
It was another slow week in ERISAland. Was it because of a cavalcade of technical disruptions across the country (including most notably federal aviation and Microsoft, but also JPMorgan Chase, United Airlines, and Apple)? Was it because everyone was busy reallocating their portfolios after the downfall of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang? Or is everyone just having trouble concentrating because they are looking forward to eating turkey next week?
Your ERISA Watch soldiers on regardless. See below for this week’s cases, which include (1) a pro se action by a man claiming his 401(k) is not subject to federal taxation because he is a resident of the “Michigan Republic” and not a U.S. citizen (Engel v. FMR, you can guess how that went); (2) a case excluding from evidence a disability insurer’s workup of a claim when it missed its deadline to decide the claim (Coleman v. Continental American); (3) two cases involving medical claims that were bounced at the pleading stage because plan terms foreclosed relief (J.Y. v. BCBS MI, Daniel V.A. v. Anthem); (4) a case where plaintiffs’ counsel got in hot water for violating a protective order in an effort to file a second action against the same defendants (Bangalore v. Froedtert); and last, but not least, (5) the result of a five-day bench trial in which the court ruled that United States Bakery engaged in subterfuge, shenanigans, and fraud by trying to dodge the withdrawal liability of a bakery (Svenhard’s) it was acquiring (Board of Trustees v. United States Bakery).
Hopefully everyone’s email returns to normal so you can continue to receive this scintillating newsletter. We’ll see you next week!
Below is a summary of this past week’s notable ERISA decisions by subject matter and jurisdiction.
Arbitration
Second Circuit
Larkin v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., No. 25 Civ. 7307 (LLS), 2026 WL 3417979 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2026) (Judge Louis L. Stanton). Dennis Larkin and Danielle Gosline brought this putative class action under ERISA against Caremark Rx, doing business as CVS Caremark, the pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) for their health plans. Plaintiffs allege that Caremark denied coverage of the weight-loss drug Zepbound on the ground that it was not medically necessary, and that it did so as part of a scheme of financial self-interest. In an August 26, 2026 opinion, the court denied Caremark’s motion to compel arbitration under the terms of service governing its Caremark.com website, holding that plaintiffs’ claims did not arise from that contract, and partially denied its motion to dismiss. That ruling left standing plaintiffs’ breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty claim, which the court allowed to proceed on behalf of a class spanning all plans for which Caremark acted as PBM. (Your ERISA Watch covered this decision in our September 2, 2026 edition.) Caremark moved for reconsideration of both rulings. In doing so, it also moved for leave to file a supplemental declaration describing how Caremark.com lets beneficiaries access their benefits and how plaintiffs used its messaging feature to communicate about the coverage decisions at issue. At the outset, the court denied leave to file the declaration. When a party offers new evidence on reconsideration, courts weigh the strength of its explanation for not submitting the evidence earlier. Caremark argued that the court had “sua sponte imposed a relational requirement, which neither party raised,” but the court rejected this. The Federal Arbitration Act reaches only disputes arising out of the contract containing the arbitration provision, plaintiffs had invoked that requirement in opposing arbitration, and Caremark’s own briefing had acknowledged a nexus requirement and offered evidence of one. That Caremark “misconstrued the type of nexus required” did not justify new evidence. As for the motion for reconsideration, the court ruled that Caremark had identified no change in law or new evidence, and concluded that its motion “amounts only to disagreement with the Court’s application of controlling law.” Caremark “does not cite any controlling authority supporting its view of the required nexus.” Even under arbitration agreements covering “any dispute,” “courts of this Circuit have only compelled arbitration for claims that arise out of or sufficiently relate to the underlying contract.” Nor did Caremark identify any evidence the court had overlooked. Moving on to the duty of loyalty claim, the court found that Caremark merely repeated its argument that ERISA limits class claims to the plans in which the named plaintiffs participate. The court again stated that Caremark “points to no controlling law requiring its interpretation, which is in fact contrary to the bulk of persuasive authority on the subject.” While the Second Circuit “has not explicitly decided whether ERISA plaintiffs may assert claims on behalf of a class containing plans they are not members of,” the Circuit’s test “mirrors the rationale of circuits that have decided the issue and, in each case, reached the same conclusion as the August 26 Order.” The court also rejected Caremark’s argument that it was not acting as a fiduciary in deciding that Zepbound was not medically necessary. Caremark’s original motion admitted that it is a fiduciary when deciding “initial claim adjudication and appeals,” plaintiffs’ allegation of a financial self-interest scheme did not convert those adjudications into “formulary-management,” and by Caremark’s own logic (i.e., that coverage is available only when a drug is both on the formulary and medically necessary), a medical necessity determination goes beyond formulary management. The court thus denied Caremark’s motion for reconsideration.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Sixth Circuit
Engel v. FMR LLC, No. 26-cv-11558, 2026 WL 3522394 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2026) (Judge Robert J. White). Jason Engel participated in his employer’s 401(k) plan, which was serviced by FMR LLC, d/b/a Fidelity Investments. After his employment ended, Engel disputed Fidelity’s withholding of roughly $3,200 in taxes from his retirement funds. He submitted a Form W-8BEN (an IRS form used by foreign individuals to certify that they are not U.S. citizens or residents), on which he “identified his country of citizenship as ‘Michigan Republic’ and listed a residential address in Dearborn Heights, Michigan, with ‘USA’ as the country. [] He claimed a zero-percent withholding rate based on the Constitution and his asserted status as a private citizen.” In three phone calls in 2025, Fidelity representatives allegedly told him they had his W-8BEN and that it was properly completed. However, in a follow-up letter, Fidelity declined to update his account because the form is “only for non-U.S. citizens,” the address on the form did not match the U.S. address on file, and processing it required a non-U.S. address. Engel then wrote to Fidelity’s legal department, asserting that “Fidelity disregarded his claimed non-U.S. status and improperly presumed that he possessed ‘Fourteenth Amendment commercial citizenship,’ which he maintained he had never consented to or contracted into.” He further contended he had repudiated his U.S. citizenship. Engel subsequently brought this pro se action and applied to proceed in forma pauperis. The court granted that application, granted his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, and treated that pleading as operative. The complaint asserted five counts: breach of fiduciary duty and improper plan administration (Count I), benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) (Count II), breach of contract and plan-related obligations (Count III), equitable accounting and restitution (Count IV), and equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) (Count V). The court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). On Count I, the court assumed that Fidelity acted as a fiduciary, but held that Engel had not plausibly alleged an actionable breach. His challenge to the withholding and account classification failed because Form W-8BEN is for establishing foreign status and its instructions say U.S. persons should not use it, and “a declaration of exclusive state citizenship” does not establish an exemption from federal taxation. Having alleged no valid basis for being treated as a non-U.S. person, Engel could not show that Fidelity breached a duty by refusing that classification or withholding the funds. His claim that Fidelity failed to explain or account for the withholding fared no better. Engel identified nothing missing from, or misleading about, the letter from Fidelity, and he described his other inquiries only generally as requests for “explanation, correction, and reconciliation.” As for the phone calls, he did not allege any action he took or refrained from taking in reliance on the representatives’ statements, so he had not alleged detrimental reliance. The court added that to the extent Engel sought surcharge, the lack of reliance was not independently dispositive, but the claim still failed because he alleged no facts showing that those statements caused the withholding or any of his claimed injuries. Moving on to Count II, the court dismissed it because Engel offered no basis for concluding that the $3,200 remained payable as a plan benefit rather than subject to tax withholding, and he alleged no calculation error, denial of a requested distribution, or other failure to honor a plan right. Count V failed for a related reason. Section 502(a)(3) does not authorize equitable relief “in the abstract,” and a plaintiff must first establish a violation of ERISA or the plan. Count V rested on the same conduct as Counts I and II, so his requests for an accounting, correction of records, and surcharge could not stand alone. Count IV failed to the same extent it sought relief under ERISA. Having dismissed the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in Counts III and IV, and dismissed them without prejudice as well.
Disability Benefit Claims
Eighth Circuit
Coleman v. Continental American Ins. Co., No. 26-cv-0522 (ECT/DJF), 2026 WL 3458557 (D. Minn. Nov. 13, 2026) (Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster). Elisha Coleman was hired by Ecolab, Inc. in December 2022 and became insured under its long-term disability plan, which was insured and administered by Continental American Insurance Company (better known as Aflac). After a deer tick bite in July 2023, Coleman developed disabling symptoms attributed to suspected Lyme disease. Coleman resigned in 2024. In 2025, he and his counsel contacted Aflac to initiate short-term and long-term disability claims. Aflac replied that he was ineligible for short-term benefits and sent a letter about Family and Medical Leave Act eligibility that did not address the long-term claim. Coleman submitted proof of loss on October 7, 2025, but his counsel could not get any information about the claim despite multiple calls. On November 13, 2025, counsel wrote that Coleman would deem the claim exhausted if Aflac did not respond within seven days. Aflac did not respond, and Coleman brought this action seeking plan benefits under ERISA in January 2026. Aflac opened its review only after the lawsuit began and issued a formal denial on April 15, 2026. It then sought to include in the administrative record the post-litigation documents generated in that review, including internal claim notes, emails with Ecolab, medical record requests, and the denial letter. Coleman moved to exclude those post-exhaustion documents. The court denied the motion from the bench at a September 29, 2026 hearing but later vacated that ruling. In this order, on sua sponte reconsideration, the court concluded that its earlier order “was erroneous.” The court began with ERISA’s claims procedure regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1. A disability claim decision is due within 45 days absent a properly noticed extension, and if the plan fails to “strictly adhere” to that requirement, the claimant is deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies, the claim is deemed denied without the exercise of discretion, and de novo review applies unless the violation is de minimis. Aflac never sought an extension, so its decision was due by November 21, 2025, at the latest, and as of that date the claim was exhausted, deemed denied, and subject to de novo review. The de minimis exception did not apply. Aflac’s delay and repeated failures to respond prejudiced Coleman, and because Aflac did not begin its review until after suit or request additional information, the violation did not occur in the context of an ongoing, good faith exchange of information. Aflac “has not seriously contested any of the above conclusions,” but it argued that there was “nonetheless good cause to expand the record to include the post-litigation documents.” The court acknowledged its authority to do so, but noted that the Eighth Circuit focuses largely on whether the party seeking to add evidence had an opportunity to present it during the administrative proceedings, and “[a]n opportunity and failure to present the additional evidence shows a lack of good cause.” Here, Aflac had ample opportunity to investigate and failed to do so. Asked at the hearing why no decision was made within the regulatory timeframe, its counsel conceded: “There is no good explanation, Your Honor. There is really no explanation. The information was submitted to Continental. It failed to act on the information. I’ll concede that point.” Aflac argued that the de novo standard of review supported its arguments, but the court stated that “the fact that review is de novo is not alone a sufficient justification to expand the administrative record.” Aflac also argued that exclusion “would leave the Court to resolve a fact-intensive disability determination on a record lacking information on which the benefits decision was based.” The court called that statement “simply untrue,” because the denial was effective pursuant to the regulation on November 21, 2025, and “[t]he post-litigation documents are unnecessary to understand the basis for that decision.” The existing record, which Aflac did not dispute, already contained extensive information, including the policy, Coleman’s job and resignation documents, medical records, claim forms, and other documents, which was sufficient to decide the claim on the merits. As a result, the court granted Coleman’s request to exclude Aflac’s post-litigation documents.
Jackson v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 4:26-cv-00225-JAR, 2026 WL 3438837 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 12, 2026) (Judge John A. Ross). Lynette Jackson, a former employee of American Water, participated in the company’s ERISA-governed short- and long-term disability benefit plan, which was administered by Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company. She alleged that she became disabled in October 2019 because of “panic attacks, anxiety, PTSD symptoms, and migraine-related impairments,” and that she was under continuous psychiatric treatment. Hartford approved short-term disability benefits through October 2020. When they expired, Jackson applied for long-term disability benefits, which Hartford denied because “Plaintiff did not have LTD coverage based on employer representations.” She alleges in this pro se action that Hartford neither independently verified her eligibility nor evaluated the medical evidence. She seeks past-due and future benefits, interest, and fees and costs under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The case was Jackson’s third attempt at pleading her claims; in its last dismissal the court ruled that she had failed to specify the nature of her disability. (Your ERISA Watch covered that decision in our February 11, 2026 edition.) Jackson also moved to proceed in forma pauperis, for appointment of counsel, and for expedited rulings. The court granted the in forma pauperis motions and proceeded to screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court first held that Jackson failed to plead exhaustion. The court stated that a participant’s ERISA claim does not accrue until the plan issues a final denial, which requires exhausting the plan’s internal remedies. Although ERISA contains no express exhaustion requirement, the Eighth Circuit has construed it to require exhaustion, and exhaustion bars suit where a participant “fails to pursue and exhaust administrative remedies that are clearly required under a plan.” Jackson’s allegations that she received short-term benefits, applied for long-term benefits, and was told she lacked coverage, constituted “the entirety of her pleadings that could plausibly be construed to relate to administrative exhaustion. But Hartford’s alleged wrongful denial of LTD benefits alone does not permit this Court to assume or infer that Jackson exhausted Hartford’s internal appeal procedures before filing a lawsuit. This alone defeats her claim.” Alternatively, the court held that Jackson’s complaint failed to state a claim. In her new complaint Jackson had adequately described her disabling conditions, but this was not enough. “Jackson’s conclusory assertion that Hartford wrongly denied LTD benefits, without factual pleadings identifying specific terms that entitle her to LTD benefits under the plan for her conditions, is insufficient to state a claim under ERISA… The Court therefore finds that Jackson has failed to allege facts stating a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).” Finally, the court declined to appoint counsel. The issues – whether Jackson exhausted Hartford’s appeal procedures and whether her conditions qualified for benefits under the terms of an identified plan – were “not complex,” and Jackson “has had numerous past opportunities to cure the deficiencies in her pleadings.” The action was dismissed without prejudice.
Medical Benefit Claims
Sixth Circuit
J.Y. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 26-cv-11173, 2026 WL 3438159 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2026) (Judge Robert J. White). J.Y. participated in an ERISA-governed health benefit plan, the Simply Blue HRA Group Benefits Plan, which Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) administered and insured. In 2023, J.Y.’s minor child, G.T., was suffering from ADHD, anxiety, depression, panic attacks, insomnia, and ideations of self-harm. J.Y. admitted G.T. to Summit Achievement, an out-of-network residential treatment facility in Maine, and G.T. also underwent psychological testing by Dr. Todd Corelli, an out-of-network provider. BCBSM rejected Summit’s claims because the facility was a non-participating provider and paid Dr. Corelli’s claims only up to an “approved amount,” leaving J.Y. responsible for the balance. Administrative appeals failed, so J.Y. and G.T. brought this action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) for the denied benefits and for violation of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act. BCBSM moved to dismiss. Because the plan did not clearly grant BCBSM discretionary authority, the court reviewed the plan document de novo. It also held that the absence of the administrative record was no barrier to deciding the motion. It called coverage of Summit’s services “a straightforward question.” The plan expressly excluded non-emergency services at non-participating psychiatric residential treatment facilities, and the complaint acknowledged that Summit was not a participating provider. Plaintiffs argued that Summit should be treated as in-network because the plan lacked adequate participating facilities, but the plan covered out-of-state non-participating facilities only in “limited circumstances,” and “‘BCBSM or its representative’ must preapprove those services ‘before they occur.’” Plaintiffs conceded that J.Y. did not obtain preapproval, and thus they were not entitled to reimbursement. Plaintiffs’ alternative theory, raised for the first time in their response brief, was that the plan’s “Case Management Program” covered the services. But that program required a signed case management contract and rested in BCBSM’s sole discretion, and BCBSM never decided whether G.T. qualified or approved the non-contractual services. As for the treatment provided by Dr. Corelli, the plan paid out-of-network providers the lesser of the billed charge or a “maximum payment level,” meaning either the rate BCBSM pays participating providers or a rate negotiated with the provider. BCBSM did not negotiate a rate with Dr. Correlli, and the participating-provider rate was a predetermined sum unrelated to the testing performed, so the underpayment claim failed. The court turned next to the Parity Act claim. It noted that the Sixth Circuit has not decided whether the Act has a private right of action, but that the First and Tenth Circuits have assumed one. Using that assumption, the court applied the Tenth Circuit’s four-part test requiring plausible allegations that (1) the Act governs the plan, (2) identify a specific treatment limitation on mental health benefits, (3) identify an analogous medical or surgical benefit, and (4) identify a disparity between the two. It rejected the facial challenge, which argued that the plan imposed a preapproval requirement on out-of-network psychiatric residential facilities without a corresponding requirement for out-of-network skilled nursing facilities. The plan conditioned skilled nursing facility coverage on a physician’s “written confirmation indicating that skilled care is needed,” and while that language did not mirror the residential treatment formula, “the effect is the same.” The as-applied challenge rested on a “network disparity” theory, under which too few in-network residential facilities forced members out of network and produced more frequent denials. The court rejected it for three reasons. First, the complaint alleged that the plan had only three participating intermediate residential inpatient providers but said nothing about the number of participating skilled nursing facilities or hospices. Second, even assuming a network disparity, it was not alone a “treatment limitation,” and the complaint did not trace it to BCBSM’s application of any of the nonquantitative treatment limitation standards in the regulation. Third, nothing supported an inference of more frequent denials; the theory was “too speculative to be plausible.” Finally, plaintiffs requested leave to amend if the court found the complaint lacking in specificity. The court held that “[t]hat avenue is now foreclosed” because “a bare request” in an opposition is not a sufficient motion for leave to amend, and in any event plaintiffs did not “propose the specific factual amendments that would support their entitlement to relief.” BCBSM’s motion to dismiss was thus granted.
Ninth Circuit
Daniel V.A. v. Anthem Blue Cross Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 26-cv-02330-JST, 2026 WL 3522396 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2026) (Judge Jon S. Tigar). Daniel V.A. is an employee of Gilead Sciences, Inc. and a participant in its ERISA-governed health plan. The plan is self-funded; Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance Company provides claim processing and provider contracting services. Daniel V.A.’s minor child, J.K.A., received twelve weeks of treatment at blueFire Wilderness Therapy, an outdoor behavioral health program for adolescents. Anthem denied the claims for this treatment because blueFire was not an in-network provider; the services were “excluded as non-emergency out-of-network services received without prior authorization.” The denial left the family responsible for more than $58,000 in out-of-pocket costs for J.K.A.’s treatment. Plaintiffs brought this action, asserting a claim for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) and a claim under the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act. Anthem moved to dismiss, and in its ruling the court considered the plan benefit booklet, which Anthem attached to its motion, and which was incorporated by reference into the complaint. On the benefits claim, the plan excluded services provided by a nonparticipating provider “without an authorized referral, except emergency services or urgent care,” and plaintiffs did not allege that blueFire was in-network or that they obtained prior authorization. They offered two theories, and the court rejected both. First, they argued that the plan’s “post-service review” process would have allowed them to obtain the needed authorization after the fact. However, the plan defined “authorized referral” and “precertification” as distinct processes. An authorized referral turns on the availability of an appropriate in-network provider and must be obtained from the claims administrator “before services are rendered,” whereas precertification is a medical necessity review. Post-service review is available when “a needed precertification was not obtained” and nothing in the plan suggested that this cured the absence of an authorized referral. The theory therefore could not save a claim that was “otherwise clearly excluded from the Plan’s coverage.” Second, plaintiffs argued that a factfinder could conclude that blueFire provided “urgent care,” relying on J.K.A.’s serious diagnoses, “extreme and self-harming behavior patterns,” and the intensive nature of the treatment. The court observed that the complaint contained none of those details, and that even if it had, they would not suffice. The plan defined urgent care as services to prevent serious deterioration of health resulting from an “unforeseen” illness or condition “for which treatment cannot be delayed.” The complaint alleged that J.K.A. had suffered from insomnia, obsessive compulsive disorder, anxiety, and depression for years before her admission and had previously been treated by several mental health professionals, so her conditions were not unforeseen. Nor did the complaint allege that treatment could not be delayed. Plaintiffs’ Parity Act claim fared no better. Plaintiffs argued that “the absence of participating wilderness therapy programs violates the Act given the existence of at least one participating skilled nursing, hospice, or rehabilitation facility.” Anthem responded that blueFire’s services could have been covered had plaintiffs sought an authorized referral. The court held, as a preliminary matter, that the complaint did not plead that the authorized referral requirement itself violated the Act. It alleged that J.K.A.’s treatment was excluded based on geographic location, provider specialty, or similar criteria, but acknowledged that the exclusion actually rested on plaintiffs’ failure to obtain an authorized referral, a requirement that applies to all out-of-network providers of both mental and physical health services. The court added that even had plaintiffs pleaded that theory, it was not clear they could have succeeded without alleging that authorized referrals for wilderness programs are denied, because the Act focuses on limitations that result in denials of coverage. They also had not argued that the higher administrative burden of seeking a referral was itself a violation. As a result, Anthem’s motion to dismiss was granted, but the court granted plaintiffs leave to amend “solely for the purpose of addressing the deficiencies identified herein.”
Pleading Issues & Procedure
Fourth Circuit
Pincelli v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 3:23-cv-3548-SAL, 2026 WL 3409795 (D.S.C. Nov. 10, 2026) (Judge Sherri A. Lydon). Ann Pincelli filed this action in 2023 against Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company after it denied her claim for ERISA-governed long-term disability benefits. In August of this year, the court vacated Reliance’s decision and remanded the case to Reliance for further proceedings, and it entered a judgment to that effect. Pincelli then moved to alter or amend the remand order. She asked the court to direct Reliance to complete its review within a set time, to retain jurisdiction over the matter, and to consider her motion for attorney’s fees in the interim. Reliance opposed, arguing that the motion was largely moot. The briefing revealed that Reliance’s review was already underway when Pincelli filed her motion, so the court ordered the parties to file a joint status report on the outcome. In November, the parties reported that Reliance had completed its review and denied Pincelli’s claim again. They also submitted a proposed schedule for filing an updated administrative record and managing the case going forward. The court found that much of the relief Pincelli sought was unnecessary because Reliance had “expeditiously reviewed and decided her claim,” and the short delay was one the parties had agreed to so that Pincelli could submit additional information. The court also saw “no real dispute” that it retained jurisdiction over post-remand issues. The court thus denied as moot Pincelli’s motion “to amend the order to either set a deadline for Reliance Standard’s review or to affirmatively retain jurisdiction of this matter.” The court did, however, revisit its judgment. Because further review was necessary, the judgment was “in tension with that further review and could create confusion as to finality.” The court accordingly vacated the judgment and stayed the case “until it is ripe for further review.” As for attorney’s fees, Pincelli had filed a separate motion, which the court said it would resolve in a separate order. The court also indicated it will enter a scheduling order governing the case going forward.
Seventh Circuit
Bangalore v. Froedtert Health, Inc., No. 20-cv-893-PP, 2026 WL 3417917 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 4, 2026) (Judge Pamela Pepper). Nitish Bangalore filed this putative ERISA class action in 2020 against Froedtert Health, Inc., its board of directors, and its benefit plan committee, alleging breach of the duty of prudence and a derivative failure to monitor based on excessive recordkeeping fees in the Froedtert Health 403(b) plan. (Your ERISA Watch has covered several orders in this case, including the court’s January 2022 and July 2025 rulings on defendants’ unsuccessful motions to dismiss.) On April 15, 2026, the court entered the parties’ stipulated protective order, which bars the use or disclosure of designated material “for any purposes whatsoever other than preparing for and conducting the litigation in which the information, documents, or other material were disclosed.” On April 23, plaintiff’s counsel emailed defense counsel that “based on the documents produced, we have a substantial forfeiture claim against Froedtert now,” which he proposed to bring in an amended complaint or a separate case. Defense counsel warned that a separate suit would violate the protective order. On June 10, plaintiff’s counsel sent a draft complaint for a new case, which defense counsel objected to. Plaintiff’s counsel then sent a revised version and immediately filed an expedited motion to remove the confidentiality designations on plan documents, summary plan descriptions, participant disclosures, Forms 5500, and audited financial statements. The next day he filed the proposed complaint, which challenges the plan’s allocation of plan forfeitures. Defendants moved to enforce the protective order and for sanctions, to restrict documents, and to reassign the new case to this court. The court observed that it was “remarkable that a dispute over a protective order could lead to eight motions, but that is exactly what has happened here.” First, the court denied the motion to remove the designations. The court’s local rules require two-way communication in a genuine effort to avoid judicial intervention, and “[a] single email sent a few hours before filing a motion, without waiting for a response or calling opposing counsel to determine whether he’d received the email, does not satisfy the Civil L.R. 37 certification requirement.” The court noted that had plaintiff waited, defendants would have voluntarily resolved two of the five challenged designations. It also granted defendants’ motions to restrict, finding the redactions narrowly tailored despite the disfavor of secrecy in judicial proceedings. On the motion to enforce the protective order, the court held that Rule 37(b) and its inherent authority permit sanctions for violating a protective order. It found the order to be “unambiguous,” requiring a party who wished to challenge the designations to proceed with that challenge and wait for a ruling. Plaintiff’s counsel “knew that filing another case using designated confidential documents from Bangalore would violate the Bangalore protective order.” His “eleventh-hour attempts to challenge the designations and revise the complaint do not make his actions any less a violation.” Because he offered “no justification for his conduct other than his post hoc attempts to scrub the record of any violations,” the court awarded defendants their reasonable fees and costs on all of the motions addressed in the order, to be paid by plaintiff’s counsel. However, the court declined to order withdrawal of the new complaint, because “dismissal – even without prejudice – requires a finding of willfulness or bad faith.” The filed complaint “suggests that the plaintiff tracked down information from the named plaintiffs and other publicly available sources,” such as Forms 5500, and nothing showed that discovery from this case had been shared with the plaintiffs in the new case. The court observed that a protective order is “designed to protect the privacy of information, not immunity from suit.” In the end, the court concluded that plaintiff’s counsel “made poor decisions” but that it would “not penalize the plaintiffs [in the new case] for their attorney’s poor judgment,” and warned that future violations would bring additional sanctions, “up to and including dismissal.” Finally, the court denied defendants’ request to reassign the new case to the court. The cases did not arise from substantially the same transaction or events, because this case concerns recordkeeping fees dating to 2014 and the new one concerns forfeitures beginning in 2020. The plaintiffs differ and the defendants only partly overlap. In short, “the violation of the court’s protective order in this case does not make [the new case] a related case that must be decided by this court.”
Provider Claims
Fifth Circuit
ER Addison LLC v. Cigna Healthcare of Texas, Inc., No. 3:24-CV-01828-N, 2026 WL 3438162 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2026) (Judge David C. Godbey). Four free-standing emergency centers – ER Addison, ER Hulen, ER Coit, and ER NearMe Plano – provide emergency care out of network to Cigna subscribers. They allege that three Cigna entities underpaid 2,055 claims for services provided between February 24, 2019, and June 30, 2022. Their second amended complaint asserts a claim for violation of ERISA payment obligations (Count I), breach of contract as to “non-self-funded ERISA plan claims” (Count II), negligent misrepresentation (Count III), unjust enrichment (Count IV), and attorney’s fees under ERISA (Count V). Cigna moved to dismiss all counts under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court noted at the outset that another judge in the district (Sidney A. Fitzwater) had decided “a very similar case” only months earlier, in which several of the same centers brought “almost identical claims,” “often with word-for-word parity between the pleadings.” (Your ERISA Watch covered that decision, in which Aetna was the defendant, in our April 15, 2026 edition.) The court noted that the Aetna decision was not binding on it, and it “exercises its own judgment.” However, “it finds the Aetna court’s reasoning highly persuasive” and followed it throughout. Beginning with Count I, the court denied the motion, rejecting Cigna’s three arguments. First, Cigna argued that ER identified no plan provisions entitling it to reimbursement. The court responded that Fifth Circuit plaintiffs are not held to a burden of identifying particular plan provisions, because plan documents can be difficult to obtain, and that representative allegations suffice when other facts support a plausible inference of liability. ER alleged that Cigna “has violated the plain terms of its plans” by underpaying out-of-network claims, “at the usual and customary level that its plans require,” and that it had requested plan documents on multiple occasions. The court found that these allegations distinguished the case from dismissals where no attempt to obtain plan documents was pleaded. Second, Cigna argued that the Texas emergency care statutes and the Affordable Care Act were inapplicable or created no private right of action. The court held that disagreement over ER’s interpretation of those statutes did not render the claims implausible and could be resolved later. Third, Cigna argued that ER lacked standing because many of its plans contained anti-assignment provisions. However, ER pleaded estoppel, contending that during a “multi-year” course of dealing Cigna never invoked any anti-assignment provisions, which was sufficient for the court at the pleading stage. On Count II, the court followed the Aetna case and distinguished between post-2019 and pre-2020 services. For post-2019 services, ER lacked standing as the patients’ assignee because the Texas Emergency Care Statutes shield insureds from balance billing. The relevant patients therefore suffered no Article III injury from the alleged underpayment, “there is no concrete financial injury,” and no cause of action existed to be assigned. For pre-2020 services, ER’s allegations were limited to Cigna’s obligations under its own plans and did not conflict with Texas law, but because of ERISA preemption “[o]nly those breach of contract claims not based upon benefits claims related to an ERISA plan survive[] the motion to dismiss.” The court dismissed Count III (negligent misrepresentation). As in Aetna, the alleged misrepresentations occurred after the insureds had bought their policies, received emergency services, and submitted claims, so no justifiable reliance by the insureds was plausibly pleaded. To the extent ER asserted its own claim, it showed no harm from any misrepresentations, only that the claims were denied. The court also dismissed Count IV (unjust enrichment) because “quasi-contractual claims are unavailable when a valid, express contract governing the subject matter of the dispute exists.” Alternative pleading is available only when a party disputes the contract’s existence, which was not the case with Cigna’s plan documents. Finally, Cigna argued that a four-year limitations period barred claims accruing before July 17, 2020. ER did not respond to this argument in its briefing. The court generally agreed that claims accruing outside the limitations period will be dismissed but noted that no specific claims had been presented. Thus, “because it cannot dismiss discrete claims based on specific facts, it denies Cigna’s motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations at this stage.”
Retaliation Claims
Second Circuit
Martin v. Google LLC, No. 3:25-CV-587 (SVN), 2026 WL 3458571 (D. Conn. Nov. 13, 2026) (Judge Sarala V. Nagala). Peter Martin, a Google Cloud sales representative, spent years pursuing the Otis Elevator account based on his managers’ alleged oral promise that his compensation for acquiring it would be based on a lucrative commission plan. In July 2023, he was diagnosed with Stage 4 colon cancer and told his supervisors. In December 2023, he closed a $35 million contract with Otis, but Google paid him no commissions on it. In early 2024, Google demoted him and lowered his performance rating, and in May 2024 it told him he would be terminated effective July 28, 2024. Martin alleges in this action that he was terminated on July 31, 2024, to eliminate near-certain liability under Google’s ERISA-covered life insurance plan, which would have paid his spouse a $2 million death benefit plus 50 percent of his annual earnings for ten years if he died while employed. In March of this year, the court dismissed Martin’s amended complaint but gave him leave to amend. (Your ERISA Watch covered this ruling in our March 11, 2026 edition.) His second amended complaint asserted twelve counts, including ADA, Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, ERISA, wage law, and common law claims. Google moved to dismiss all but the Connecticut discrimination counts. The court denied the motion as to the ADA claims, finding it plausible that a May 29 termination notice was not “definite” given the mixed messages Google sent in July, so that his EEOC charge was timely measured from his July 31 termination. On Martin’s first ERISA claim, for plan benefits, the court held that Martin failed to state a claim. The complaint alleged that life insurance benefits were triggered only by his death during employment, and it offered no factual basis for his assertion that he was owed some “vested percentage.” Martin’s briefing recast the claim as one for “interference with the right to maintain coverage,” but he cited no authority recognizing such a claim under § 502(a)(1)(B). At oral argument, Martin’s counsel effectively conceded that he was pursuing only a § 510 interference claim, so the court turned to that claim next. Under § 510, a plaintiff must show that the employer was “at least in part motivated by the specific intent to engage in activity prohibited by § 510,” which requires “more than the incidental loss of benefits as a result of a discharge.” Thus, Martin had to plausibly allege a “minimal inference” of discriminatory motivation, and the court found he had not. First, the complaint did not plausibly allege that Google appreciated the severity of his diagnosis. Martin alleged that he “never missed a day of work due to his treatment,” which undermined any inference that Google knew how serious his condition was; he alleged only that Google “knew or should have known” of the low survival rate of his cancer. Second, Martin did not plausibly allege that Google was even partly motivated to terminate him because of having to pay the life insurance benefit. The timing also did not support Martin because he was terminated a full year after disclosing his diagnosis. In the end, the court stated, “Plaintiff alleges only that the unavailability of benefits was a consequence of his termination – not a motivating factor behind it.” The court also dismissed Martin’s state law claims. Although the court found a clear and definite oral promise plausibly alleged, the parol evidence rule barred the oral promise because the compensation agreements were written and integrated. Thus, the promissory estoppel, implied-in-fact contract, implied covenant, wage law, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment claims failed. The negligent misrepresentation claim failed for lack of allegations that Google knew its promise was false. The court thus granted most of Google’s motion, including its motion to dismiss the ERISA counts.
Withdrawal Liability & Unpaid Contributions
Ninth Circuit
Board of Trustees of the Bakery & Confectionery Union and Industry International Pension Fund v. United States Bakery, No. 3:21-cv-617-SI, 2026 WL 3408540 (D. Or. Nov. 10, 2026) (Judge Michael H. Simon). The Bakery and Confectionery Union and Industry International Pension Fund is a multiemployer pension plan. Svenhard’s Swedish Bakery, whose Oakland employees were represented by a Bakery Union local, was in severe financial difficulty by 2013. In March 2014 Svenhard’s approached United States Bakery (USB) about a sale, and USB’s CEO, Bob Albers, proposed separate purchases of Svenhard’s Exeter facility, equipment, and intellectual property so that USB would “not be liable for [Svenhard’s] unfunded Bakers pension amount.” The deals were stretched into a five-year plan under which Svenhard’s kept operating on leases and licenses until USB took over. During this time USB insisted on secrecy, telling Svenhard’s to “keep the emails to a minimum and have mainly phone calls instead.” When Svenhard’s closed its Oakland facility in December 2015, it withdrew from the plan and was assessed more than $50 million in withdrawal liability, payable at $162,941 monthly for 240 months, plus $514,847.67 in delinquent contributions. USB kept Svenhard’s afloat with loans, required it to forward every communication from the Pension Fund, and joined strategy meetings on the liability. Negotiations between Svenhard’s and the Pension Fund continued throughout this time, during which Svenhard’s never disclosed that it had sold its intellectual property to USB and was operating under a soon-to-expire license. In 2019 Svenhard’s signed a settlement agreement with the Pension Fund calling for $12,500 monthly for 240 months on the withdrawal liability and $8,580.80 monthly on the delinquent contributions. Svenhard’s CEO knew when he signed that USB would shortly take over. After USB did so on November 4, 2019, Svenhard’s, which had made six payments, missed its first payment after the takeover and filed for bankruptcy on December 19, 2019. The Pension Fund sued USB and its subsidiaries, Mountain States Bakeries and Central California Baking, as successors to Svenhard’s and under ERISA’s “evade or avoid” provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c). Defendants asserted waiver and discharge based on the settlement agreement. This order represented the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law after a six-day bench trial on liability. On the issue of successor liability, defendants did not dispute substantial continuity of business operations, and their counsel conceded that they “‘probably’ took over operations in a manner that showed substantial continuity.” This was because defendants used the same plant, recipes, trademark, and customers, and more than 90 percent of the workforce was rehired. The evidence of actual notice of the withdrawal liability was “overwhelming,” as defendants were “active, albeit secret, participants” in the settlement negotiations. On fairness, which “primarily turns on notice,” the court found that USB could have negotiated a steeper price discount or bought Svenhard’s through bankruptcy, and that the risk of its “convoluted” scheme was “better placed on Defendants than on the Pension Fund.” Indeed, “Permitting Defendants to avoid successor liability to Svenhard’s pension obligation would result in harm to the pensioners and other employers and a windfall to Defendants, contrary to the purpose of ERISA[.]” The court then turned to the settlement agreement, which defendants argued “effectively discharged Svenhard’s ERISA liabilities.” The court disagreed, ruling that the settlement agreement was voidable for (a) fraudulent inducement under Maryland law, which governed the agreement, and (b) violation of ERISA’s “evade or avoid” provision. On fraud, the court noted that Svenhard’s signed the settlement agreement representing that it needed the reduced payments to stay in business and could keep paying them. However, at that point Svenhard’s had already sold its intellectual property, was operating under a license about to expire, knew USB would take over within months, at which time it would stop operating and could not pay. It also hid this information from the Pension Fund, at USB’s direction, to keep USB from being pursued as a successor. Under the “evade or avoid” provision, the court found that the settlement agreement was “the culmination of a years-long plan” to keep the Pension Fund in the dark, and avoiding withdrawal liability was “a principal purpose” of the agreement. As a result, the transaction was void under Section 1392(c). In the end, the court concluded that USB was a successor employer to Svenhard’s under ERISA, and that all defendants were jointly and severally liable for Svenhard’s withdrawal liability and delinquent contributions. The court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding the next phase of trial: damages.
