Walker Specialty Constr., Inc. v. Board of Trs. of Constr. Indus. & Laborers Joint Pension Tr. for S. Nevada, No. 24-1560, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 21743 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2026) (Before Circuit Judges Rawlinson, Miller, and Desai)

Here at Your ERISA Watch we generally leave the withdrawal liability and unpaid contributions cases alone, as they tend to be very similar and not particularly engaging. (The vast majority are default judgments against deadbeat employers.) However, on rare occasions – when the federal court output is slow and an interesting issue pops up in an appellate decision – we are happy to take a swing. This week’s notable decision fits the bill.

The plaintiff was Walker Specialty Construction, Inc., a company that performed asbestos abatement and demolition in Nevada. Asbestos abatement is directed at insulation, roofing, and flooring, and “involves removing or covering asbestos-containing materials to prevent the release of asbestos fibers, which can facilitate the refurbishment and renovation of existing buildings and the construction of new ones.”

For several years Walker contributed as a participating employer to the Board of Trustees of the Construction Industry and Laborers Joint Pension Trust, a pension plan governed by ERISA, as amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA). However, in 2019 Walker ceased operations and stopped contributing.

In 2021, the Trust informed Walker that it owed the Trust $2,837,953 in withdrawal liability. Walker refused to pay, claiming that it was not required to pay under the MPPAA. Specifically, Walker cited a provision in the MPPAA stating that employers are excepted from withdrawal liability rules if they are operating in the “building and construction industry.” 29 U.S.C. § 1383(b). The Trust countered that asbestos abatement did not qualify as “building and construction” because it involved tearing down structures rather than building them.

The parties could not reach an agreement, and the dispute went to arbitration. Meanwhile, Walker continued to contribute, as required by the MPPAA, while it disputed the Trust’s claim. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the Trust, “holding that ‘work in the construction industry’ is ‘the provision of labor whereby materials and constituent parts may be combined on the building site to form, make or build a structure’ and that Walker’s work ‘does not fit within that definition.’”

Walker then sued the Trust in district court to contest the arbitration award. On cross-motions for summary judgment, Walker found a more receptive ear with District Court Judge Andrew P. Gordon. The district court “adopted a more expansive understanding of ‘building and construction industry,’ which includes the erection, maintenance, repair, and alteration of buildings and structures.” As a result, the court granted Walker’s summary judgment motion and ordered the Trust to return Walker’s payments with interest. (Your ERISA Watch reported on this decision in our February 28, 2024 edition.) The Trust appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which issued this published decision.

The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, as well as the statutory interpretation of the term “building and construction industry.” The court noted that when ERISA was first enacted, it did not adequately protect multiemployer pension plans from the financial consequences of individual employer withdrawals. The MPPAA was designed to address this issue, imposing liability on employers that withdraw from such plans.

However, Congress created a “building and construction industry” exception due to “the transitory nature of contracts and employment” in the industry, which does not necessarily shrink when a contractor leaves, as employees are often dispatched to other contractors contributing to the plan.

The sole issue on appeal was “whether asbestos abatement qualifies as work in the ‘building and construction industry.’” The Trust argued for a narrow interpretation that the term “only relates to the building of structures,” while Walker argued that the term is broader and “includes alterations and repairs.”

The court acknowledged that the MPPAA did not define the term “building and construction industry,” and thus the court was forced to interpret it as a matter of first impression. The court began by looking to the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) definition of the term under the Taft-Hartley Act because, at the time Congress enacted the MPPAA, that was the only other time Congress had used the term.

The court explained that the NLRB had given this term “a comprehensive definition,” and because it had done so, “we must infer that Congress incorporated the NLRB’s definition of ‘building and construction industry’ into the MPPAA.”

This decision doomed the Trust. As the court explained, over a series of years and decisions the NLRB had settled a meaning for the term under the Taft-Hartley Act “to include not only the erection of new buildings, but also maintenance, repair, and alterations that are essential to the buildings’ usability.” The court noted that two other circuit courts – the Second and Eighth – had also similarly relied on the NLRB’s “expansive interpretation of ‘building and construction industry’ to include repairs and alterations under the MPPAA exception.”

The court rejected the Trust’s arguments to the contrary. The Trust argued that the court should not use the NLRB interpretation because “Taft-Hartley is a different law covering a different subject area than the MPPAA.” However, the court found that the laws were in fact quite similar as they addressed the same issues: “Although Taft-Hartley addresses labor practices and the MPPAA addresses pension plans, it is appropriate to use the same definition of ‘building and construction industry’ under both statutes because Congress enacted the exceptions based on the transient nature of the construction industry in both contexts.”

The Trust also argued that the MPPAA “expressly references and incorporates several other terms from Taft-Hartley,” but did not do so with the “building and construction industry” exception. However, the court ruled that “a cross-reference is not required, and its absence does not defeat the presumption that Congress intended to incorporate the NLRB’s definition…into the MPPAA.”

The Trust further argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright v. Raimondo reduced any deference the court owed to the NLRB. However, the court explained that it was not deferring to the NLRB; instead, it was interpreting statutory language based on Congressional intent, which “is plain from its use of the same language in both statutes.”

Because the court ruled that the NLRB’s definition of “building and construction industry” applied equally to the MPPAA, the only remaining question was whether Walker’s activities fell within that definition. The court quickly found that they did because they involved “maintenance and repair…of immobile structures…which become integral parts of structures and are essential to their use for any general purpose.” Indeed, “Walker’s abatement work requires substantial alterations to buildings – it is not merely scraping surfaces, as the Trust argues.”

As a result, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “Walker’s asbestos abatement is part of the ‘building and construction industry’ under the MPPAA.” It thus affirmed the district court’s ruling in Walker’s favor.

Below is a summary of this past week’s notable ERISA decisions by subject matter and jurisdiction.

Class Actions

Ninth Circuit

Imber v. Lackey, No. 1:22-CV-00004-HBK, 2025 WL 3761593 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025) (Magistrate Judge Helena M. Barch-Kuchta). Brandon Imber brought this class action against multiple defendants associated with “the December 31, 2018 sale of 2,000,000 shares of common stock of Ritchie Trucking Service Holdings, Inc….to the People Business Employee Stock Ownership Plan (‘ESOP’) for $19,543,000[.]” Imber contended that “the ESOP fiduciaries failed to provide or provided incomplete information to the ESOP’s advisors,” that the ESOP’s trustee “failed to conduct a prudent investigation as to the purchase price,” and as a result “the ESOP paid more than fair market value for Ritchie Holdings stock[.]” Plaintiffs’ complaint asserted eight claims for relief under ERISA against defendants, including breach of fiduciary duty, prohibited transactions, and co-fiduciary liability. After more than three years of litigation, including motions to dismiss, limited discovery, and mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement in March 2025. The settlement includes a cash settlement fund of $485,000 and a stock settlement involving a $1.4 million reduction in the principal balance of ESOP-related debt, resulting in the release and allocation of 115,000 shares of Ritchie Trucking Employer Stock to the ESOP accounts of class members. In our October 1, 2025 edition we reported that the court granted plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for class certification and preliminary settlement approval, and a fairness hearing was held on December 19. There were no objections to the settlement from any class members, and thus in this order the court granted final approval, finding it fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court also approved attorneys’ fees in the amount of $442,624, expenses in the amount of $33,009.53, a service award of $5,000 for class representative Imber, and $5,449 in settlement administration costs and expenses. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the court dismissed all claims alleged in the action with the exception of Count V, which was an individual claim not covered by the settlement.

Discovery

Second Circuit

Long Island Neuroscience Specialists LLP v. Oscar Health, Inc., No. 25-CV-05813 (GRB) (JMW), 2026 WL 17142 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2026) (Magistrate Judge James M. Wicks). Plaintiff Long Island Neuroscience Specialists LLP treated a patient with health plans issued or administered by defendant Oscar Health. Plaintiff contends that it submitted claims to Oscar that Oscar refused to pay in full, despite an arbitration award in plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff filed this action and in its amended complaint it alleges improper denial of benefits under ERISA and unjust enrichment. Oscar intends to file a motion to dismiss, but while it is preparing that motion it has filed a motion to stay discovery. Plaintiff has not opposed the motion. The court cited the standard for deciding such motions: “In evaluating whether a stay of discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss is appropriate, courts typically consider: ‘(1) whether the defendant has made a strong showing that the plaintiff’s claim is unmeritorious; (2) the breadth of discovery and the burden of responding to it; and (3) the risk of unfair prejudice to the party opposing the stay.’” The court found all three factors weighed in Oscar’s favor. The court credited Oscar’s arguments that it is not a proper party in the action and that plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment is likely preempted by ERISA. Furthermore, the court noted that “Plaintiff has already changed its legal theories once since the inception of this matter,” making it unclear what discovery would be required, which “may result in burdensome efforts that could be unnecessary if the action is dismissed or narrowed by the Court’s ruling.” Finally, regarding the risk of unfair prejudice, the court noted that the case is in its early stages, and a short stay is unlikely to cause undue prejudice. Furthermore, plaintiff did not object to a stay, which resulted in “little to no prejudice.” As a result, the court granted Oscar’s motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of the anticipated motion to dismiss.

Medical Benefit Claims

Fifth Circuit

Townley v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 4:24-CV-3513, 2025 WL 3771448 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2025) (Magistrate Judge Dena Hanovice Palermo). Erin Townley was a beneficiary of an ERISA-governed health insurance plan administered by Aetna Life Insurance Company when she gave birth by cesarean section in May 2023. Her newborn required medically necessary care which cost about $7,000, but when Townley filed a claim under her plan to cover these costs, Aetna denied it. Townley initially sued in Texas state court, alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Aetna removed the case to federal court, where Townley filed an amended complaint alleging that Aetna’s denial violated ERISA. Aetna filed a motion to dismiss. The court began with the standard of review, determining that the abuse of discretion standard applied because the plan granted Aetna the discretion to determine benefit eligibility and interpret plan terms. Under this standard the court ruled that Aetna’s interpretation of the plan was legally correct and consistent with a fair reading of the plan. Townley argued that the plan provided “automatic coverage for the newborn for 31 days following birth.” However, the court stated that the plan language required that a newborn be enrolled within 31 days following birth in order to receive retroactive coverage, and Townley did not allege that she enrolled her child within this deadline. Townley alternatively argued that the Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act (NMHPA) entitled her to coverage, but the court explained that the NMHPA only provides that benefits cannot be restricted in certain ways for persons that are already covered. “By the plain terms of the statute, the NMHPA does not require coverage of benefits to a person who is not otherwise covered under the plan. As Aetna states, enrollment is required for benefit coverage eligibility… Nothing in the NMHPA requires automatic coverage for non-beneficiaries.” The court concluded that Townley’s ERISA and NMHPA claims “cannot be saved by any amendment” because “no new factual allegations could change the analysis[.]” The court thus granted Aetna’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.

Plan Status

Eighth Circuit

Thompson v. Pioneer Bank & Trust, No. 5:24-CV-05067-RAL, 2025 WL 3771472 (D.S.D. Dec. 31, 2025) (Judge Roberto A. Lange). Andrew Taylor Thompson was employed by Pioneer Bank & Trust as a financial advisor from 2006 to 2024, when he alleges he was compelled to resign. Following his resignation, Thompson sued Pioneer, asserting three counts: (1) an ERISA claim alleging that a salary continuation agreement (SCA) between him and Pioneer was an ERISA-governed employee benefits plan breached by Pioneer, (2) a declaratory judgment seeking various declarations related to his employment agreement and resignation, and (3) breach of the employment agreement. Thompson attached the SCA to his complaint, but it was unsigned. Pioneer moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the SCA was never executed and thus was not an ERISA-governed plan, which meant the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The court initially denied this motion, relying on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Sanzone v. Mercy Health (discussed in Your ERISA Watch’s April 8, 2020 edition), which determined that whether a plan is governed by ERISA “is an element of the plaintiff’s case and not a jurisdictional inquiry.” In that decision, the court found that “Thompson raised a colorable ERISA-governed claim based on his allegations of entering into the SCA.” Thompson moved for partial summary judgment on issues related to the employment agreement, while Pioneer sought summary judgment on Thompson’s ERISA claim, arguing once again that the SCA was never executed and thus did not create an ERISA plan. Pioneer contended that the parties executed a long term retention agreement in 2018 in lieu of the SCA, and thus the parties never signed the SCA. This time the court agreed with Pioneer, concluding that the unexecuted draft SCA did not create an ERISA plan binding on the parties, and therefore Thompson had not pleaded a viable claim arising under federal law. The court noted that ERISA preempts state law causes of action related to employee benefit plans and creates a federal cause of action for participants or beneficiaries to recover benefits due under an employee benefit plan. However, because the SCA was never executed, it was not an ERISA-governed plan, and Thompson could not bring an ERISA claim based on it. Thompson argued that while his complaint was focused on the SCA, his ERISA claim “includes a broader claim of relief that is not limited to the SCA,” including benefits from a profit-sharing and 401(k) plan. However, the court ruled that “Thompson’s Complaint plainly pleads that the SCA is an ERISA-governed plan, that Pioneer breached the SCA, and that he has an ERISA remedy based on the SCA… This Court need not consider whether some ERISA claim might spring from elsewhere in Thompson’s employment because Thompson’s Complaint pleads no such claim.” As a result, the court granted Pioneer’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that it lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction over Thompson’s first claim for relief. The court noted that it did not have diversity jurisdiction over the remaining two state law claims, and thus it dismissed the entire case without prejudice. Thompson’s motion for partial summary judgment on his state law claims was denied as moot.

Ninth Circuit

Furst v. Mayne, No. CV-20-01651-PHX-DLR, 2026 WL 21269 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2026) (Judge Douglas L. Rayes). This is a case originally filed in 2020 that we have reported on three times. It is a family dispute between siblings (plaintiff brother and defendant sister) over the management of the DHF Corporation Profit Sharing Plan. All along the parties have litigated the case as if it were governed by ERISA. Indeed, they litigated the case vigorously, taking the case to a motion for summary judgment by defendant, which the court mostly denied, upholding its decision on reconsideration. Now, bafflingly, plaintiff has filed a “motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss his own case without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” As the court put it, “Plaintiff contends that now, after five years of litigation and ‘[u]pon further review,’ he ‘had determined that the [P]lan is not an ERISA-covered plan as a matter of law,’ and therefore the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because his complaint invoked only this Court’s federal question jurisdiction.” Defendant’s response was equally strange. She “conspicuously avoids stating whether she agrees with Plaintiff’s jurisdictional analysis.” Even though she had conducted herself during the case as if ERISA governed it, now she “does not say whether [she] agrees the Plan is not governed by ERISA, or whether…this issue is jurisdictional in nature.” Instead, she merely asked that the court dismiss the case with prejudice instead of without prejudice. The court denied plaintiff’s motion, noting that “the issue of whether a plan is governed by ERISA” is a merits issue, not a jurisdictional issue. As a result, the court ordered plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be dismissed with prejudice given that “Plaintiff now admits that he will be unable to prove that the Plan is subject to ERISA.” The court allowed defendant a response, which “should address whether Defendant agrees that the Plan is not subject to ERISA, notwithstanding Defendant’s contrary position earlier in this litigation.” Will the court get to the bottom of this mysterious turn of events? If so, we will of course give you an update.

Pleading Issues & Procedure

Second Circuit

Meka v. Deloitte LLP, No. 25 CIV. 3547 (AKH), 2025 WL 3761874 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2025) (Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein). Anudeep Meka is a Texas resident and citizen of India. He alleges that he resigned from his employment at IBM in June of 2024 and returned to India. He then received a conditional offer of employment from Deloitte Consulting to work in their Dallas office. Meka signed the offer letter and submitted a background check questionnaire to Deloitte. Deloitte also agreed to sponsor his H-1B visa, and he reentered the United States in December of 2024 under this sponsorship. However, in January of 2025 Deloitte withdrew its offer of employment. Annoyed at Deloitte’s reversal, Meka subsequently filed this action alleging sixteen claims against Deloitte under state and federal law. Deloitte filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted in this order. Three of the claims were alleged under ERISA, “pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3), to recover benefits, enforce rights under alleged benefit plans, and obtain equitable relief.” The court made short work of these claims, noting that civil actions under ERISA “may be brought by participants,” and ERISA defines “participant” as “any employee or former employee…who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan… The Supreme Court has construed this definition to mean ‘either employees in, or reasonably expected to be in, currently covered employment, or former employees who have a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment or who have a colorable claim to vested benefits.’” However, the court observed that Meka’s employment with Deloitte “never commenced,” and thus “he was not a participant in any ERISA-governed plan and lacks statutory standing to assert ERISA claims.” As a result, the court dismissed those claims. The court gave Meka the opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies identified in its order.

Sixth Circuit

Mason v. Head, No. 3:25-CV-01362, 2026 WL 18759 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 2, 2026) (Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.). Plaintiffs Andy Mason and Clay Head filed this action in state court, both individually and derivatively on behalf of A&W Southern Sod Farms, LLC, against defendants William Head, Julie Head, and Tennessee Elite Sod Farm, LLC. In a second amended verified complaint filed November 12, 2025, plaintiffs contended that William Head breached fiduciary duties related to an ERISA-governed retirement plan in connection with “more than $500,000 of unauthorized transfers by William to his company that eventually went to him.” Defendants removed the case to federal court on November 21, 2025, citing ERISA as creating federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case back to state court, arguing that defendants’ removal was untimely. In a short no-nonsense order the court agreed with plaintiffs. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, a notice of removal must be filed within 30 days after the defendant receives a copy of an amended pleading or other paper indicating that the case is removable. With their motion, plaintiffs provided emails from defense counsel from as early as September 2, 2025 showing that “Defendants knew that Plaintiffs developed evidence of William Head’s possible unauthorized contributions in the A & W Southern Sod Farms, LLC retirement plan… Defendants had actual knowledge that ERISA was implicated because Defendants specifically cited 26 U.S.C. § 408 (Individual Retirement Account) after receipt of Plaintiffs’ counsel email.” As a result, the removal “was more than 30 days after Defendants had actual knowledge that Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty allegations implicated the IRA plan governed by ERISA. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for remand is GRANTED.” However, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), determining that “Defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for removal.”

Ninth Circuit

Dalton v. Freeman, No. 2:22-CV-00847-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 3771345 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025) (Judge Daniel J. Calabretta). Last year, in Cunningham v. Cornell, the Supreme Court took a look at ERISA’s prohibited transactions provision, found in Section 406. Section 406 generally prohibits transactions between a plan and a person in interest where the transaction transfers plan assets. However, Section 408 creates exceptions to this rule; the most commonly invoked one is Section 408(b)(2)(A), which allows “Contracting or making reasonable arrangements with a party in interest for…services necessary for the establishment or operation of the plan, if no more than reasonable compensation is paid therefor.” The question in Cunningham was whether plaintiffs were required to plead that no Section 408 exceptions applied in order to establish a claim under Section 406. The court ruled that plaintiffs were not required to negate defenses under Section 408 in their complaints. Instead, as the court in this case explained, “section 406 sets out the basis and three necessary elements for prohibited transactions claims, while section 408 provides affirmative defenses to such claims… Thus, in bringing a prohibited transactions claim, a plaintiff needs only to satisfy the elements of section 406… Plaintiffs are not required to attempt to anticipate and proactively plead facts establishing that potential affirmative defenses under section 408 do not apply.” While this approach was a straightforward interpretation of the statutory language, “the Supreme Court recognized that this structure creates a procedural issue. In short, by only requiring a plaintiff to plead the basic elements under section 406 and not necessitating that they address the exceptions under section 408 in their complaint, meritless cases could make their way past the motion to dismiss stage and into discovery.” Thus, the Supreme Court suggested that district courts could use “an uncommonly used tool” to help weed out potentially meritless cases: the “reply to an answer,” authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a)(7). Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Alerus Financial, N.A. engaged in prohibited transactions in its dealings with the O.C. Communications Employee Partnership Program Plan and Trust. Alerus did not challenge the adequacy of those allegations, but asserted an affirmative defense under Section 408, contending that the transactions were services for reasonable compensation. The court stated that the case was “in the exact procedural posture discussed in Cunningham.” As a result, the court concluded that a reply was warranted and ordered plaintiffs to file one pursuant to the Supreme Court’s discussion in Cunningham. The court observed that its order “should not be read as a comment regarding the viability of Plaintiffs’ prohibited transactions claim or Defendant’s affirmative defense,” but was simply “grounded in considerations of factual clarity and procedural efficiency.” The court “expects that if Plaintiffs can put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations that arguably show the asserted exemption does not apply, the parties will promptly proceed forward with discovery.”

Starboard Attitude Trust v. FirstFleet Inc., No. CV-25-03701-PHX-MTL, 2025 WL 3763927 (D. Ariz. Dec. 30, 2025) (Judge Michael T. Liburdi). Gary L. Wagoner is a health care provider in Arizona who treated a patient named Jeffrey Cagle, who assigned his claim for benefits to Wagoner. In this pro se action Wagoner, through Starboard Attitude Trust, contends that FirstFleet, Inc., the sponsor and administrator of Cagle’s ERISA-governed self-insured health plan, underpaid his claim because it “misadjudicated” Wagoner as being in-network under the plan when he was actually an out-of-network provider. If these facts seem familiar to you, they should, because “[t]his is the fifth time Plaintiff has asserted his claims against FirstFleet for the Cagle assignment.” (Your ERISA Watch has reported on Wagoner’s crusade on several occasions.) Wagoner’s first lawsuit was dismissed by Judge James A. Teilborg, Wagoner voluntarily dismissed his second and third actions, and his fourth lawsuit was dismissed as being res judicata by Judge Diane J. Humetewa, “who invited the defendant to file a motion for attorneys’ fees.” FirstFleet filed a motion to dismiss this fifth action, and the court wasted no time granting it, adopting Judge Humetewa’s “thoroughly reasoned res judicata analysis in which Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed in Wagoner IV.” The judge ruled that the claims were the same, they all arose from Wagoner’s “billing dispute with FirstFleet over the Cagle claim,” there was a final judgment on the merits in FirstFleet’s favor, the parties were identical, and Wagoner “has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims.” Wagoner attempted to avoid res judicata by bringing his claims on behalf of a trust, but the court rejected this maneuver: “as a non-lawyer, Plaintiff cannot assert claims on behalf of his trust… Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff is the real party in interest with respect to his trust and both will be considered functionally the same party under res judicata.” As a result, the court dismissed the action, entered judgment in FirstFleet’s favor, and invited FirstFleet to move for attorneys’ fees and related expenses.

Wagoner v. State Industrial Products Corp., No. CV-25-01763-PHX-JJT, 2025 WL 3771269 (D. Ariz. Dec. 31, 2025) (Judge John J. Tuchi). In our second case of the week featuring Gary L. Wagoner, he and the Catalina Seaward Trust filed this action asserting similar claims for failure to pay benefits for medical services he provided to a different patient, Vavrix D. Owens, in 2018. Wagoner alleged that “Mr. Owens was insured by Cigna, an insurance provider owned by Defendant, that pre-authorized the services but denied the claim after the services were performed.” In 2022, Wagoner initially sued defendant in the wonderfully named Dreamy Draw Justice Court, and defendant removed the case on ERISA preemption grounds. Wagoner’s claims were dismissed after he failed to respond to a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs alleged that in 2025 Wagoner received letters from defendant stating it could not verify Owens’ eligibility or locate his account. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this new action in Dreamy Draw Justice Court, alleging five state law claims based on the same facts as in the 2022 litigation, but adding allegations regarding the 2025 letters. Defendant once again removed the case to federal court because of ERISA preemption. It then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were barred due to claim preclusion. Plaintiffs “do not dispute that the 2022 Judgment was final on the merits, or that the two actions involve identical parties. Rather, Plaintiffs only dispute that the claims are the same in light of the 2025 Letters, which “post-date[] the 2022 dismissal and create[] new, independent causes of action for misrepresentation and consumer fraud.” Plaintiffs also contended that their state law claims “rest on duties independent of any plan benefits.” The court rejected these arguments, noting that it had already ruled that plaintiffs’ state law claims were completely preempted by ERISA and were thus extinguished. Furthermore, “The only factual difference between the two lawsuits is that Plaintiffs received the 2025 Letters after the 2022 Judgment. The operative question, then, is whether the 2025 Letters give rise to a claim that did not exist in the 2022 Litigation.” The court concluded, “They do not.” The court ruled that “Plaintiffs’ current ERISA claim existed in 2022, and he had the opportunity to pursue that claim then. Plaintiffs’ current ERISA claim also turns on substantially the same evidence as the former ERISA claim, involves the same purported infringement of Plaintiffs’ right to benefits underlying the former ERISA claim, and arise out of the same nucleus of facts as the former litigation.” As a result, “Plaintiffs’ ERISA claim in this action is precluded by the 2022 Judgment.” The court thus granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the action with prejudice.