Most ERISA practitioners are familiar with Cigna v. Amara, the 2011 Supreme Court decision that helped defined the contours of ERISA’s remedial scheme. But did you know, fifteen years later, that the case is still going?

Read on to learn about Amara’s latest trip to the Second Circuit, and then stick around for this week’s other cases, which include (1) an eleven-year-old case on remand from the Second Circuit (again) involving shenanigans in a Vermont retirement plan (Browe v. CTC Corp.), (2) the demise of another putative class action alleging the misuse of forfeited unvested employer contributions to a retirement plan (Polanco v. WPP), (3) an award of long-term disability benefits stretching all the way back to 2009 (Nabi v. Provident), and last, and probably least, (4) a plaintiff who cited hallucinated AI-generated cases in her pleadings and got away with a slap on the wrist and a chance to amend those pleadings (Moore v. Wireless CCTV).

Below is a summary of this past week’s notable ERISA decisions by subject matter and jurisdiction.

Attorneys’ Fees

Second Circuit

Browe v. CTC Corp., No. 2:15-CV-00267-CR, 2026 WL 1102837 (D. Vt. Apr. 23, 2026) (Judge Christina Reiss). This is an unusual case in several ways: (1) it is eleven years old; (2) it has been up to the Second Circuit and back twice; and (3) it is from your editor’s home state. The case involves a deferred compensation plan created and maintained by Bruce Laumeister for certain employees of his company, CTC Corporation. Lucille Launderville, who held various executive positions at CTC, was an administrator of the plan. Beginning in 2004, Laumeister, Launderville, and another employee, Donna Browe, “began withdrawing funds from the Plan in order to pay CTC’s operating expenses. By 2008, Plaintiffs Launderville and Browe knew that CTC was struggling financially and entered into a side deal with Defendant Laumeister, in which Defendant Laumeister was to personally fund Plaintiffs Launderville’s and Browe’s Plan benefits. Plaintiffs Launderville and Browe remained silent regarding the Plan’s shortfall and their side deal until 2015, when it fell through.” This lawsuit followed in which Launderville, Browe, and other former CTC employees alleged that defendants CTC and Laumeister violated ERISA by inadequately funding the plan and failing to pay benefits, among other claims. Defendants counterclaimed against Launderville for contribution and indemnification as a breaching co-fiduciary. In 2017-18, the district court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of plaintiffs. The case went up to the Second Circuit, which in 2021 largely ruled in favor of plaintiffs, but reversed and remanded on several issues. The district court then issued supplemental findings and remedial orders, which once again went up to the Second Circuit. That court again reversed for more fact-finding, and also ruled that Launderville and Browe were not entitled to benefits. The district court finally wrapped the merits up in an April 7, 2026 order, and in this order it ruled on motions for attorney’s fees from both sides. First the court addressed whether defendants had standing to seek fees. Plaintiffs argued that defendants, as “former fiduciaries,” lacked standing. However, the court found that defendants had already been adjudicated to be fiduciaries and thus had standing to seek fees. Plaintiffs had more success with their argument that defendants could not receive fees based on their counterclaim for contribution; the court agreed that contribution was “an equitable remedy” and “not a cause of action under ERISA for which attorney’s fees are available pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).” Next, the court concluded that defendants had achieved “some degree of success on the merits” by successfully defending against Launderville’s and Browe’s ERISA claims, but because defendants lost regarding the remaining plaintiffs, they “may not recover attorney’s fees from the Remaining Plaintiffs.” Next, the court applied the five-factor Chambless test, concluding that it weighed in favor of awarding defendants fees against Launderville, but not against Browe, primarily because Launderville “did not act in good faith in bringing this lawsuit and because Defendants prevailed in demonstrating she was not entitled to any recovery.” The court then turned to the motion for fees by the remaining plaintiffs. The court agreed with defendants that plaintiffs’ request for $465,000 in fees included work done on behalf of Launderville and Browe, and thus their request would need to be recalculated. The court ruled that the remaining plaintiffs “undisputedly obtained some degree of success on the merits,” and after applying the Chambless factors, concluded that an award of fees was appropriate. As a result, both sides were partially victorious and now have 30 days to refile their fee requests in accordance with the court’s ruling.

Sixth Circuit

Erickson v. Walsh Construction Grp., LLC, No. 2:23-CV-3296, 2026 WL 1101968 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 23, 2026) (Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.). Bradley D. Erickson filed this action against his employer, Walsh Construction Group, LLC, for relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and analogous state laws. Additionally, Erickson brought a claim under ERISA alleging that Walsh failed to remit insurance contributions and deductions on his behalf. The parties eventually reached a settlement, which required Walsh to pay $35,000, which included payment for wages to Erickson, payment of attorneys’ fees and costs, and a $100 payment to Erickson’s son to release any potential ERISA claims. Walsh was supposed to make these payments within 21 business days of court approval, but it failed to do so. This led to a series of court orders and motions to enforce the settlement, during which Walsh’s counsel withdrew. Eventually, the court granted Erickson’s unopposed motion to enforce the settlement, after which Erickson filed an unopposed motion for attorney’s fees. In this order the court granted Erickson’s motion, awarding $3,988.45. The court used the lodestar method to calculate the attorneys’ fees, determining that the 14.30 hours worked by Erickson’s counsel to enforce the settlement were reasonable. The court approved $600 per hour for the partner on the case, finding his rate to be “at the high end of billing rates for private employment lawyers,” but “given Attorney DeRose’s significant experience, the Court finds this rate to be reasonable.” The court also approved $215 per hour for a junior associate and $170 per hour for a paralegal.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Second Circuit

Polanco v. WPP Grp. USA, Inc., No. 24-CV-9548 (JGK), 2026 WL 1099370 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2026) (Judge John G. Koeltl). Rafael Polanco and Monique Johnson are former participants in a retirement plan sponsored by WPP Group USA, Inc. They filed this action against WPP and the plan’s investment committee, alleging that defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by using plan forfeitures to reduce WPP’s contributions to the plan instead of reducing the plan’s administrative costs. Like many such plans, the WPP plan allows employees to contribute wages to individual retirement accounts, with the employer making matching contributions. Employee contributions vest immediately, while WPP’s contributions are subject to a three-year vesting schedule. If a participant leaves before vesting, the unvested contributions are forfeited. The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ first complaint, jettisoning plaintiffs’ breach of the duty of loyalty and self-dealing claims with prejudice. The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the duty of prudence and the duty to monitor, but allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint to re-allege these claims. (Your ERISA Watch covered this decision in our November 5, 2025 edition.) Plaintiffs accepted the court’s invitation and filed an amended complaint, and again defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In their new complaint, plaintiffs continued to focus on forfeitures, arguing that the plan committee was imprudent by “failing to use Forfeitures to cover administrative costs and by failing to allocate all Forfeitures by the end of each Plan year.” Plaintiffs advanced two new theories in an effort to overcome the court’s objections to their first complaint. First, plaintiffs argued that “there is ‘no indication’ that using Forfeitures was necessary to maintain current employer-contribution levels or to cover future employer-contributions,” or that “WPP’s process in determining the amount of its Company Contributions is based on any consideration of the amount of Forfeited Plan Assets.” The court rejected these allegations, finding them “fundamentally…no different” from plaintiffs’ first complaint. The court ruled that plaintiffs had to allege “specific facts…that invite the inference that the fiduciary actually engaged in imprudent conduct. And the simple assertion that the employer did not need to use the Forfeitures for discretionary employer contributions does not suggest that it was imprudent to do so.” Second, plaintiffs argued that the committee did not “ensure[ ] that all [Forfeitures] for the plan year were promptly exhausted by year end or shortly thereafter, and did not remain in an unallocated Plan account.” This did not pass muster either “because the plaintiffs never explain why it would be imprudent for the Plan Committee not to allocate all Forfeitures at the end of the Plan year.” The court noted that “Forfeitures accrue whenever a Plan participant experiences a break in service before the employer contributions in the participant’s account vest,” and thus “the time at which Forfeitures accrue in the Plan’s Forfeitures account is variable.” As a result, “[i]t is therefore not only reasonable but entirely expected that the Plan’s Forfeitures account would contain potentially large sums of money on December 31 of each year.” Indeed, “it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the Form 5500 filings would show a balance even close to zero at year end.” As a result, the court found plaintiffs’ amended claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence to be insufficient, and dismissed it. The court dismissed their derivative claim alleging breach of the duty to monitor as well. This time both dismissals were with prejudice, and thus the case is now over.

Sixth Circuit

Trout v. Meijer, Inc., No. 1:25-CV-1378, 2026 WL 1098213 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2026) (Judge Hala Y. Jarbou). Meijer, Inc., is a Midwest grocery store chain which offers an ERISA-governed health insurance plan to its employees. The plan includes a “wellness program” which requires employees to pay a $20 per week surcharge if they use tobacco products. If an employee signs a pledge at the start of the year stating they do not use tobacco products, they avoid the surcharge. Meijer collects these surcharges directly from employees’ paychecks and uses them to offset its contributions to the health plan. For employees who use tobacco, Meijer offers a cessation program as an alternative standard. If completed within the first six months of coverage, the surcharge for the entire year is eliminated. If completed later, only future surcharges are reduced. Justin Trout, a Meijer employee, paid the surcharge and filed this putative class action challenging the program. He brought claims under section 502(a)(2) and (a)(3) of ERISA, alleging that Meijer violated 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D) by not providing the “full reward” to employees who complete the wellness program in the second half of the year. He also claimed Meijer violated § 300gg-4(j)(3)(E) by failing to disclose that physician recommendations would be accommodated. Additionally, Trout alleged that Meijer breached its fiduciary duties and engaged in prohibited transactions by collecting unlawful surcharges and using them to offset its contributions. Meijer moved to dismiss. The court addressed the “full reward” issue first, and ruled that the plan complied with ERISA. The court rejected Trout’s interpretation of the law, instead “adopt[ing] a more plausible reading: § 300gg-4 requires employers to allow employees to qualify for the full reward at least once per year. As long as employers meet that requirement, they are free to offer additional opportunities to qualify for a partial reward.” Trout complained that this did not treat “similarly situated” people the same, but the court explained that “the prohibition on unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals is designed (like the statute as a whole) to prevent discrimination based on participants’ health conditions. It is not designed to prevent discrimination based on the time of year a participant qualifies for the program.” Moving on to notice requirements, the court agreed that Trout stated a claim that Meijer violated the requirement to disclose the availability of a reasonable alternative standard. The court found that Meijer’s benefits guides described the wellness program sufficiently to trigger the notice requirement and failed to include necessary disclosures about accommodating physician recommendations. Meijer argued that this conclusion relied on Department of Labor regulations, and that Congress “did not grant the DOL authority to interpret § 300gg-4(j)(3)(E) or impose additional requirements beyond those included in the statute.” However, the court found that “a regulation clarifying § 300gg-4’s notice requirement is authorized by the general delegation in § 1135.” The DOL was thus permitted to “fill in” the details of the law, “[a]nd imposing the accommodation disclosure requirement contained in 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 is a reasonable exercise of that authority.” The court also found that Trout had adequately alleged causation of loss because he was forced to pay the surcharge. Moving on, the court ruled that Trout did not state a claim for breach of fiduciary duties or engaging in prohibited transactions. The court found that Trout failed to allege harm to the plan and did not have standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty, as he did not demonstrate that Meijer’s actions caused a loss to the plan or that the surcharges were plan assets. The court further noted that Meijer’s imposition of the surcharge was done in a settlor capacity, not a fiduciary capacity. The court also ruled that claims that accrued before November 5, 2021 were barred by the federal four-year catch-all statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Finally, the court addressed remedies. Citing the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in Aldridge v. Regions Bank, the court ruled that Trout could seek equitable restitution and disgorgement but not equitable surcharge because surcharge is a remedy that was not typically available in equity. However, Trout could only obtain restitution and disgorgement if he could trace the tobacco surcharges to a specific fund, which the court noted could be difficult due to commingling. In the end, Trout’s action survives, but in a greatly diminished capacity.

Disability Benefit Claims

Second Circuit

Nabi v. Provident Life & Casualty Ins. Co., No. 1:23-CV-00844-HKS, 2026 WL 1132875 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2026) (Magistrate Judge H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr.). Angelika Nabi was employed as the office manager of her husband’s medical practice, ENT Medical Associates, where she performed various administrative tasks. Because of her employment, she had long-term disability coverage under an ERISA-governed group policy issued by Provident Life & Casualty Company. In August of 2003, Nabi was diagnosed with glioblastoma multiforme, a type of aggressive brain cancer, after experiencing a seizure. Despite undergoing surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation, her condition was considered terminal. Over time, Nabi experienced a gradual decline in her cognitive abilities, which affected her ability to perform her job. She stopped working in December 2009 due to these impairments. Nabi should have applied for benefits with Provident at this time, but she did not, allegedly due to her cognitive decline. She finally applied in 2021 when her husband discovered the policy. By this time Nabi had undergone four brain surgeries, three facial surgeries, and two knee surgeries. Provident investigated her claim and began paying it, but only retroactively to September 8, 2021, the date of her notice. Nabi thus filed this action, contending that Provident wrongly denied her benefits from 2009 to 2021. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, but the court denied both in a June 30, 2025 order in which it concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Nabi filed her claim “as soon as reasonably possible,” as required by the policy. (Your ERISA Watch covered this decision in our July 9, 2025 edition.) The case proceeded to a bench trial in December of 2025, and this order represented the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court reviewed Provident’s decision de novo, as agreed by the parties, and ruled in Nabi’s favor. The court concluded that that due to the cognitive effects of her cancer treatments, Nabi was unable to give notice of her disability claim when she stopped working in 2009. The court determined that she filed her claim “as soon as reasonably possible” after her husband discovered the policy. The court found that the testimony of Nabi’s neurosurgeon was credible and supported the conclusion that Nabi’s cognitive impairments prevented her from filing a claim: “The full record thus supports the conclusion that Nabi’s inability to remember the policy, recognize that she could file a claim after she stopped working in December 2009, and take the necessary steps to do so was not a garden-variety memory lapse but rather the physiological result of the radiation and chemotherapy that she had undergone.” The court further concluded that Provident could not rely on the proof of loss provision as a basis for denial, as it was not a reason provided during the administrative appeal process. Consequently, the court awarded Nabi benefits retroactive to 2009 and determined she was entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest.

Fourth Circuit

Karnes v. Midland Credit Mgmt., d/b/a Encore Capital Grp., No. 7:24-CV-00335, 2026 WL 1103453 (W.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2026) (Judge Robert S. Ballou). Alana Marie Karnes was terminated as a Midland Credit Management employee in 2022. While employed, she participated in Midland’s ERISA-governed disability benefit plan, which was administered by Prudential Insurance Company. Karnes became disabled in 2021 and took several medical leaves of absence over the next year prior to her termination. Eventually, she was approved for both short-term disability (STD) and long-term disability (LTD) benefits from Prudential, although she was required to appeal denials of both benefits before prevailing. Karnes brought this pro se action in 2024 against Midland, asserting claims for breach of contract, disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), interference under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and interest on delayed benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). The court dismissed Karnes’ complaint, but granted her leave to amend all of her claims except for her ADA discrimination claim. Karnes filed an amended complaint in which she reasserted all of her dismissed claims and also asserted “several new claims, including retaliation under the ADA, FMLA, and ERISA § 510; breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA §§ 502(a)(3) and 404; and state law claims for forgery, wrongful discharge, and defamation.” Midland moved to dismiss once again. On Karnes’ non-ERISA claims, the court (1) dismissed her ADA discrimination claim, citing res judicata, and noting that Karnes “remained disabled long after her termination and does not allege that she was able to return to work,” which meant that she could not be “a ‘qualified individual’ capable of performing the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation”; (2) dismissed her FMLA interference claim, ruling that Karnes could not show prejudice from her termination, because once again she “remained disabled and unable to work through at least February 2024, long after any FMLA leave would have expired”; (3) dismissed her claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing because she failed to plead any specific contractual obligations Midland had under the employment contract; (4) dismissed her claim for ADA retaliation because she pled no causal link between her alleged protected conduct and her termination, and failed to allege any pretext or hostility; (5) dismissed her FMLA retaliation claim for similar reasons; (6) dismissed her claim for forgery because it is a criminal offense with no private right of action; (7) dismissed her claim for wrongful discharge because she failed to plead a public policy violated by Midland; and (8) dismissed her claim for defamation because it was time-barred and her alleged defamatory statements were “merely hypothetical.” As for Karnes’ ERISA claims, the court dismissed her benefits claim which alleged “improper delay and mishandling” of her claim, noting that Karnes did not allege Midland had control over the administration of the STD or LTD benefit plans. Indeed, Karnes admitted that “Prudential ‘is responsible for conducting any ERISA mandated claim evaluation and final review rests with [Prudential] and with no other entity.’” The court also dismissed Karnes’ Section 510 retaliation claim, ruling that “Karnes does not allege facts showing that her termination was motivated by her pursuit of ERISA-protected benefits or that Midland acted with intent to interfere with her ability to obtain such benefits. Indeed, by her own admission, Karnes received all benefits she was eligible for under the plan.” The court also dismissed Karnes’ breach of fiduciary duty claim, ruling that her allegations of “reckless mismanagement of Plaintiff’s disability and leave claims” were insufficient because her “allegations appear to be attributable to Prudential, not Midland,” and furthermore, “any administrative delays or errors do not appear to have reduced the amount of benefits paid or changed the outcome of her claims.” As a result, Midland’s motion to dismiss was granted once again, this time with prejudice.

Ninth Circuit

McLeod v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. CV 22-87, 2026 WL 1133684 (D. Mont. Apr. 27, 2026) (Judge Susan P. Watters). Dona McLeod was an operator at CHS, Inc., a refinery in Billings, Montana, and was a member of United Steel Workers Local 11-443, which provided ERISA-governed long-term disability insurance coverage to its members through a group policy issued by Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company. McLeod became disabled in 2020 following a stroke and was approved for a monthly benefit of $4,000 by Reliance. Later, McLeod became eligible to collect a pension from CHS; she elected to receive a lump-sum distribution of $75,701.89, which she rolled over into an individual retirement account (IRA). In 2021 Reliance informed McLeod that these pension benefits were “Other Income Benefits” under the policy and therefore triggered the policy’s offset provision. Reliance thus reduced her benefit to $1,261.70 per month. McLeod unsuccessfully appealed and then filed this action, seeking recovery of plan benefits and other equitable remedies. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the assigned magistrate judge recommended granting Reliance’s motion and denying McLeod’s motion. McLeod filed an objection, arguing that the contract-interpretation doctrine of contra proferentem should apply under the de novo standard of review, which would require any ambiguities in the policy to be construed in her favor. In this order the court agreed with Reliance and the magistrate. The court applied the de novo standard of review because the policy did not grant Reliance discretionary authority to interpret the policy. The court explained that the policy identified the union as the policyholder and provided, “[t]he Policyholder and any subsidiaries, divisions, or affiliates are referred to as ‘you,’ ‘your,’ and ‘yours,’ in this Policy.” It further defined “Other Income Benefits” subject to offset as including “that part of Retirement Benefits paid for by you.” The court agreed with Reliance that “the Policy’s use of ‘you’ is clear and unambiguous when read in context,” and included CHS as an “affiliate” of the union. Because the result was clear and unambiguous, the contra proferentem doctrine did not apply. McLeod argued that “you” only applied to the union, not her employer, but the court found that this interpretation would render key provisions of the policy meaningless, and in fact would eliminate McLeod’s benefit entirely because “[u]nder McLeod’s interpretation – limiting ‘you’ to the Union – only the Union’s own employees would qualify for coverage.” The court further noted that McLeod “does not specifically challenge the finding that she ‘was not only ‘entitled’ and ‘eligible’ to receive this Retirement Benefit, but in fact received the Retirement Benefit when she rolled the lump sum distribution into an IRA.’” As a result, because the policy included the CHS pension as an offset, and she did not dispute that she received it, the court found that Reliance did not err in using the pension to reduce her disability benefit. Reliance was granted summary judgment.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Fifth Circuit

Ellis-Young v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV H-26-321, 2026 WL 1075158 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2026) (Judge Lee H. Rosenthal). Sherri Ellis-Young was employed by JPMorgan Chase and was a participant in the company’s ERISA-governed long-term disability benefit plan, which was administered by The Prudential Insurance Company of America. Ellis-Young alleged she “‘suffers from multiple medical conditions resulting in both exertional and nonexertional impairments,’ which cause ‘chronic pain and limitations,’ and from ‘anxiety, depression and visual impairments.’” Prudential initially approved her claim for benefits, but terminated them less than a year later, asserting she was no longer disabled under the policy. Ellis-Young filed this action, and Prudential responded with a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Ellis-Young’s complaint should be dismissed because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court construed the motion as one for summary judgment. The court noted that the plan required Ellis-Young to appeal Prudential’s denial within 180 days of the date of denial, which was extended by COVID-19 emergency regulations to the end of the national emergency, or May 11, 2023. 180 days from this date gave Ellis-Young until January 6, 2024 to appeal. Ellis-Young argued that communications from her and her counsel during 2023 and 2024 constituted an appeal. The court did not agree, ruling that these communications expressed only an “intent to appeal” rather than constituting an actual appeal. The court cited letters which stated that Ellis-Young “will be [filing] an appeal,” provided “legal notice of Mrs. Sherri Ellis-Young’s intent to appeal,” and “repeatedly requested additional information so that she could file a proper appeal.” As a result, the court likened this case to Holmes v. Proctor & Gamble Disability Benefit Plan and Swanson v. Hearst Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, two Fifth Circuit cases on this issue. “This case has all the material facts that led to dismissal in Holmes and Swanson.” The court noted that Ellis-Young “did not submit to Prudential any factual or substantive arguments or evidence explaining her disagreement with its denial until September 2025,” which was too late. The court also rejected Ellis-Young’s argument that the exhaustion requirement should be excused, again relying on Swanson. The court found no evidence that Prudential misled Ellis-Young or failed to notify her of the appeal deadline, and thus “[t]here is no basis to excuse Ellis-Young’s exhaustion obligations.” As a result, the court ruled in favor of Prudential, granting its motion for summary judgment.

Medical Benefit Claims

Seventh Circuit

Danielle B. v. Lafayette School Corp., No. 4:26-CV-014-GSL-JEM, 2026 WL 1113353 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 23, 2026) (Judge Gretchen S. Lund). Danielle B. is the mother of a minor, I.B., and was employed by Lafayette School Corporation. Danielle B. participated in the school’s health benefit plan, which insured I.B. as well. The plan was administered by Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc., and provided coverage for mental health services. I.B. received treatment for various mental health disorders, and was eventually admitted in 2023 to blueFire, a licensed outdoor therapeutic program in Idaho. blueFire is designed to support teens with behavioral health issues in a wilderness setting, with treatment by licensed therapists. I.B. received treatment at blueFire for approximately three months; plaintiffs were charged approximately $71,500. However, when plaintiffs submitted claims to Anthem for this treatment, Anthem denied them, citing missing procedure codes, ineligible provider types, and the plan’s exclusion of wilderness programs. Plaintiffs responded by filing this action in state court against the school and Anthem, asserting two claims: one for breach of contract and declaratory relief, and one for violation of the federal Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (“Parity Act”), as amended to ERISA. Defendants removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss the Parity Act claim only. The court denied the motion. The court found that plaintiffs sufficiently pled a facial Parity Act violation by alleging that the plan imposed “specific, enumerated accreditation requirements on residential mental-health treatment centers, while imposing no comparable, enumerated accreditation requirements on skilled-nursing, rehabilitation, or hospice facilities that provide medical or surgical care.” The court also addressed the plan’s exclusion of wilderness programs, noting that while the exclusion appeared not to violate the Parity Act on its face because it categorically denied coverage for all charges from such programs, it was still premature to dismiss at this stage. As for plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge, the court found that they adequately alleged that the plan’s accreditation requirements for mental health facilities were more stringent than for medical or surgical facilities, thus plausibly stating a Parity Act violation. The court was “puzzled” by defendants’ arguments to the contrary because plaintiffs “specifically allege[d], and specifically list[ed], the four accreditation organizations that mental-health facilities must use and that the Plan does not have the same accreditation requirements for skilled nursing or hospice facilities.” The court emphasized that dismissal of Parity Act claims at the pleading stage in the Seventh Circuit is disfavored because plaintiffs often need discovery to obtain “comparative analyses” required by the Act. As a result, the court concluded that plaintiffs plausibly stated a Parity Act violation and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Pension Benefit Claims

Third Circuit

Taylor v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund, No. 24-CV-04321, 2026 WL 1133599 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2026) (Judge Christine P. O’Hearn). Plaintiff Stultz G. Taylor is the owner of STS Sheetmetal Inc. and a longtime member of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Union Local Numbers 43 and 27. As a member, he is a vested participant in the ERISA-governed Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund (NPF) pension plan. In 2018, Taylor submitted an application to NPF indicating he intended “to retire from [the] Local Union with the understanding that [he] will not be able to collect [his] pension until [he] reach[es] the age of 62 or at such time [he is] no longer the owner of STS.” He further represented that he “intend[ed] to continue operating STS” but his duties would involve “office work only.” NPF recharacterized his application as a request for information about plan benefits, explaining that he was not retiring because he would continue to own STS. Taylor continued to own STS and perform clerical work there. In 2021, Taylor applied for pension benefits effective January 1, 2022. However, NPF denied his request, concluding that his continued clerical work for STS constituted “Disqualifying Employment” under the plan. Taylor unsuccessfully appealed this decision and then filed this action, asserting four counts under ERISA: (1) failure to provide ERISA benefits; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) estoppel; and (4) failure to provide a full and fair review. The case proceeded to cross-motions for summary judgment. At the outset, the court struck two affidavits offered by Taylor, ruling that they were outside the administrative record. On the merits, the court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review because the plan gave the appeals committee discretionary authority to make benefit determinations. The court noted that the plan required a participant to be “retired” in order to receive benefits, meaning “he has ceased working in Covered Employment, as well as in any Disqualifying Employment, and such cessation of work is intended to be permanent.” Taylor argued that his continued work was not “Disqualifying Employment,” and that he fell within one of the plan’s exceptions, but the court rejected both contentions. First, the court stated that “Disqualifying Employment is defined to include, inter alia, ‘employment with any Contributing Employer,’” and “[i]t is undisputed that STS is a Contributing Employer… And the clerical work Taylor performed for STS is certainly ‘employment’ on its face, meaning it qualifies as Disqualifying Employment under the Plan.” Thus, the plan provision was not simply limited to “trade work” as Taylor suggested. Second, Taylor did not qualify for his cited exception because the work he was doing was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. Moving on to count two, the court ruled that Taylor’s breach of fiduciary duty claim failed because he was not seeking relief on behalf of the plan under Section 1132(a)(2), and was seeking legal, not equitable, relief, which made Section 1132(a)(3) unavailable as well. Finally, counts three and four were non-starters because they were either duplicative of Taylor’s benefits claim or not supported by an independent cause of action under ERISA. Thus, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Taylor’s.

Remedies

Second Circuit

Amara v. Cigna Corp., No. 24-2913, __ F. App’x __, 2026 WL 1113470 (2d Cir. Apr. 24, 2026) (Before Circuit Judges Livingston, Jacobs, and Leval). This case turns a quarter-century old this year and refuses to die. As background, this is a class action by employees of Cigna who alleged that Cigna miscalculated their benefits under its pension plan. The highlight of the litigation was the Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in Cigna v. Amara that federal courts are not allowed to reform benefit plans under Section 1132(a)(1)(b) of ERISA, but can achieve the same result under Section 1132(a)(3), which provides equitable relief. On remand, the plan was reformed to provide class members all accrued benefits from the defined benefit pension plan (“Part A”), plus all accrued cash balance plan benefits (“Part B”). A plus B sounds simple enough, but the parties spent years litigating over how to calculate these sums. Eventually, the math was appropriately crunched, and a judgment issued. The Second Circuit affirmed in 2014. In recent years, however, the parties have squabbled over enforcing this judgment. In 2022 the Second Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling against plaintiffs, finding that Cigna had adequately complied with the judgment. (Your ERISA Watch covered this ruling in our November 16, 2022 edition, which we foolishly titled “The End of Amara?”) Plaintiffs did not give up, however. They again filed a motion for an accounting or post-judgment discovery based on their belief that defendants were improperly calculating award payments. The district court denied this motion in May of 2024. Plaintiffs appealed, and in this summary order the Second Circuit affirmed again. The appellate court was clearly tired of the case and only devoted four paragraphs to dismissing plaintiffs’ arguments. Plaintiffs argued that the district court inappropriately required a “showing of actual noncompliance as a prerequisite for Plaintiffs to prevail on their motion.” The Second Circuit disagreed: “Instead of requiring actual noncompliance, the district court stated that ‘the question for the Court is whether, as applied here, Plaintiffs have raised ‘significant questions regarding noncompliance with a court order’ sufficient to justify the remedy sought.’” This was good enough for the appellate court, which stated that, “[i]n its careful and thorough opinions, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden under this standard. For substantially the reasons in the district court’s opinions, we AFFIRM the orders of the district court.” Perhaps at long last this really is the end of Amara, but we would not dare to predict it.

Retaliation Claims

Second Circuit

Wilson v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees Local 52, No. 25-CV-2907 (OEM) (LKE), 2026 WL 1110227 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2026) (Judge Orelia E. Merchant). This is a putative class action brought by three craftsmen working in film and television production in the New York City area. They are associated with the labor union IATSE Local 52. Local 52 distinguishes between three tiers of union membership: members, applicants, and permits. Members have more consistent work, opportunities for advancement, and eligibility for the pension plan, unlike applicants and permits. In their complaint plaintiffs asserted various challenges to the way Local 52 manages its membership and administers benefits under state and federal law. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged (1) breach of contract under Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) § 301, (2) interference under ERISA § 510, (3) breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 502(a)(3), and (4) retaliation under New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) § 290. They seek “several forms of relief, including class certification…; a declaration that Defendants breached…the IATSE Constitution; an award of compensatory and consequential damages for breach of the IATSE Constitution; an order for declaratory and equitable relief under ERISA §§ 510 and 502(a)(3); permanent injunctive relief…compensatory and emotional distress damages for Local 52’s retaliation; reasonable attorneys’ fees; pre- and post-judgment interest; and all ‘such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.’” Local 52 filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, and further argued that the court should strike the class allegations. The court addressed subject matter jurisdiction first, ruling that plaintiffs’ claims were not subject to “Garmon preemption,” which prohibits courts from deciding controversies that “arguably arise” under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA). (For more on Garmon preemption, check out our discussion of the case of the week in our April 8, 2026 edition.) The court acknowledged that the NLRA provides exclusive jurisdiction over some activities, but “federal courts simultaneously possess subject-matter jurisdiction over suits alleging violations of labor contracts.” Regarding ERISA specifically, the court stated that (1) “ERISA operates independently of the NLRA, governing the administration of most employee benefit plans,” and does not generally apply to unfair labor practices; (2) “[e]ven assuming that Plaintiffs’ ERISA claims raised labor issues, however, federal courts may decide such issues that arise collaterally in cases brought under independent federal remedies”; and (3) Garmon “primarily addresses potential conflicts between state and federal laws, not potential conflicts between federal laws.” However, the court found that the NYSHRL claim of one plaintiff was preempted under LMRA § 301, as it involved determining whether Local 52 violated the IATSE Constitution. As for the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, the court ruled that (1) plaintiffs plausibly stated a LMRA § 301 claim by alleging a breach of the IATSE Constitution, which provided for immediate membership upon achieving vested status; (2) the LMRA claims of one plaintiff were not time-barred because the IATSE Constitution was adopted in 2021, and his claims were brought within six years; (3) plaintiffs plausibly stated an ERISA § 510 claim because they alleged specific intent to interfere with their rights by granting certain benefits to members and not them; (4) plaintiffs could not obtain monetary damages, including “the value of lost future employment benefits,” under ERISA §§ 510 and 502(a)(3) because those sections only allow for equitable relief; and (5) one plaintiff’s NYSHRL retaliation claim could not proceed because he failed to plausibly plead “temporal proximity” which might establish a causal connection between his protected activity (filing a lawsuit against the union) and the adverse action (blocking his invitation of membership). Finally, the court denied Local 52’s motion to strike plaintiffs’ class allegations, finding it premature to rule on class certification at this stage of the litigation. As a result, Local 52’s motion to dismiss was granted in part, denied in part, and the case will continue.

Fifth Circuit

Moore v. Wireless CCTV LLC, No. CV H-25-5476, 2026 WL 1130370 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2026) (Judge Lee H. Rosenthal). Bridgett Moore filed this action against her former employer, Wireless CCTV LLC, where she worked as a regional account manager. Moore alleged that she was mistreated in numerous ways by Wireless, including Wireless’ manipulation of commission payments, failure to provide compensation information, and interference with her physician-approved medical leave and insurance coverage. Moore alleged fourteen causes of action against Wireless: “(1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied-in-fact contract/promissory estoppel; (3) quantum meruit or unjust enrichment; (4) the procuring-cause doctrine; (5) violation of Chapter 61 of the Texas Labor Code; (6) retaliation under the FLSA; (7) retaliation under the Texas Labor Code; (8) fraud and constructive fraud; (9) negligent misrepresentation; (10) interference with protected rights under ERISA § 510; (11) COBRA notice violations; (12) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (13) ERISA breach of fiduciary duty; and (14) declaratory judgment.” Wireless moved to dismiss Moore’s complaint. Addressing the federal claims first, the court found that Moore did not allege complaints about rights protected by the FLSA, such as minimum wage or overtime, but rather about commission payments, which are not protected under the FLSA. The court also ruled that Wireless complied with COBRA obligations, as Moore’s change to unpaid, non-FMLA medical leave constituted a “reduction in hours,” and thus was a qualifying event under COBRA. On Moore’s ERISA claims, the court ruled that “Moore has pleaded no facts plausibly showing interference under § 510; the alleged facts merely show that Moore lost benefits during non-FMLA medical leave. The loss of benefits is, alone, insufficient to state a claim under § 510 anyway… For similar reasons, Moore has not plausibly pleaded an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim. Even setting aside Wireless’s argument that Moore failed to plead that Wireless was a fiduciary, the facts do not show that Wireless breached any fiduciary duty. Rather, the alleged facts show that Wireless properly sent Moore a notice under COBRA and properly returned a payment for an expired plan.” Moving on to the state law claims, the court dismissed Moore’s breach of contract and related claims because she had an active Texas Workforce Commission claim and had not exhausted administrative remedies. The court also found Moore’s tort claims insufficiently pleaded, lacking the necessary factual basis. The court thus granted Wireless’ motion to dismiss, but allowed Moore to file an amended complaint, likely because she had been proceeding pro se and recently retained counsel. Finally, the court agreed with Wireless in a footnote that Moore’s pleadings “indicate[d] the use of generative AI” and cited cases “that do not exist.” The court warned Moore that “briefing ‘built on AI-generated cases that stand for legal propositions in direct contravention of actual case law’ ‘is the epitome of baseless’ and that, ‘[w]hile courts afford pro se litigants considerable leeway, that leeway does not relieve pro se litigants of their obligation under Rule 11 to confirm the validity of any cited legal authority.’”