Aramark Servs., Inc. Grp. Health Plan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 24-40323, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 1154313 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 2026)

This week’s notable decision is not a decision at all. Instead, it’s a two-paragraph order in which the Fifth Circuit vacated its December 18, 2025 published opinion in this case and agreed to rehear it en banc.

In its December ruling (which Your ERISA Watch covered as one of our cases of the week in our December 24, 2025 edition), a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit examined an arbitration provision in an agreement between an employee health plan sponsored by Aramark Services, Inc. and the third-party administrator of the plan, Aetna Life Insurance Company. Aramark had sued Aetna, contending that Aetna was liable for breach of fiduciary duties and prohibited transactions under ERISA based on Aetna’s improper payment of provider claims, retaining undisclosed fees, and engaging in claims-handling misconduct.

Aetna filed a motion to compel arbitration, but the district court denied it. The district court ruled that (1) the parties had not clearly and unmistakably delegated the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and thus it was the court’s job to decide the issue, and (2) Aramark’s claims were equitable in nature and thus not subject to arbitration, because the arbitration clause exempted “temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctive relief or any other form of equitable relief.”

The Fifth Circuit panel affirmed, ruling that the arbitration provision was ambiguous and thus, under the rule of contra proferentem (ambiguous language should be construed against the drafter, i.e., Aetna), the issue of arbitrability was for the court to decide. The Fifth Circuit further ruled that the relief requested by Aramark, even though it was monetary, was equitable in nature and could be sought pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 2011 guidance in Cigna Corp v. Amara and the Fifth Circuit’s 2013 decision interpreting Amara in Gearlds v. Entergy Servs., Inc.

The decision was not unanimous. Judge Edith H. Jones agreed with the first part of the decision regarding arbitrability, but wrote a vigorous dissent in which she accused Amara of causing “confusion,” characterized its discussion of equitable surcharge as dicta, and contended that the dicta was at odds with the holdings of other Supreme Court cases. As a result, she contended that the Fifth Circuit “should repudiate Gearlds” and rule that the monetary remedy sought by Aramark did not constitute “equitable relief.”

This week’s order does not explain which part of the panel’s decision attracted the interest of the full court, but the smart money is obviously on the second part which antagonized Judge Jones. Will the Fifth Circuit jettison Gearlds and follow the path blazed by the Fourth Circuit (in Rose v. PSA Airlines, Inc. (2023)) and Sixth Circuit (in Aldridge v. Regions Bank (2025))? Or will it stick to its guns and deepen a circuit split? We will of course keep you in the loop.

Below is a summary of this past week’s notable ERISA decisions by subject matter and jurisdiction.

Attorneys’ Fees

Third Circuit

Allied Painting & Decorating, Inc. v. International Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund, No. CV 21-13310 (RK), 2026 WL 1168178 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2026) (Magistrate Judge Tonianne J. Bongiovanni). This is a withdrawal liability case under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) in which the International Painters and Allied Trades Industry Pension Fund contended that Allied Painting & Decorating, Inc. owed the fund $427,195 based on Allied’s withdrawal from the fund in 2005, even though the fund did not pursue payment until 2017. An arbitrator found that the fund did not act “as soon as practicable” in issuing a notice and demand to Allied, but still ruled in the fund’s favor because Allied was not prejudiced by this delay, thereby dooming its laches defense. However, the district court vacated this award, citing “‘a reasonable appearance of bias against Allied,’ which resulted in the ‘deprivation of a fair hearing.’” The fund appealed to the Third Circuit, which affirmed in July of 2024. The appellate court ruled that Allied did not even need to raise its laches defense, let alone prevail on it. Instead, the duty to provide notice of withdrawal liability assessment and demand payment “as soon as practicable” was a statutory prerequisite to obtaining relief, and the fund flunked this requirement with its twelve-year delay. (Your ERISA Watch reported on this decision in our July 17, 2024 edition.) Fresh off this victory, Allied renewed its motion for attorney’s fees, which the district court assessed in this order. The parties agreed that in withdrawal liability cases fees may be awarded to a prevailing party under 29 U.S.C. § 1451(e). However, the parties disagreed over what standard to apply under that statute. Allied contended that the court should use the Third Circuit’s five-factor test as set forth in Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, while the fund contended that the court should use the standard set forth in the Third Circuit case of Dorn’s Transp., Inc. v. Teamsters Pension Tr. Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity. The court noted that “the MPPAA was not at issue in the Ursic matter, which instead involved a request for attorney’s fees based on an employee’s successful claim under § 510 of ERISA to recover past and future pension benefits.” Dorn’s, on the other hand, was an MPPAA case, and thus “Dorn remains the applicable Third Circuit precedent for determining whether to award attorneys’ fees and expenses to a prevailing employer under the fee shifting provisions of the MPPAA.” Under Dorn’s, a prevailing employer “is entitled to attorneys’ fees only if the Plan’s assessment of withdrawal liability was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.” Under this demanding standard the court denied Allied’s motion for attorney’s fees. The court noted that prior to the Third Circuit’s decision in this case, it was “generally understood” that “even where there was a delay in a fund asserting a payment demand, an employer would still have to raise a laches objection” and establish prejudice. However, the Third Circuit clarified in its ruling that “prejudice and, indeed the laches defense, have no place in the withdrawal liability calculus[.]” This ruling “represents a significant shift in the law that could not have been reasonably anticipated or foreseen by the Fund.” Thus, “while the Fund ultimately did not prevail, under the circumstances presented, the Court finds that the Fund’s assessment of withdrawal liability was not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. As a result, Allied’s motion for attorney fees and expenses is DENIED.”

Seventh Circuit

Ryan v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 21-CV-592-WMC, 2026 WL 1146274 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 28, 2026) (Judge William M. Conley). Plaintiff Frances Ryan was an internal medicine physician who was a participant in an ERISA-governed long-term disability benefit plan insured by Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company. She became disabled in 2018 after she suffered an injury to her head on vacation which caused post-concussion symptoms. Hartford initially approved Ryan’s claim in 2018, but in 2020 it terminated her benefits, contending she had no cognitive limitations and could return to work in her own occupation. Ryan unsuccessfully appealed and then brought this action. In June of 2025 the court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment that Hartford abused its discretion in denying her claim and remanded to Hartford for further review. (Your ERISA Watch covered this decision in our June 25, 2025 edition.) On remand, Hartford caved and reinstated Ryan’s benefits. The only remaining item before the court was Ryan’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), which the court granted in this order. First, the court determined that Ryan met the threshold requirement of “some success on the merits” for fee eligibility under ERISA. Hartford argued that the court’s remand was a “purely procedural” victory and did not meet this standard. However, the court found this argument “baseless” because Ryan’s benefits were ultimately reinstated pursuant to the order. Moving on to entitlement, “the Seventh Circuit employs two tests – a five-factor test and the ‘substantially justified’ test.” Both tests yielded the same result, favoring an award. The court found that Hartford’s position was not substantially justified, it had “ample means” to satisfy an award, and an award would “deter similar conduct in the future.” Next, the court calculated the reasonableness of Ryan’s fees by using the lodestar test of multiplying reasonable hours spent by a reasonable hourly rate. Hartford did not dispute the hourly rate (sadly not mentioned in the order) claimed by Ryan’s counsel, William T. Reynolds IV, and instead argued that the total amount should be reduced for (1) lack of success on the merits, (2) work on undecided motions, (3) administrative tasks, and (4) excessive hours. The court declined to reduce fees based on lack of success on the merits, as Ryan’s victory was “essentially complete.” The court also awarded full fees for work on the undecided motions, noting that “counsel’s time is dedicated more to the litigation as a whole, rather than a discrete series of claims, meaning district courts ‘should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended.’” The court further found that counsel did not spend excessive time on certain tasks identified by Hartford. However, the court did exclude fees for clerical tasks and costs related to mediation, which were not recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. As a result, Ryan’s motion was granted nearly in full, resulting in an award of $151,612.50 in fees and $402 in costs.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Fourth Circuit

Nolan v. Sonic Automotive, Inc., No. 3:25-CV-00474-KDB-WCM, 2026 WL 1195596 (W.D.N.C. May 1, 2026) (Judge Kenneth D. Bell). Joseph Nolan III was an employee of Sonic Automotive, Inc. and a participant in one of Sonic’s ERISA-governed 401(k) retirement plans. Nolan alleges that he and other participants suffered financial losses due to the mismanagement of his plan and another plan, the “California plan,” also sponsored by Sonic. He sued Sonic and related defendants, alleging (1) breach of fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty to the plans (Counts I and II), (2) breach of co-fiduciary duties (Count III), (3) breach of fiduciary duty of prudence by Sonic for failing to monitor the plans’ benefit committee (Count IV), (4) engaging in prohibited transactions in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (Count V), and (5) failing to act in accordance with the governing plan documents in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (Count VI). Specifically, Nolan focused on four funds, contending that the plans selected and retained these “higher cost, lower-performing investment options,” failed to follow the investment policy statement (IPS), did not conduct periodic reviews, and paid unreasonable fees to the plans’ investment advisor. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Addressing standing first, the court found that Nolan lacked standing to bring claims under the California Plan because he did not participate in it. Nolan contended that he had standing to obtain relief under that plan “because both Plans are ‘sponsored, maintained, and administered by Sonic and share the same fiduciaries,’ and because the alleged injuries are traceable ‘to the same challenged conduct.’” However, this was not good enough because of the “narrow scope of Article III standing,” under which Nolan could not “demonstrate a concrete, real-world injury stemming from the alleged violation.” As for the duty of prudence, the court found that claims related to the initial selection of funds were time-barred under ERISA’s six-year statute of limitations. On the merits, the court concluded that Nolan did not plausibly allege a breach. The court noted that the duty of prudence is “process-oriented, not results-oriented,” and Nolan failed to allege facts suggesting a flawed decision-making process by the fiduciaries. Furthermore, regarding Sonic’s growth fund, the court found that (1) Nolan chose an inappropriate benchmark by using a passively-managed index fund to compare to Sonic’s active fund, (2) Nolan relied too heavily on the fund’s information ratio, which had variable results at any rate, and (3) Sonic was not required to choose a fund with the lowest expense ratio, and the fund had minimal underperformance in any event. Regarding Sonic’s value fund, the court found that the S&P 500 index was not a good comparator and there was insufficient underperformance. For the remaining two funds, Nolan contended that lower cost share classes were available, but the court noted that it was not clear that the Sonic plans were eligible for those classes, and in any event plans are not required to always select the cheapest share class. The court also rejected Nolan’s excessive fees claim because he “attempt[ed] to repurpose the methodology for calculating reasonable attorney’s fees as a framework for evaluating the compensation paid to a financial-services firm.” Moving on to Nolan’s breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty claim, the court dismissed this claim, stating that it impermissibly “piggybacked” on the prudence claim without independent facts suggesting a disloyal motive or self-interested conduct by defendants. The court also dismissed Nolan’s breach of co-fiduciary duty claim, and his prudence claim against Sonic, because they were derivative of his other already rejected claims. As for the prohibited transactions claim, the court again found that the claims related to the inclusion and retention of funds were time-barred, and the allegations of excessive advisory fees did not constitute a prohibited transaction. Finally, the court dismissed Nolan’s claim for failure to act in accordance with plan documents, ruling it duplicative of the breach of fiduciary duty claim and noting that the IPS was not a binding plan document. As a result, defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in full.

Fifth Circuit

Eibensteiner v. EssilorLuxottica USA Inc., No. 3:25-CV-2443-X, 2026 WL 1140895 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2026) (Judge Brantley Starr). This case involves a dispute over the management of EssilorLuxottica USA’s ERISA-governed defined contribution retirement plan. The plan offered various investment options, including a stable value fund known as the Prudential Guaranteed Income Fund, which was backed by Prudential Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company.  Plaintiffs, who are employee participants in the plan, allege that “the Prudential Fund provided significantly lower crediting rates than comparable investments which EssilorLuxottica could have made available to plan participants. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Prudential improperly benefited from plan participants being invested in the Prudential Fund because the assets invested in it were held by Prudential, who kept the difference between the amount earned on the investments and the amount paid to Plan members (the ‘spread’).” Plaintiffs sued EssilorLuxottica and its benefits committee alleging that they failed to adequately monitor the Prudential Fund, investigate alternatives, or negotiate better terms, and that Prudential’s compensation structure constituted prohibited transactions under ERISA. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Addressing the duty of prudence first, the court acknowledged that plaintiffs had offered examples of investments that were allegedly comparable to the Prudential Fund, but ruled that none provided a “meaningful benchmark” for comparison. The court stated that “the allegations regarding the comparators’ characteristics remain largely high-level and are wanting for substantial factual detail concerning their underlying structure, contractual terms, or specific risk exposures.” The court was also unimpressed by allegations regarding Prudential’s risky financial condition, faulting plaintiffs because they “do not allege whether these conditions were atypical within the industry, materially different from those of insurers offering the comparator products, or how those factors would have affected a prudent fiduciary’s decision-making.” Turning to the prohibited transactions claim, the court found that plaintiffs failed to allege that Prudential was a party in interest at the time of the relevant transaction: “The amended complaint does not identify whether Prudential was already providing services to the Plan or its committee at the time the relevant contract was entered. Absent such allegations, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly plead that EssilorLuxottica caused the Plan to engage in a prohibited transaction with a party in interest.” Finally, the court ruled that plaintiffs’ derivative claim for failure to monitor fiduciaries failed because the underlying breach of fiduciary duty claims were not plausibly alleged. The court thus granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, but gave plaintiffs leave to amend.

Disability Benefit Claims

First Circuit

Shortill v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 2:25-CV-00264-JAW, 2026 WL 1179948 (D. Me. Apr. 30, 2026) (Magistrate Judge John C. Nivison). In 2021 Susan Shortill began working at TRISTAR, a third-party insurance administrator, as a claims supervisor, a position classified as sedentary. Pursuant to her employment she was a participant in TRISTAR’s ERISA-governed long-term disability (LTD) plan, which was insured by Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company. In July of 2023, Shortill suffered a traumatic injury at home, resulting in a broken neck, shoulder pain, back pain, bruising, and a concussion. Shortill received short-term disability benefits until late January 2024, returned to work part-time in February and March 2024, and was eventually terminated as part of a layoff on March 15, 2024. At the same time, Shortill applied for LTD benefits with Reliance. Reliance determined that Shortill was disabled through April 19, 2024 due to her injury and recovery, which included surgery, but could have returned to work after that date. Shortill unsuccessfully appealed, and this action followed in which Shortill sought benefits pursuant to ERISA Section 1132(a)(1)(B). The case proceeded to cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record. The assigned magistrate judge used the arbitrary and capricious standard of review because the plan gave Reliance discretionary authority to determine benefit eligibility. Shortill contended that Reliance had a structural conflict of interest, but the court ruled that this did not change the standard of review. “[T]he record reflects that Defendant took steps to insulate the claims determination process from its financial interests by, for example, employing third party peer reviewers and an independent appeal unit,” and “Plaintiff has not cited any evidence to suggest that the structural conflict influenced Defendant’s decision in some way[.]” Thus, “the conflict is entitled to little, if any, weight in the overall analysis.” On the merits, the court found that Reliance considered Shortill’s mental health condition, including her depression, but found no evidence that it precluded her from working as a claims supervisor. The court noted that Shortill did not assert her mental health as a basis for disability in her application. As for Shortill’s physical condition, the court ruled that Reliance’s decision was supported by medical records and expert opinions, noting that Reliance reasonably considered the combined effects of her injuries and focused on the appropriate time periods in making its decision. The court also found that Reliance conducted a reasonable vocational assessment by accounting for the requirements of Shortill’s sedentary occupation as it is normally performed in the national economy. As a result, the magistrate judge concluded that Reliance’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious, and thus recommended that Reliance’s motion for judgment should be granted.

Ninth Circuit

Rushing v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. CV 24-10088-JFW(RAOX), 2026 WL 1162757 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2026) (Judge John F. Walter). Candace Rushing was employed by Peet’s Coffee & Tea and was a participant in Peet’s ERISA-governed long-term disability benefit plan, which was insured by Life Insurance Company of North America (LINA). Rushing suffered a knee injury in 2010 and became disabled. She submitted a benefit claim to LINA, which approved it. In doing so LINA initially calculated Rushing’s benefit based on her hourly base rate without accounting for commissions. After some discussion, LINA included commissions in its calculations and paid Rushing benefits until 2020, when it terminated her claim for failure to provide proof of loss. On appeal, LINA reinstated her benefits, but again the parties could not agree on how to calculate Rushing’s benefits, disputing how to account for commissions and overtime pay. Rushing exhausted her appeals and then filed this action. She claimed that LINA incorrectly calculated her commission income, failed to include her overtime pay at 1.5 times her regular pay rate, and incorrectly offset her benefits. The case proceeded to Rule 52 briefing; this order represented the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. At the outset, the court addressed the standard of review. LINA contended that a document titled “Employee Welfare Benefit Plan: Appointment of Claim Fiduciary” (ACF) gave it discretionary authority, thus entitling it to abuse of discretion review, but Rushing argued that the ACF was not a plan document and thus could not support deferential review. (LINA did not produce the ACF until litigation.) The court noted that “there is a split of authority over whether LINA’s ACF (or virtually indistinguishable ACF) is an enforceable Plan document sufficient to provide LINA with the requisite discretion.” The court sided with LINA, noting that “[a]n ERISA Plan may be made up of multiple documents and ‘there is no requirement that documents claimed to collectively form the employee benefit plan be formally labeled as such.’” The ACF contained the name of the plan and the plan administrator, was signed by the plan and LINA, and stated that it was effective along with the policy. Under these circumstances, “it is difficult to see how it could be anything other than a plan document.” The court thus applied abuse of discretion review, noting that even though LINA had a conflict of interest, it would view LINA’s decision with “a low level of skepticism” because “the record generally reflects that LINA engaged in an ongoing, good faith exchange of information and updated Plaintiff’s benefits following an interactive process triggered by Plaintiff providing new information.” Under this deferential standard of review, the court ruled that LINA did not abuse its discretion in calculating Rushing’s commissions, as the policy did not exclude months with no commissions and did not authorize selectively averaging only higher-earning months. However, the court found that LINA abused its discretion in calculating Rushing’s five hours per week of “overtime” by using her base rate of pay instead of her regular rate of pay. The court stated that if LINA was going to include all 45 hours per week in calculating benefits, it had to use the regular rate of pay for all 45 hours. LINA did not, however, have to use a 1.5 rate for those hours as argued by Rushing. Moving on, the court concluded that LINA did not abuse its discretion when determining Rushing’s date of disability or calculating offsets for her benefits, as these issues were either already resolved or abandoned by Rushing. Finally, the court determined that LINA paid the correct amount of interest on delayed benefits, but owed additional interest due to the miscalculation of “overtime” pay. The court ruled that ten percent was an appropriate interest rate because Rushing “endured enormous hardships,” including “paying interest on credit cards and ruining her credit, selling possessions to pay for basic necessities, relying on food banks, borrowing money from friends and family to buy food and pay her rent, declaring bankruptcy in 2021, and paying extra income tax[.]” The court ordered the parties to agree on the amount of benefits and interest owed, and in the “unlikely event” they could not agree, the court indicated it would remand to LINA for recalculation.

Pleading Issues & Procedure

Seventh Circuit

Greer v. Greer, No. 25-CV-1897-JPS, 2026 WL 1180166 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 30, 2026) (Judge J.P. Stadtmueller). Angela Greer contends that she initiated divorce proceedings against her then-husband, Shawn Greer, in 2022, which resulted in a default judgment of divorce in 2023. The divorce judgment apparently contemplated the issuance of a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) which “required a division of [Shawn’s] retirement account at Bradley Corporation,” with Angela entitled to 65% of the account, valued at approximately $350,000. Shawn moved to reopen the divorce judgment, but before the state court could adjudicate the couple’s disputes he passed away. Angela alleged that she repeatedly provided the divorce decree to Bradley to prevent it from distributing any funds from Shawn’s retirement account while she obtained a QDRO. However, Bradley allegedly paid the funds out to the couple’s three children anyway. Angela thus filed this action against the children and Bradley, alleging breach of fiduciary duty by Bradley in connection with the plan payout. Bradley removed the case to federal court, asserting that Angela’s claims were governed by ERISA. Angela moved to remand the case back to state court, arguing that her claims did not rely on ERISA and that state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction. The court agreed that removal was proper because “Angela’s breach of fiduciary duty claim relies, at least in part, on ERISA, which is enough to bring this case to federal court.” Furthermore, “While Angela stylizes her claim as one for breach of fiduciary duty, it is obvious that she seeks to recover or otherwise enforce her rights under the plan.” As a result, the court construed her action as a claim for benefits under ERISA Section 1132(a)(1)(B), which meant that “state and federal courts share concurrent jurisdiction over this case.” However, even though jurisdiction was proper in federal court, the court granted the motion to remand because the removal was procedurally defective. Bradley “concedes that it did not obtain the written consent of any of the Children prior to removal,” even though at least two of the children had been served with the complaint. The court found that, “[d]ue to Bradley’s lack of reasonable diligence in determining whether the Children had been served, there is no basis to excuse Bradley’s defective notice of removal. As such, remand to the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County is required and the Court need not address the parties’ remaining arguments.” The case will thus proceed in state court.

Retaliation Claims

Seventh Circuit

Thompson v. Ascension Med. Grp. Southeast Wisconsin, Inc., No. 25-CV-1964, 2026 WL 1180165 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 30, 2026) (Magistrate Judge William E. Duffin). Melanie Thompson filed this action against Ascension Medical Group Southeast Wisconsin, Inc., Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital of Milwaukee, Inc., and Columbia St. Mary’s medical director Stephanie Momper, alleging thirteen claims for relief arising from her employment and eventual termination. Among her claims was one for violation of ERISA Section 510. Thompson signed a “Physician Employment Agreement” in 2010 to work part-time as a family medicine physician at Columbia St. Mary’s clinics and hospitals, which were operated by Ascension. The agreement specified a part-time schedule “subject to Clinic’s operational needs,” but Thompson claims that the agreement defined “part-time” as 20 hours per week, and she was assured that she would always be scheduled for 20 hours. However, over the years, Thompson’s scheduled hours varied, and she alleged that her hours were reduced significantly after 2019, leading to her constructive termination in 2024. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the court ruled on in this order. The court denied the motion as to some counts (e.g. breach of contract, bad faith, Age Discrimination in Employment Act), but granted it as to others (e.g. promissory estoppel, reformation of contract, tortious interference with contract). As for Thompson’s ERISA claim, she contended that Ascension violated Section 510 because it “constructively terminated [her] employment contract prematurely in April 2024 (as it remains valid through September 30, 2026) by among others: refusing to schedule her for work a minimum of 20 hours per week, by terminating her malpractice insurance coverage, by terminating her State patient compensation fund contributions, by terminating her retirement benefits, by terminating her continuing medical education benefits and further, by attempting to claw back paid compensation before her employment contract termination date.” Thompson argued that “[t]he reasonable inference of this allegation is that Ascension intentionally refused to provide [her] with any hours from April 22, 2024 through the end of her contract, among others, for the purpose of preventing her from receiving future retirement benefits.” This was insufficient for the court, which stated that “Thompson made no allegation in her complaint that the defendants intended to interfere with her benefits.” Thompson’s termination may have led to the loss of benefits, “[b]ut any consequential loss of benefits does not give rise to a claim under § 510 every time an employee is terminated.” As a result, the court granted Ascension’s motion to dismiss Thompson’s ERISA claim, without prejudice.

Venue

Tenth Circuit

Peter T. v. Oxford Health Ins., Inc., No. 2:24-CV-00189-TC-DAO, 2026 WL 1211766 (D. Utah May 4, 2026) (Judge Tena Campbell). The plaintiffs in this action, Peter T., Maura K., and M.T., are seeking benefits for treatment that occurred at a facility called BlueFire Wilderness Therapy. The defendant is Oxford Health Insurance, Inc., the insurer of their ERISA-governed employee health benefit plan. Plaintiffs live in Connecticut, the employer sponsoring the plan is in Connecticut, Oxford is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut, and BlueFire is in Idaho. Plaintiffs filed this action in the District of Utah, so you can guess what happened next: Oxford filed a motion to transfer venue, contending that the case should be transferred to the District of Connecticut pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented”). Plaintiffs sensibly did not oppose the motion. The court noted that plaintiffs alleged that “certain appeals related to coverage…‘were written by a company located in Salt Lake City, Utah,’” but the complaint “contains no further details about this allegation and Oxford counters that ‘none of the decisions at issue in this case were issued in Utah.’” As a result, the court was “uncertain whether venue is appropriate in the District of Utah: no parties reside in or may be found in Utah, and it does not appear that the plan was administered (or potentially breached) in Utah.” On the other hand, “Defendant has its principal place of business in Connecticut, where the Plaintiffs also reside, and it appears that the plan was administered in Connecticut. The court therefore finds that the District of Connecticut is an appropriate venue for this action.” The court noted that ordinarily it would run through the Tenth Circuit’s six-factor test for determining whether transfer was appropriate, but it dispensed with the test here: “Because the Plaintiffs did not file an opposition, the court does not address each of these factors in depth. But the court has carefully considered the reasons stated in Oxford’s motion and agrees that these factors taken as whole – and especially the location of potential witnesses – weigh in favor of transfer.” With that, the court granted Oxford’s motion, and the case will proceed in the District of Connecticut.