, Standard is only financially responsible for benefits under the long-term plan, while the short-term claims are self-funded by G&W. Ramos stopped working in 2023 because of gout, tendinopathy of the right bicep, polyarthralgia, osteoarthritis in the right ankle and foot, asthma, and other conditions. He did not know he might be eligible for disability benefits and believed his condition “would be addressed solely through worker’s compensation.” Eventually he learned about the disability plans and applied for benefits in 2025, nearly two years after he stopped working. Both plans contained deadlines requiring proof of loss within specified periods after the waiting period and providing that “[i]f Proof Of Loss is filed outside these time limits, your claim will be denied.” Ramos sued in February of this year after Standard “failed to issue a decision with respect to his application for benefits.” Standard responded with a motion to dismiss. Ramos then amended his complaint without opposition, and the parties agreed that the amendment did not moot the motion. Standard argued that the plain language of the plans excluded Ramos from coverage because his application was untimely and that it breached no fiduciary duty. The court first addressed Ramos’s claim for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B). Standard had calculated filing deadlines of January 20, 2024, for the short-term plan and April 14, 2024, for the long-term plan. Ramos did not dispute those calculations, did not argue that he lacked capacity, and did not point to any tolling provision. Because “[i]t is…clear under strict construction of the terms of the Plan policies that Mr. Ramos’ benefits application was untimely,” the court dismissed any claim he might have for benefits under the plan. However, it reached a different result on equitable relief. Ramos’s amended complaint did not expressly allege a breach of fiduciary duty, but the court considered the argument in his response brief because a plaintiff “may elaborate on [] allegations [in a brief] so long as the elaborations are consistent with the pleading.” The court cited the three elements of such a claim: a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant is a fiduciary, (2) the defendant breached its duty, and (3) the breach caused harm. The first and third elements were “easily satisfied” because Standard, as a plan administrator, was “certainly a fiduciary,” and a breach would have caused Ramos to miss his deadline and lose eligibility for benefits. As for the second element, the court cited a fiduciary’s duty to affirmatively communicate material facts, which requires that a fiduciary “cannot remain silent if it knows or should know that the beneficiary is laboring under a material misunderstanding of plan benefits” and its obligations are not excused “merely because [the beneficiary] failed to comprehend or ask about a technical aspect of the plan.” However, the court also recognized that “ERISA does not require plan administrators to investigate each participant’s circumstances and prepare advisory opinions for literally thousands of employees.” The court stated that it “understands the critical question in this case to be whether Standard Insurance knew or should have known that Mr. Ramos was eligible (or potentially eligible) for benefits. If so, then Standard Insurance likely had a fiduciary duty to inform Mr. Ramos about his potential eligibility and the deadlines for applying for benefits.” The complaint did not definitively allege Standard’s knowledge, but at the pleading stage the court drew reasonable inferences in Ramos’s favor. If Ramos received workers’ compensation, G&W must have known of his ailments, and Standard would have known if it administered G&W’s workers’ compensation fund. Even if not, it was “reasonable to assume that G&W is in regular communication with Standard Insurance (the administrator of the Short-Term Plan) about its actual and potential financial obligations under the Short-Term Plan.” While “concrete proof is lacking,” the allegations showed more than a “mere possibility” of a breach, and “the question of what Standard Insurance knew and when is an issue of Standard Insurance’s state of mind that is not usually appropriate to resolve on a motion to dismiss.” The court also rejected Standard’s argument that it could not be liable for short-term plan benefits because only G&W pays them. Although a benefits claim must be brought against the party obligated to pay, “the question of whether Mr. Ramos is entitled to legal relief under the Short-Term Plan (which the Court has already resolved in the negative) has no bearing on the question of whether Standard Insurance breached its fiduciary duty as the administrator of the Short-Term Plan.” Thus, “It would be premature at this point to dismiss any such claims for equitable relief against Standard Insurance.” As a result, Standard’s motion was only partly granted; Ramos’s equitable relief claim will proceed.

Disability Benefit Claims

Eighth Circuit

Regulus v. Ascension Long Term Disability Plan, No. 4:25-cv-00616-SRC, 2026 WL 3320297 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 3, 2026) (Judge Stephen R. Clark). Raven Regulus, a behavioral-health counselor, stopped working in 2021 after reporting symptoms she attributed to mold and toxin exposure during workplace renovations. She participated in Ascension’s ERISA-governed long-term disability plan, which delegated claim administration to Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. Under the plan, benefits continue after 24 months only if a participant cannot perform “any work or service for which the Participant is reasonably qualified,” and the plan conditioned benefits on proof of disability satisfactory to the claims administrator, defined as “objective medical evidence.” Sedgwick approved long-term disability benefits from 2022 through 2024, when it told her she would have to satisfy the plan’s “any occupation” definition to continue. Sedgwick requested additional medical information from Regulus and her doctors and, when the information it received did not establish that she could not work in any occupation, extended her benefits so she could undergo another examination. The examining physician, Dr. Liana Palacci, concluded that Regulus “should be able to perform sedentary work for any occupation after completing her current course of physical therapy,” and two vocational evaluations identified sedentary occupations in her labor market that fit her background and training. As a result, Sedgwick terminated Regulus’s benefits. On appeal, Regulus submitted additional medical records, and Sedgwick referred the file to two more physicians, Dr. Henry Richardson, board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation and pain management, and Dr. Sandy Lee, board certified in rheumatology and internal medicine. Both disagreed with her treating providers about her functional impairment, with Dr. Lee citing the “paucity of provider documentation.” Sedgwick told Regulus that it would decide the appeal unless she submitted more information or requested more time, and Regulus said she had no additional information, asked for a decision that day, and waived the 21-day comment period. Sedgwick upheld the termination, and Regulus brought this action against Ascension and Sedgwick, which proceeded to cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties agreed that the plan gave Sedgwick discretionary authority, so the court reviewed the decision for abuse of discretion. The court noted that an administrator may choose between reliable but conflicting medical opinions and may accept reviewing physicians over treating physicians unless the record does not support the denial. The court found that “Sedgwick did what the law commits to claim administrators: It weighed evidence and came to a decision that has support in the record.” Its denial letters detailed the plan’s definition of disability and the records reviewed, which included the examination, the opinions of Drs. Richardson and Lee, the vocational analyses, and more than seventy records from more than forty providers. Each of the three reviewing doctors concluded that Regulus lacked a qualifying disability, and Drs. Richardson and Lee “simply evaluated her disability differently” than her providers did. The court noted that Sedgwick “wasn’t required to favor Regulus’s doctors’ opinions just because they were her treating physicians,” and indeed, “[a] plan administrator may even prefer the opinion of its own consulting physician over that of an applicant’s treating physician.” The court rejected Regulus’s two principal objections. She argued that Sedgwick refused to credit her treating physicians’ opinions as legally sufficient evidence of disability, but the court, relying on its prior analysis, held that Sedgwick and its reviewing doctors acted within their discretion in disagreeing with her providers. Regulus also argued that Sedgwick’s notices violated 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g) by never telling her what she needed in order to prove that her “constellation of impairments” was disabling. Regulus focused on a nurse case manager’s statement about “the lack of supporting medical information” and on a short excerpt from the June 2024 denial letter. However, the court found that Regulus’s excerpt abridged a lengthy passage in the denial letter that listed the kinds of evidence she could submit on appeal, including provider observations and findings, office visit notes, lab and radiology reports, and therapy notes. Considering all of Sedgwick’s communications, the court found the notice sufficient. As a result, the court granted Ascension and Sedgwick’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court declined, however, to award Ascension and Sedgwick their requested attorneys’ fees.

ERISA Preemption

Seventh Circuit

Kelly v. NiSource Inc., No. 2:26-CV-00321-GSL-JEM, 2026 WL 3333711 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 3, 2026) (Judge Gretchen S. Lund). David Kelly, a former NiSource executive, alleged that NiSource breached a 2003 contract “executed pursuant to [his] participation in [a] Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan,” under which it agreed to pay “100% of [his] medical benefit insurance.” In January 2026, Kelly’s retiree medical coverage changed, requiring him to pay part of his premiums. In this pro se complaint he seeks to recoup those costs and restore his prior coverage. He attached six exhibits to his complaint, including a “Benefits Comparison” chart stating that “[i]f you retire on or before January 1, 2004, NiSource pays 100% of your medical cost and you pay 0%,” and an unsigned, undated list of his “termination benefits.” He also attached NiSource’s February 2026 letter responding to his claim for restored coverage, which reviewed each document he relied on, explained why none entitled him to additional benefits, and informed him of his right to appeal within 180 days and, afterward, to bring a civil action under ERISA. Kelly brought his action in Indiana state court, and NiSource removed it, arguing that his claims were completely preempted by ERISA because they challenged the terms of NiSource’s ERISA-governed “Post-65 Retiree Medical Plan,” in which Kelly admitted he participates. Kelly’s “Reply to Notice of Removal,” which the court construed as a motion to remand, argued that his “individual medical indemnity agreement” was a separate agreement not governed by ERISA. NiSource moved to dismiss on preemption grounds and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Addressing jurisdiction first, the court applied the two-part test of Aetna v. Davila to determine whether complete preemption applied. The first prong asks whether the plaintiff could have brought his claim under § 502(a)(1)(B). Kelly had not attached any separate contract to his pleadings, and his exhibits, read with NiSource’s briefing, suggested a dispute over the range of benefits under the ERISA plan. The benefits chart appeared to be a handout describing estimated costs and coverage options for future retirees, and the court found that the “contractual agreement” in the second exhibit “plainly refers to a group retirement plan.” NiSource’s denial letter reinforced the point, since Kelly had sought to restore his benefits through the plan’s ERISA review procedures and NiSource had addressed his claim under an ERISA framework. The court reached the same result even assuming Kelly had plausibly alleged a separate contract. In Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), the plaintiff argued that he sought to enforce a contract that was not an employee benefit plan, but the Seventh Circuit held that “[a] suit based on the difference between the pension promised by contract and the pension established by the plan ‘relates to’ the pension plan,” and that while “some courts” treat a contract to enhance benefits as distinct from the plan, the Seventh Circuit “[is] not among them.” The court found “[t]hat logic applies squarely to Plaintiff’s medical plan here.” Under the second Davila prong, the court found no independent legal duty because resolving the claim would require analysis of Kelly’s current benefits, “whether [] benefits were vested, [and] whether NiSource properly administered [Kelly’s] plan.” Furthermore, Kelly was “not attempt[ing] to remedy any violation of a legal duty independent of ERISA.” The claim was thus completely preempted, the court had jurisdiction, and Kelly’s motion to remand was denied. As for NiSource’s motion to dismiss, the court held that exhaustion, though an affirmative defense, may be resolved under Rule 12(b)(6) where the plaintiff’s allegations clearly point to the defense. Kelly did not contest that he failed to appeal the February 2026 denial, as the letter instructed, and he did not allege futility, since the letter promised a full review without “deference to the adverse benefit determination.” The court thus granted NiSource’s motion to dismiss. Noting that Kelly had brought “a garden-variety state law claim” that the court had now converted into an ERISA claim, the court allowed him to amend his complaint.

Eighth Circuit

G.A. v. Health Care Service Corp., No. 1:26-cv-00181-SNLJ, 2026 WL 3319160 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 3, 2026) (Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr.). G.A., a minor, and his parents, Kevin and Tracey Akers, sued Health Care Service Corporation over the denial of coverage for an emergency air ambulance transport. G.A., who was seven years old at the time, was a passenger in a vehicle struck head-on by an impaired driver who crossed lanes at 90 miles per hour. He was flown from Cape Girardeau, Missouri to St. Louis for treatment of life-threatening injuries. The family was covered by a group health insurance policy provided through Kevin’s employer and administered by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, which is a subsidiary of defendant. Defendant denied the claim based on an internal determination that air transport was not medically necessary, contrary to the findings of G.A.’s treating providers. Plaintiffs exhausted their internal appeals and then filed this action in state court, asserting claims for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. Defendant removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction and moved to dismiss the claims as preempted by ERISA. Plaintiffs responded by filing a first amended complaint that asserted the contract and vexatious refusal claims in Count I and a denial of benefits claim under ERISA in Count II. Defendant then moved to dismiss the state law claims in Count I based on ERISA preemption. In this order, the court framed the motion around three questions: whether the policy was an ERISA plan, whether it fell within the ERISA safe harbor, and, if it was a plan outside the safe harbor, whether the state law claims are preempted. However, the court never got past question one because it could not determine whether ERISA preempted Count I. Defendant had submitted a policy with its removal documents, authenticated by a declaration from one of its employees, but plaintiffs disputed that it was the policy at issue and argued that it was incomplete or “silent on a number of significant issues.” (Plaintiffs did not attach a policy to their state court petition or the amended complaint.) The court rejected defendant’s argument that because plaintiffs had pled an ERISA claim in Count II, that counted as an admission that the policy is governed by ERISA. The court noted that plaintiffs added that claim only after defendant moved to dismiss on preemption grounds, and because Count I seeks recovery under state law if the policy is not governed by ERISA while Count II seeks recovery if it is. Because plaintiffs disputed the accuracy of defendant’s policy, factual issues existed which could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the preemption issue “is more properly addressed by a motion for summary judgment after the parties have engaged in discovery.” As a result, the court denied defendant’s partial motion to dismiss.

Life Insurance & AD&D Benefit Claims

Fifth Circuit

Richards v. LifePoint Health Welfare Benefits Plan, No. 3:25-CV-3541-X, 2026 WL 3391457 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2026) (Judge Brantley Starr). Tiffany Richards’s husband began full-time employment with LifePoint and elected life insurance coverage on November 25, 2024. On December 26, 2024, he collapsed, was taken to a hospital, and never returned to work. He died on February 2, 2025. The policy required employees to complete an eligibility waiting period, which ended on the “first of the month following 30 days of continuous, Active Employment.” Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, the policy issuer, denied Richards’s claim because it read the policy to require active employment through the waiting period and any remaining days until coverage began. Because Mr. Richards did not work from December 26 through January 1, when his coverage would have started, Lincoln deemed him ineligible. Richards sued the plan, and the court granted LifePoint’s first motion to dismiss without prejudice. Applying abuse of discretion review, it held that LifePoint prevailed “so long as Lincoln’s interpretation of the Policy is at least on the low end of reasonableness,” and that it was “not unreasonable to conclude that the Policy requires continuous Active Employment for the entire Eligibility Waiting Period.” The court allowed Richards to amend to allege facts showing that Lincoln and LifePoint had treated similarly situated claimants differently, which could amount to an abuse of discretion or a pleading dispute requiring discovery. (Your ERISA Watch covered this ruling in our June 3, 2026, edition.) Richards filed an amended complaint in which she alleged that (1) LifePoint abused its discretion in denying coverage; (2) the deferential standard no longer applied because LifePoint failed to provide required documents and information; and (3) Texas insurance law, which bars discretionary clauses, made the abuse of discretion standard inapplicable. LifePoint moved to dismiss again. In this order the court first addressed ERISA’s claims procedure regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1, which requires a plan to give a claimant, upon request and free of charge, reasonable access to “all documents, records, and other information relevant to the claimant’s claim for benefits.” Under § 2560.503-1(h)(2)(iii) and (m)(8), information is relevant if, among other things, it “demonstrates compliance with the administrative processes and safeguards required pursuant to paragraph (b)(5),” which in turn calls for processes designed to ensure that plan provisions “have been applied consistently with respect to similarly situated claimants.” LifePoint argued that it had to disclose only what Lincoln relied on in making its determination, namely the policy, the plan document, and Mr. Richards’s file, and that it had done so. However, “[t]he Court agrees with Richards.” It reasoned that, having permitted her to amend to allege disparate treatment, it could not fault her for failing to do so when LifePoint “refused to provide her with any information on how it assesses similar claims by other individuals it insures.” In the court’s words, “LifePoint deprived Richards of the information the Court required her to plead and the law entitled her to.” The court therefore denied the motion as to the first and second counts. On the third count, Richards argued that Texas law, which prohibits discretionary clauses in life insurance policies, governed. LifePoint responded that Tennessee law applied, and Tennessee does not bar such clauses. The court agreed with LifePoint. The plan provided that it and each component plan should be construed under ERISA and the law of the state identified in a component plan, or, absent one, Tennessee law. The policy was incorporated by reference into the plan as a component plan, and the administrator relied on, and gave Richards, the document containing the Tennessee choice-of-law provision. The court thus held that Tennessee law applied and that LifePoint’s denial should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, a standard the policy interpretation had already satisfied. The court thus granted in part and denied in part LifePoint’s motion to dismiss, allowing the first and second counts to proceed. The court limited discovery to Richards’s claim that LifePoint treats similarly situated individuals differently for purposes of life insurance claim denials.

Medical Benefit Claims

Seventh Circuit

Robinson v. Health Care Service Corp., No. 1:25-cv-00924-SEB-CSW, 2026 WL 3371861 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 6, 2026) (Judge Sarah Evans Barker). Mona Robinson receives dependent health coverage under AT&T Umbrella Benefit Plan No. 3 through her husband’s former employment with AT&T. Health Care Service Corporation, doing business as Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois (BCBSIL), is the claim administrator for the plan. Robinson’s in-network orthopedic surgeon recommended corrective surgery at North Meridian Surgery Center, where he practices and is a part owner. Before the surgery, the surgeon’s office and North Meridian sought prior authorization from BCBSIL, and Robinson alleged that she and North Meridian, on her behalf, asked to confirm that North Meridian was in her network and that North Meridian said it was. She had the surgery in May 2023. However, about six weeks later, BCBSIL told her that “[d]ue to the high dollar charges on th[e] claim,” “pre-payment review would be required,” and in July 2023 it declined coverage, explaining that the policy allows benefits only for services from Blue High-Performance Network providers and that benefits are “not guarantee[d]” when a claim is “submitted with only a PPO, Alternate network or Participating provider classification[.]” BCBSIL upheld the denial in November 2023, leaving Robinson responsible for $105,121.03. Robinson sued BCBSIL and the AT&T plan under ERISA, alleging that BCBSIL breached its fiduciary duty by preauthorizing an out-of-network surgery, and that BCBSIL and the plan breached the plan’s terms by refusing to pay benefits. BCBSIL moved to dismiss, arguing that Robinson improperly invoked § 1132(a)(3) to challenge a benefits denial that can proceed only under § 1132(a)(1)(B), and that it was not a proper defendant under § 1132(a)(1)(B). The plan moved to dismiss on grounds that mirrored BCBSIL’s, contending that Robinson failed to plead plan terms entitling her to benefits and that she could not assert a fiduciary breach claim against the plan. On the § 1132(a)(1)(B) benefits claim, the court granted BCBSIL’s motion because a claim for benefits “must be brought against the party having the obligation to pay the benefits,” and Robinson conceded that the plan, as a self-insured plan, is the proper defendant. The claim survived against the plan because Robinson alleged that the plan covers outpatient surgical services by an in-network surgeon whether or not the facility is in network. The plan language she cited, a list of covered outpatient services, offered “weak support at best,” but it was sufficient to plausibly state a claim. The plan argued that Robinson relied on the terms of a component program that did not apply to her, but this information, even if it “might ultimately prove fatal,” was outside the complaint and could not be considered. As for the fiduciary breach claim, the court dismissed it as applied to the plan. The amended complaint alleged no facts showing what the plan itself did or failed to do. Robinson argued that the plan is vicariously liable because its terms treat a third-party administrator’s actions as “an action by the Plan Administrator,” but the plan administrator, AT&T Services, Inc., was not a party. However, the court let Robinson’s fiduciary breach claim proceed against BCBSIL. Robinson plausibly alleged that BCBSIL misled her into believing the surgery would be covered by preauthorizing it without giving her complete and accurate information about her coverage, including whether North Meridian was in network. BCBSIL argued that the plan’s terms informed her that preauthorization does not guarantee coverage, but the pleadings did not identify the particular benefit program at issue, so the court could not resolve that argument. It also found unavailing BCBSIL’s argument that Robinson did not rely on any statements from BCBSIL, and instead relied on statements from her physicians, regarding whether they were in-network, as her allegations supported a reasonable inference that both she and North Meridian contacted BCBSIL. The court concluding by noting “‘[t]he more difficult [lurking] question’ of whether Ms. Robinson ‘may obtain meaningful relief’ on the theories of liability she has asserted in this case.” As for now, “her complaint is sufficient, even if barely, to survive Defendants’ pleading challenges.”

Pension Benefit Claims

Ninth Circuit

Berkeley v. Intel Corp., No. 5:23-cv-00343-EJD, 2026 WL 3322772 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2026) (Judge Edward J. Davila). Gregg Berkeley brought this class action against Intel Corporation and the Administrative Committee of the Intel Minimum Pension Plan, alleging that the plan used unreasonable actuarial assumptions when converting single life annuities to joint and survivor annuities. He claimed that the conversions, which relied on the GAM-83 mortality table and PBGC interest rates, violated the joint and survivor annuity requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 1055, the anti-forfeiture rule of 29 U.S.C. § 1053, and the committee’s fiduciary duty to the class. In April 2026, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. On the § 1055 claim, it held that the evidence did not show that a “‘reasonableness’ requirement may be inferred from the ordinary meaning of ‘actuarial equivalent,’ from congressional intent, or from Department of Treasury regulations.” It then rejected the § 1053 claim for the same reasons, observing that although forfeiture claims are not always derivative of actuarial equivalence claims, Berkeley relied on the same theory for both, namely that the plan unlawfully decreased the value of his benefits by applying unreasonable actuarial assumptions in violation of § 1055. (Your ERISA Watch covered this ruling in our April 15, 2026, edition.) Berkeley moved under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment, challenging only the § 1053 ruling. The court noted that Rule 59(e) relief is “an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources,” and generally available only to correct manifest errors of law or fact, to present newly discovered evidence, to prevent manifest injustice, or in light of an intervening change in controlling law. Berkeley argued that the court committed clear error in finding that his § 1053 claim relied on the same actuarial equivalence theory as his § 1055 claim, contending that the § 1053 claim instead rested on the statutory guarantee that an employee’s “normal retirement benefit” is nonforfeitable at normal retirement age. The court rejected the argument for several reasons. At the outset, it was not new, because Berkeley had argued in opposing summary judgment that the forfeiture provision does not turn on an interpretation of actuarial equivalence, and the court had considered and rejected it based on the complaint. The court pointed to three provisions in the complaint that supported its ruling. First, the complaint repeatedly alleged that the defendants violated § 1053 by failing to provide “actuarially equivalent” benefits, including allegations that paying less than the actuarial equivalent of an accrued benefit is an illegal forfeiture. Second, the complaint’s introductory allegations treated the two claims as resting on the same theory, asserting that the plan’s outdated mortality table violated both provisions, and its § 1053 count incorporated the reasons “explained above” in the § 1055 section. Third, although the complaint quoted the “normal retirement benefit” language, Berkeley did not actually invoke it, and the very next allegations asserted forfeiture based on “adjustments in excess of reasonable actuarial reductions.” His summary judgment opposition likewise cited the language only briefly before returning to the argument that the actuarial adjustment to his normal retirement benefit was “unreasonable.” The court also rejected Berkeley’s new argument that it should not have considered 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-11(b)(2) in analyzing § 1053, because his complaint relied on that regulation for both claims. The court thus denied Berkeley’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. Given the recent decisions from the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits that disagreed with the district court’s rulings in this case (neither of which were mentioned in this order), Your ERISA Watch expects an appeal to the Ninth Circuit.

Retaliation Claims

Sixth Circuit

Rankin v. Coulter Ventures, LLC, No. 2:25-cv-1334, 2026 WL 3319382 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2026) (Judge Douglas R. Cole). Rayshawn Rankin worked briefly for Rogue Fitness (the public-facing name of Coulter Ventures, LLC). Hired in August 2024, he was injured on the job ten days later, and Rogue fired him on October 23, 2024, citing attendance issues, after he allegedly was assigned tasks beyond his medical restrictions and was told that Rogue would “ask [him] to resign” if he needed surgery. Rankin alleged that he communicated his health insurance elections to Rogue’s HR staff in person, that Rogue never implemented them, and that it never told him of the failure or gave him a chance to elect again. Rogue’s HR director stated in a declaration that Rankin made no elections within the 30-day enrollment window. Rankin thus brought this pro se action, asserting five claims, the majority of which arose under the ADA. His fifth claim asserted a claim of interference with benefits under ERISA § 510. Rogue moved for summary judgment on all five, arguing that the four non-ERISA claims were untimely because Rankin’s complaint was docketed more than 90 days after his right-to-sue notice, and that the § 510 claim failed on the merits. The court denied the motion as to the non-ERISA claims, holding them timely because the 90-day period was tolled while Rankin’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis was pending, including the short interval in which he submitted a revised motion in response to the court’s deficiency order. On the § 510 claim, Rogue argued that Rankin had not created a triable issue on the “purpose of interfering” element of his claim, and that he never timely elected to participate in Rogue’s benefit programs. The court said Rogue’s argument “may turn out to be correct,” but concluded that summary judgment was premature because there had been no discovery – which had been stayed – on the claim. The court recognized that Rule 56(d) ordinarily requires an affidavit or declaration explaining why the nonmovant cannot present facts essential to oppose the motion, and Rankin’s declaration did not do so. But courts are more forgiving where a party has clearly explained its need for discovery elsewhere, and in his brief Rankin explained that he had not yet had discovery and that “[i]nternal communications, policies, and training materials” bearing on his claim remained in Rogue’s control. As for Rogue’s position that Rankin never properly enrolled in benefits, that issue also required at least some discovery, and Rankin, who is pro se, said he had relied on HR staff who led him to believe his elections were complete. Whether Rogue’s failure to enroll him was motivated by a purpose of interfering with his rights would depend on what the internal communications, policies, and training materials showed. As a result, the court denied Rogue’s motion for summary judgment, without prejudice to renewal once adequate discovery has occurred.

Class actions were the theme this week, as three wrapped up (Allison v. Republic Mortgage, Halter v. Providence, and Schuman v. Microchip), and fees were awarded in another (Bailey v. Sedgwick). The Schuman final approval is especially notable, as that case was filed in 2016 and has had several twists and turns, including a trip to the Ninth Circuit resulting in a published opinion establishing a new test for evaluating the enforceability of ERISA releases.

Other than that, it was a fairly slow week; everyone was likely too busy voting. See below for cases involving John Deere’s allegedly mendacious severance plan (Ahmed v. Deere), preemption of provider claims (Riverside v. Apex), and a doomed life insurance claim (Strawson v. Transport Labor), among others. We’ll be back next week.

Below is a summary of this past week’s notable ERISA decisions by subject matter and jurisdiction.

Class Actions

Fourth Circuit

Allison v. Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., No. 1:24-CV-950, 2026 WL 3300765 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 2, 2026); Allison v. Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., No. 1:24-CV-950, 2026 WL 3306356 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 2, 2026) (Judge Catherine C. Eagles). Matt Allison, a former employee of Republic Mortgage Insurance Company, participated in the company’s ERISA-governed defined contribution profit sharing plan. The plan’s guaranteed interest account (GIA) was its sole capital preservation option. Allison had his entire account in the GIA and suffered a loss of about nine percent around January 2024. He alleged that Republic Mortgage failed to prudently monitor the plan’s investment in the GIA, certified false and misleading statements about the risk of loss, and failed to act to avoid a $1.3 million loss of principal, even though it should have anticipated a market value adjustment as the phased shutdown of its mortgage insurance business approached. He sued under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109 and 1132(a). After a denied motion to dismiss, discovery, and an all-day mediation before a retired federal judge who specializes in ERISA cases (unnamed in the decision), the parties reached a $650,000 settlement on the basis of a non-opt-out class under Rule 23(b)(1). The court preliminarily approved that settlement, but soon after Allison moved for final approval, the Fourth Circuit decided Trauernicht v. Genworth Financial Inc. (Your ERISA Watch’s case of the week in our March 18, 2026, edition), which “undermin[ed] use of Rule 23(b)(1) in this kind of case.” After discussion with the court, the parties renegotiated and amended the settlement to substitute a Rule 23(b)(3) class. The court preliminarily approved the amended settlement on July 1, 2026, held a final fairness hearing on October 16, 2026, and in these two orders it granted final approval and awarded fees, costs, and a service award. In the final approval order, the court certified a settlement class of participants whose account balances were reduced by the market value adjustment to the GIA in or around January 2024, along with their beneficiaries and alternate payees. The class, identified from Republic Mortgage’s records, had 100 members, which satisfied ascertainability and numerosity, since a class of 40 or more is presumptively too numerous for joinder. Commonality rested on shared questions such as whether Republic Mortgage was a fiduciary and whether it failed to adequately monitor the GIA, typicality on the same alleged breach of fiduciary duty, and adequacy on the absence of conflicts. Predominance and superiority were satisfied because the claims arose from “a single course of conduct about a single investment option that was subject to a single market value adjustment,” and while damages would be calculated individually, the method of calculation was common. The court found the settlement fair under the Fourth Circuit’s four factors from Berry v. Schulman. Republic Mortgage had produced thousands of pages of written discovery, and plaintiff’s counsel testified that before mediation they “had a thorough understanding of the claims’ strengths and vulnerabilities.” The court saw “no evidence or indication of collusion.” The court noted that the settlement recoups up to 50 percent of calculated class-wide damages, liability was contested, the claim had novel aspects, and counsel testified without contradiction that a 50 percent recovery in an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty case is “an excellent outcome.” An independent fiduciary had also approved the settlement on behalf of the plan. Notice reached 97 of the 100 class members, no one objected, and one class member opted out. (His letter was postmarked September 1, one day after the August 31 deadline, but the court treated it as timely because he “likely put the letter in the mail on August 31, 2026” and the delay caused no administrative problems.) The pro rata plan of allocation, which multiplies the net settlement amount by the percentage of each account invested in the GIA at the time of the adjustment, “goes well beyond” the standard that an allocation have a reasonable and rational basis. The court found the notice sufficient and the Class Action Fairness Act’s waiting period satisfied. As a result, the settlement received final approval. In the fee order, the court explained that district courts in the circuit “overwhelmingly apply” the percentage of the fund method, with a lodestar cross-check using national market rates for complex ERISA class actions. Here class counsel sought $214,450, one third of the fund, after reducing the original $216,450 request by $2,000 to account for the opt-out. The court found the fee reasonable because ERISA litigation is a “rapidly evolving and demanding area of law,” counsel worked on contingency, one third is customary for comparable matters, and the class recovered half its estimated damages. The lodestar was $97,404, producing a multiplier of about 2.2, which the court called “a relatively low multiplier,” within the 2 to 4.5 range that courts generally find reasonable. The court found reasonable the $11,835 charged by the settlement administrator, Atticus, and up to $25,000 for the independent fiduciary, Fiduciary Counselors. It approved the $10,000 service award because Allison started the litigation, provided documents, reviewed both complaints, and took off work and flew to Minneapolis at his own expense for the mediation, and the award was small relative to the class recovery. As a result, the settlement was accepted and the action was dismissed with prejudice.

Sixth Circuit

Bailey v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-02749-TLP-tmp, 2026 WL 3306377 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 2, 2026) (Judge Thomas L. Parker). Korine Bailey sued Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. on behalf of a putative class under ERISA to recoup the costs of tobacco surcharges in Sedgwick’s employee health plan. The parties settled for a non-reversionary $3 million gross amount to be paid into a qualified settlement fund on behalf of more than 5,000 employees who paid tobacco or nicotine surcharges. The court has already granted both preliminary and final approval of the settlement. After deducting attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and any case contribution award, the net settlement amount will be distributed automatically to class members pro rata based on the surcharges each paid during the class period. In this motion Bailey moved, unopposed, for attorneys’ fees of one third of the gross settlement amount, litigation costs of $18,485.37, and a case contribution award of up to $7,500. The court began with Rule 23(h) and the common fund doctrine, under which a lawyer who recovers a fund for others “is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.” Under Sixth Circuit authority, the court explained that it could choose between the lodestar and percentage of the fund methods, and the court adopted the percentage method here because it was easy to calculate, gave counsel reasonable expectations, and encouraged early settlement. It was not concerned that the method pushed counsel to settle too low, since one third of $3 million is still substantial, and district courts in the circuit often award a third of the gross amount in large class settlements. The court then tested reasonableness under the six factors from Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc. The value of the benefit to the class, “the most important” factor, favored approval because the settlement provides about 24 percent of estimated class-wide damages, which “compares favorably with recoveries in other ERISA class action settlements.” Society’s stake in rewarding attorneys, the contingent nature of the work, the complexity of the litigation, and the skill of counsel also supported the fee. On complexity, the court noted counsel’s representation that when the case was filed, “there was little controlling appellate authority interpreting the ‘full reward’ requirement” and several courts had dismissed materially similar claims. As a lodestar cross-check on the hourly value of the services, class counsel reported about 424 hours and a lodestar of $339,289.50 at a blended rate of $800.21, which the court found reasonable. The requested fee therefore produced a multiplier of about 2.95, which fell within the normal range and aligned with a typical one-third contingency award. The court also approved the requested litigation costs under the common fund doctrine and Rule 23(h), finding $19,733.02 reasonable. As for Bailey’s case contribution award, the court recognized that such awards encourage class representatives and reward their efforts. The court examined the following factors: the actions taken to protect the class, the financial risk assumed, and the time and effort spent. Here, Bailey reviewed pleadings, gathered documents, communicated with counsel, and took part in settlement discussions. The $7,500 award is only 0.25 percent of the gross settlement amount and was not a windfall, and the court found that the settlement “would not be possible without [her] direct participation.” As a result, the court granted the unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and a case contribution award.

Ninth Circuit

Halter v. Providence Health & Services, No. 2:25-cv-00210-JNW, 2026 WL 3228564 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 2026) (Judge Jamal N. Whitehead). Victoria Halter brought this putative class action on behalf of the Providence Health & Services 401(k) Savings Plan, and similarly situated participants and beneficiaries, against Providence Health & Services and its Total Rewards Management Committee. Halter contended that defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by using forfeited employer contributions to reduce Providence’s contributions to the plan instead of using them to pay plan expenses. As we detailed in our June 10, 2026, edition, the court preliminarily approved a $42.7 million class settlement on June 4. A fairness hearing was subsequently held on October 20, 2026, and this order was issued the next day. In its order the court certified a settlement class under Rules 23(a) and (b)(1) consisting of all participants or beneficiaries of the plan, including alternate payees, from January 1, 2018, through June 4, 2026. The court found that the Rule 23(a) requirements were met, and that Rule 23(b)(1) was satisfied because separate actions by individual class members would risk inconsistent adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendants, or adjudications that as a practical matter would dispose of the interests of absent members. The court appointed Halter as class representative and found that class counsel could fairly and adequately represent the class under Rule 23(g). The court found that notice satisfied Rule 23(c)(2) and (e) and due process. Individual notice went by email or first-class mail to class members who could be identified with reasonable effort, together with a settlement website, which was “the best notice practicable under the circumstances.” Notice under the Class Action Fairness Act was also given to the state attorneys general, the United States Attorney General, and the Secretary of Labor. Under Rule 23(e), the court found the settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate. It resulted from arm’s-length negotiations by experienced counsel overseen by a neutral mediator and was reached only after class counsel received pertinent information and documents from defendants, so the parties were well positioned to evaluate the case. The court weighed the expense, risk, and uncertainty of extended litigation against the settlement amount, which fell within the range of reasonable settlements given the nature of the claims, the potential recovery, the risks of litigation, and approved settlements in similar cases. There were no objections, and the settlement was reviewed and approved on behalf of the plan by an independent fiduciary, Fiduciary Counselors. The court finally approved the plan of allocation and gave the settlement administrator final authority to determine each class member’s share of the net cash fund and unallocated plan assets. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce and interpret the order and the settlement agreement. Halter’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, settlement administration expenses, and a service award were also granted, although the order did not state the amounts. The court thus gave the settlement final approval, entered judgment on all claims, counts, and causes of action, and ended the litigation.

Schuman v. Microchip Technology Inc., No. 16-cv-05544-HSG, 2026 WL 3257801 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2026) (Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr.). This decade-old ERISA class action involves former employees of Atmel Corporation who were terminated by Microchip Technology Incorporated after the 2016 closing of the Atmel-Microchip merger. The certified class includes all former U.S.-based Atmel employees who were employed on the closing date and were terminated by Microchip without cause between April 4, 2016, and March 19, 2017. The litigation has involved multiple dispositive motions, class certification proceedings, and an appeal to the Ninth Circuit (which was the case of the week in our June 11, 2025, edition). On remand, the district court denied defendants’ motions to decertify the class and reopen discovery (as we covered in our June 10, 2026, edition). With a July trial date looming, the parties reached a settlement. The court preliminarily approved the agreement (as discussed in our August 12, 2026, edition), held a final fairness hearing on October 15, 2026, and in this order it considered the motion for final approval and a motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and service awards. The court incorporated its Rule 23(a) and (b) analysis from its preliminary approval order and turned to Rule 23(e). The court reviewed the agreement for signs of collusion and found that nothing had changed from preliminary approval. The settlement was non-reversionary and the majority of its value would go to the class notwithstanding any clear sailing provision on fees. Furthermore, notice was adequate. Class counsel had been in contact with 213 of the 220 class members, including representatives of three deceased members’ heirs or estates, and 198 members had already submitted the IRS forms needed for payment. No class member objected, and only one opted out. Class counsel had prosecuted the case vigorously for a decade and had enough information to make an informed decision, and a settlement reached on the eve of trial by experienced counsel after a decade of litigation was negotiated at arm’s length. As for the amount, the court found that “[t]here is no question here that the relief provided is adequate.” The five class members who did not sign releases will receive 100 percent of their unpaid severance benefits plus nearly a decade of prejudgment interest, which the court said is “more than what the class members would have been guaranteed to receive if they had prevailed on all issues at trial,” since prejudgment interest is discretionary. Class members who signed releases will receive amounts “just 20% less than the most they might have recovered had they prevailed on all issues.” In total, including interest, the settlement is worth more than $9 million, with an average payout of roughly $43,000 and individual payments from about $5,881 to $136,628. Continued litigation would likely have lasted years and required addressing the Ninth Circuit’s new multi-factor test for the enforceability of the releases, and the court had left open the possibility of revisiting whether common issues continued to predominate. The larger recovery for those who signed releases was equitable because “[t]he enforceability of the releases was a critical issue in the case, and could have precluded any further recovery for those Class Members had the case continued.” The lack of any objections to the settlement also supported approval. As for fees, class counsel sought $3.5 million, separate from the class’s recovery. Applying the Ninth Circuit’s “two-step hybrid lodestar/multiplier approach,” the court found that three firms had spent 3,823 hours over nearly ten years for a lodestar of more than $3.9 million, at rates from $640 to $1,465, with a “modest” $13,897 in costs. The court thus found plaintiffs’ request to be reasonable. The court also approved $10,000 service awards for the two named plaintiffs, which was less than a quarter of the average class member recovery and reflected “extensive time…over the course of many years, sitting for depositions and responding to extensive discovery.” As a result, the court gave the settlement final approval, and the case is now finally at an end.

Disability Benefit Claims

Second Circuit

Melo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 25-cv-3813 (LAK), 2026 WL 3217289 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2026) (Judge Lewis A. Kaplan). Luciana Melo, a former Google employee, stopped working after January 3, 2023, and was awarded benefits under Google’s ERISA-governed long-term disability benefit plan, which is administered by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Under the plan, her monthly benefit was 65 percent of her “Predisability Earnings.” Earnings are based on the employee’s “annualized hourly rate as of [the employee’s] last day of Active Work before…Disability,” and they exclude tips, awards, bonuses, overtime pay, stock options, employer contributions to deferred compensation or pension plans, and “any other compensation from the [employer].” On her last day of work, Melo was paid $44.83 per hour, or $7,770.53 per month, so she was awarded a monthly benefit of $5,050.84. Melo subsequently brought this action pro se against both Google and MetLife under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), challenging how her benefit was calculated. The defendants jointly moved for summary judgment, and this order was the result. Melo first argued that her benefit should have been based on her “total gross earnings for 2022” of $116,999.26, which MetLife should have divided by twelve. The court rejected the theory on several grounds. The 2022 pay records included categories of compensation, such as overtime and bonus pay, that the plan expressly excludes. Melo herself alleged that her last day of work was January 3, 2023, which made that date, “not any date in 2022,” the relevant starting point. Even if her last day of active work had been in 2022, her pay records did not show a higher hourly rate in 2022 than she earned on January 3, 2023. As a result, the record did not support a finding that MetLife miscalculated her predisability earnings. Melo next argued that her benefit was reduced by an improper amount after she returned to work. Under the plan, a returning employee’s monthly benefit is not reduced “except to the extent” that the benefit plus the amount the employee “earn[s] from working” exceeds 100 percent of Predisability Earnings. Melo began working for the New York City Department of Education in September 2024, and MetLife determined from her employment records and pay stubs that she earned $3,779.36 in September and $5,399.08 in October. Combined with her $5,050.84 benefit, those earnings exceeded her $7,770.53 in predisability earnings, and thus MetLife informed her that she had been overpaid $3,739.06. Melo contended that it was “inaccurate to attribute a full month of earnings” to the excess earnings calculation because she began work in the middle of the month, on September 17. The court found that “[t]he plain text of the Plan reveals no basis for such an argument,” since the benefit was reduced by what she actually earned that month, and “[w]hether she began work on September 1 or September 30 is irrelevant.” In short, Melo’s benefit calculation claims “are refuted by basic math and the plain text of the Plan.” The court granted defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Third Circuit

Thompson v. Command Alkon Inc., No. 22-344, 2026 WL 3229175 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2026) (Judge Harvey Bartle III). Nancy E. Thompson was the office manager and controller of Libra Systems, Inc. when Command Alkon Incorporated acquired Libra in 2020. Because Libra’s co-owners insisted that she have an employment contract in connection with the sale, Thompson and Libra signed a written agreement on the same day of the purchase, with both sides represented by counsel. The agreement provided for five years of employment and described itself as an “unfunded top hat plan [under] ERISA.” It allowed Thompson to resign for “good reason,” defined to include “a material and unreasonable diminution in [her] duties, authority, or responsibility” without her consent, in which case she would receive severance payments for the remainder of the term, conditioned on 30 days’ written notice and an opportunity to cure. Libra’s rights under the agreement were assigned to Command Alkon. Claims for severance were subject to procedures set forth in an exhibit to the agreement, which required a written denial within 90 days, allowed an appeal to the plan administrator within 60 days of the denial, and required suit within 90 days after an adverse appeal decision. On July 19, 2021, Thompson sent Command Alkon notice of good reason for her resignation. Command Alkon’s associate general counsel denied the claim by letter on August 4, 2021, stating that Command Alkon “disagree[d] that there has been a material and unreasonable diminution in [plaintiff’s] duties, authority, or responsibility under the agreement.” The letter did not describe the plan’s review procedures or deadlines. After Thompson resigned on August 19, her lawyer wrote on August 21 that she was entitled to $467,726 and would pursue her remedies under Pennsylvania wage law. Command Alkon then again rejected her claim in letters of August 26 and October 5. Thompson sued in state court, and Command Alkon removed the case to federal court. The judge originally assigned to the case (Gene E.K. Pratter) held in 2023 that ERISA preempted Thompson’s state law claims. (Your ERISA Watch covered this decision in our May 31, 2023, edition.) In response, Thompson amended her complaint to assert a claim for severance benefits against the plan under § 502(a)(1)(B) (Count I) and a claim against Command Alkon for equitable relief to enforce the agreement under § 502(a)(3)(B)(ii) (Count II). Judge Pratter passed away in 2024, and the case was eventually reassigned to Judge Bartle. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and Judge Bartle resolved the motions in this order. Command Alkon first argued that Thompson failed to exhaust her appeals under the agreement. The court acknowledged that a claimant generally must exhaust administrative remedies before suing for ERISA benefits, and found that no exceptions, such as futility, applied. Thompson contended that she was not required to appeal because the denial letter did not tell her about the appeal procedures, which both the agreement and ERISA’s claims regulations require a denial notice to include. The court agreed with Thompson, relying on two Third Circuit decisions, one of which (Epright v. Environmental Resources Management, Inc.) stated that when a denial letter “does not explain the proper steps for pursuing review of the termination or denial, the Plan’s time bar for such a review is not triggered.” The court rejected Command Alkon’s argument that Thompson knew of the requirements regardless of whether she was specifically informed, holding that the Third Circuit’s decisions “reject the notion that the court should make an individualized determination whether a claimant had actual or constructive knowledge” of omitted information, since “[t]he fairest and easiest way” to inform claimants of their appeal rights is through the denial letter. Next, the court rejected Command Alkon’s argument that Thompson’s failure to sign and deliver a release, which was “a condition precedent to her entitlement to severance payments,” defeated her claim: “This argument is without merit. Plaintiff has produced evidence that she resigned for good reason and was improperly denied severance benefits. If proven, plaintiff had no obligation to sign a release.” As a result, the court moved on to the merits, which it could not resolve on summary judgment: “There are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether plaintiff terminated her employment for good reason and is therefore entitled to severance payments.” The case will thus be tried to the court at a later date.

Life Insurance & AD&D Benefit Claims

Seventh Circuit

Strawson v. Transport Labor Contract/Leasing Inc., No. 24-CV-06158, 2026 WL 3257583 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2026) (Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.). William Strawson worked for Transport Labor Contract/Leasing Inc. (TLC), which offered its employees supplemental life insurance administered by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. William had $100,000 in coverage and named his wife, Ann Strawson, as a beneficiary. He fell ill in March 2023 and stopped working by April 3, 2023 to receive medical treatment. According to Ann, TLC kept paying vacation days, let him keep a company work truck until July 2023, continued his medical, dental, and vision coverage, and kept issuing pay stubs and deducting life insurance premiums from his pay through June 2, 2023. William died on August 23, 2023. TLC initially sent Ann a claim form, but later informed Ann that William’s coverage had ended; MetLife denied the claim on the same ground. TLC returned the premiums that had been deducted, and MetLife denied Ann’s appeal. Ann thus brought this action against TLC and MetLife for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and also asserted ERISA estoppel and an FMLA interference claim against TLC. Defendants moved to dismiss. Because the plan gave MetLife discretionary authority to interpret the plan, the court reviewed the denial under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Under the plan’s “Date Your Insurance Ends” section, coverage ended when employment ended, which occurred when the employee ceased to be “Actively at Work,” which was defined as performing the usual duties of the job full time, at least 30 hours a week. The plan also contained a “Continuation of Insurance with Premium Payment” section, which extended coverage for up to three months for employees who ceased active work due to sickness, after which employment was considered to end if the employee did not return. Reading the provisions together, the court concluded that William ceased to be actively at work on April 3, his coverage continued for three months, and it expired by July 2, 2023, before his death. Ann’s arguments to the contrary were unsuccessful. She relied first on the plan’s Family and Medical Leave clause, but the court found that the clause says only that certain leaves “may qualify” for continuation of insurance under the FMLA or similar laws and did not independently extend coverage. In any event, Ann did not allege that William took FMLA leave or any other legally mandated leave. Ann also cited the plan’s porting and conversion options, “but these provisions do not affect the date that insurance coverage ends, and Ms. Strawson does not allege that Mr. Strawson exercised any of these options.” Ann further contended that William was “treated…as a[n] active employee” by TLC, but the court stated that the plan “is governed by objective terms, not by the parties’ subjective views or by phrases that are not used in the Plan.” (The plan used the defined term “active work,” not “active employee.”) Furthermore, the work truck that TLC let William keep had no bearing on the definition of “active work,” and neither did the continued medical coverage or premium deductions. As a result, MetLife’s denial was not arbitrary and capricious. The estoppel claim also failed. The court noted that statements can estop enforcement of a plan’s written terms only in “extreme circumstances,” and require knowing written misrepresentation, reasonable reliance, and detriment. The court declined to treat the premium deductions as clerical errors at the pleading stage, but deductions for roughly two months after William stopped working did not constitute “extreme circumstances.” Many of the representations alleged by Ann were not written, others were made after William’s death and could not have been relied upon, and “no reliance alleged here could be reasonable, because the written details of the plan already explained the duration of coverage.” Finally, on the FMLA claim, Ann alleged that TLC never gave William an eligibility notice. However, her theory that he would then have investigated his life insurance and obtained a personal policy was a “highly attenuated chain of prejudice” that was “far too speculative” and “has nothing to do with the structure of Mr. Strawson’s leave.” The court thus granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, and because “repleading will not cure the flaws in the amended complaint, the dismissal is with prejudice.”

Provider Claims

Ninth Circuit

Riverside Healthcare System, L.P. v. Apex Management Group I, Inc., No. 5:24-cv-00273-MRA-DTB, 2026 WL 3270515 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2026) (Judge Monica Ramirez Almadani). Riverside Healthcare System, L.P. treated a motorcyclist injured in a 2019 vehicle collision and billed $1,995,262 for his care. The patient was covered by a self-funded ERISA plan sponsored by Apex Management Group I, Inc. and Analytic Alternative, LLC, which contained a $2,500 combined calendar year maximum for certain services. Riverside participated in MultiPlan, Inc.’s preferred provider organization network under a Participating Facility Agreement (PFA). Riverside alleges that after MultiPlan cited the coverage limit, the parties negotiated a compromise. MultiPlan sent Riverside a single case agreement (SCA), which Riverside signed. However, no other party signed it (there was no space for other signatures), and in December 2019 Riverside was told it would receive only $2,500. Riverside sued Apex, Analytic, and MultiPlan in state court in 2023, and defendants removed the case to federal court. Riverside’s first amended complaint asserted claims for breach of written contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unfair competition, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference, and declaratory relief. The court dismissed the unfair competition claim for failure to plead the lack of an adequate remedy at law and the misrepresentation claims as time-barred, and it granted leave to amend. Riverside did not amend within the allowed time limit. Several months later the parties filed dueling motions, which were decided in this order. Riverside sought leave to amend add two claims for breach of warranty of authority against MultiPlan, and defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims, arguing that ERISA preempted them. The court first held that the claims were not completely preempted. Under Aetna v. Davila’s two-prong test, the first prong failed because Riverside was neither a participant nor a beneficiary and could not have sued under § 502(a)(1)(B). The second prong failed because Riverside’s claims arose from MultiPlan’s alleged breaches of the PFA and SCA, “two contracts separate from the Plan between two non-ERISA entities.” However, even though complete preemption did not apply, the court held that conflict preemption did. The court ruled that the PFA and SCA both “referred to” and had an impermissible “connection with” the benefit plan. The agreements expressly invoked the plan’s terms and limited any rights Riverside could enforce. The PFA covered only “Covered Services” for which the insurer was responsible under a program’s terms, and the SCA made payment subject to the patient’s benefit plan. Riverside argued that the Affordable Care Act’s ban on annual coverage limits overrode the $2,500 cap, “[b]ut accepting that argument would require the Court to determine whether the coverage limit is lawful in order to decide whether Riverside’s claims depend on the Plan. This searching inquiry into the terms of the Plan is directly contrary to Congress’s intent that ERISA provide for exclusive federal review.” Furthermore, Riverside’s claims had an impermissible “connection with” the plan because they would “interfere with nationally uniform plan administration,” since insurers would be bound by ad hoc contracts between providers and third parties like MultiPlan rather than by plan terms. The court rejected Riverside’s argument that the ACA, not state contract law, made the limit unlawful, because that “conflates the asserted basis for challenging the limit with the legal mechanism through which Riverside seeks to recover.” It was not dispositive that the claims concerned a plan-provider relationship that ERISA does not itself govern. The court chided Riverside for its untimely negligent misrepresentation claims: “Had Riverside timely asserted those claims, they could have provided an avenue to litigate its allegations on the merits.” As for Riverside’s motion for leave to amend, it failed under Rule 16. The pleading amendment deadline had passed in June of 2025, and Riverside did not show that it was diligent. It argued that it learned of MultiPlan’s lack of authority from a corporate representative’s August 2025 deposition, but the court found that Apex “blatantly signaled in its answer” that it had not authorized MultiPlan to bind it, and MultiPlan’s answer likewise denied acting as Apex’s agent. The court thus granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment on all of Riverside’s claims and denied Riverside’s motion for leave to amend.

Severance Benefit Claims

Seventh Circuit

Ahmed v. Deere & Co., No. 4:26-cv-04114-SLD-RLH, 2026 WL 3306360 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2026) (Judge Sara Darrow). Tauseef Ahmed and Anthony Catalfano, longtime Deere & Company employees, allege that Deere used a performance review system to push them out of their jobs without paying them severance benefits to which they were entitled. In the summer of 2024, Deere eliminated nearly 500 salaried positions in Iowa and Illinois in a reduction in force it called “Mozart” and sponsored a severance program for those employees. The program paid up to twelve months of salary, at half a month for each year of service, and offered other benefits, including unpaid leave of up to 30 days to apply for another Deere job and an unpaid leave to bridge to retirement. To receive payments, employees had to keep working satisfactorily until their last day, sign a release, and comply with confidentiality and twelve-month non-solicitation obligations. Executives then warned that more positions would be eliminated through “attrition” and “forced attrition.” Management required that a percentage of employees be rated as Performance Needs Improvement, and the ratings system was revised to make that easier. Employees who received such ratings were offered a choice between three months of severance and a release, or a sixty-day performance improvement period with no severance if they failed. Ahmed, a product manager with nearly 25 years of service, chose the improvement option but was terminated for “failure to meet expectations.” Catalfano, a senior software engineer with over 28 years of service, accepted only three months of severance, even though he was entitled to twelve under the severance program, and signed a release. Neither was told that he might be eligible for payments under the severance program. The two thus brought this action asserting in Count I that Deere and the severance plan violated ERISA by breaching fiduciary duties and failing to provide benefits. Ahmed also brought discrimination claims in Counts II through IV. Defendants moved to dismiss Count I, arguing that the severance program is not an ERISA plan, plaintiffs were not eligible participants, no breach of fiduciary duty was plausibly alleged, and Catalfano released his claims. The court first held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged an ERISA plan. In deciding the issue, the court considered whether payments under the severance plan were continuous or one-time, whether the obligations were long-term, whether numerous events triggered payment, whether case-by-case review was needed, and whether managers exercised discretion, with no one factor determinative. Here, Deere’s obligation arose whenever an employee was let go for a qualifying reason, so liability extended “into perpetuity.” Implementing the program required determining the reason for termination, eligibility for year-end bonuses and bridge to retirement, whether employees performed “satisfactorily” until their last day, and compliance with releases and non-solicitation terms. It was not dispositive that each employee received a single, arithmetically calculated payment. In the end, “the decision to pay benefits is made on an individual, ongoing basis, after exercising the discretion described in the [Severance Program].” The court distinguished defendants’ cases on the ground that the programs in those cases involved contingencies that might never materialize, limited time periods, one-time mechanical payments, and little discretion. Deere’s obligation arose more frequently and indefinitely, involved greater managerial discretion, required tracking releases and non-solicitation compliance, and interacted with other benefit programs. As for plaintiffs’ eligibility for the program, the court explained that employees who are facially made ineligible by a pretextual termination remain participants because a contrary rule “would gut the statute” by making the protections of 29 U.S.C. § 1140 “effectively unattainable.” Reading the allegations in plaintiffs’ favor, Deere “pretextually created the performance improvement plan and forced poor performance reviews so that they could reduce Deere’s workforce.” Thus, plaintiffs were plausibly eligible. Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim also survived. The court stated that allegations that Deere “farcically changed its evaluation policy” to force well-performing employees out without telling them of their rights under the program “would be a blatant violation of the duty to communicate information regarding a plan and refrain from misrepresenting its terms.” The claim was not duplicative of the benefits claim because the alleged misconduct surrounding the denial went beyond “a denial of benefits, without more.” As for Catalfano’s release, the court applied the Seventh Circuit’s “totality of the circumstances” factors and found it plausible that the release was invalid, because he had no input into its terms, no counsel, and was allegedly misled about his rights. Nor did the complaint plausibly require him to tender back the three months’ pay, because the tender requirement is excused when a plaintiff receives only something he was already entitled to. The amount also can be set off against any recovery. As a result, Deere’s motion to dismiss was denied in its entirety.