This week we are reporting on twice as many cases as last week, which sounds like a lot! Unfortunately, there were only three cases in last week’s edition, so suddenly it’s not so impressive. Apparently, the federal courts are still suffering the effects of the government shutdown.

The six cases we did get run the gamut, however. Read on to learn about whether forfeiture claims can make a comeback (no, Del Bosque v. Coca-Cola), whether beneficiaries of an accidental death policy can pursue discovery into the insurer’s conflict of interest (yes, Kramer v. MetLife), whether submitting false expense reports can negate your entitlement to severance benefits (yes, Cella v. Lilly), and whether your 401(k) is protected from garnishment by the federal government if you have been convicted of embezzlement (not really but sort of, United States v. Green).

Hopefully the cases will pick up now that the shutdown is over, although the holidays are coming up which may put a damper on things. We’ll all find out together in next week’s edition.

Below is a summary of this past week’s notable ERISA decisions by subject matter and jurisdiction.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Fifth Circuit

Del Bosque v. Coca-Cola Southwest Beverages LLC, No. 3:25-CV-01270-X, 2025 WL 3171326 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025) (Judge Brantley Starr). Plaintiffs in this action are participants in Coca-Cola’s 401(k) retirement plan. They allege that Coca-Cola has mismanaged its plan by including an imprudent and costly suite of JP Morgan target date funds and by spending forfeited employer contributions on the cost of future employer contribution obligations. Coca-Cola moved to dismiss this action, arguing that plaintiffs failed to state their claims of imprudence and disloyalty. The court agreed and granted the motion in this order, dismissing the complaint without prejudice. To begin, the court held that plaintiffs’ comparator target date funds were not meaningful benchmarks to demonstrate imprudence because they contained only actively managed investment options while JP Morgan’s funds were comprised of a mix of passive and actively managed funds. Additionally, the court held that inclusion of the funds in the plan was not per se imprudent simply because cheaper options with lower fees existed. In order to state a claim that Coca-Cola breached its fiduciary duty of prudence, the court stated that plaintiffs were required to plead that its selection process was imprudent. Because they did not include such allegations, the court dismissed the target date fund claims. Next, the court dismissed the claim of disloyalty related to the forfeitures. The court was persuaded by the logic of a sister court out of the Eastern District of Louisiana which similarly dismissed a putative fiduciary breach class action arising from the alleged misuse of forfeited funds. Like the court in Louisiana, the district court held that Coca-Cola did not violate the duty of loyalty because ERISA and the terms of the plan authorize the use of forfeiture funds for employer contribution matching. In fact, the court concluded that plaintiffs’ theory would require something that ERISA does not, maximizing profits, and would effectively require that all forfeiture funds be used to create an additional benefit not contemplated in the plan. For these reasons, the court granted Coca-Cola’s motion to dismiss.

Class Actions

Eleventh Circuit

Davis v. United Bank Corp. Retirement Plan Committee, No. 5:24-CV-328-MTT, 2025 WL 3142143 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2025) (Judge Marc T. Treadwell). In a straightforward and frictionless decision the district court this week preliminarily certified a settlement class of participants in the United Bank Corporation Employee Stock Ownership Plan, appointed named plaintiffs Ruth Davis and Jim Ogletree class representatives and their attorneys at The Barton Firm and Barnes Law Group class counsel, and preliminarily approved of the $2 million settlement in this case alleging fiduciary wrongdoing under ERISA. The court held that the proposed class was adequately defined and clearly ascertainable, and that it satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b). Specifically, the court found that the 74-member class satisfies numerosity, that there are common questions of law, fact, and liability surrounding the company stock valuation and liquidation, that plaintiffs and their claims are typical of the class, and that they and their lawyers, R. Joseph Barton and J. Cameron Tribble, are adequate representatives. Moreover, the court considered certification under both Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(A) appropriate given that the resolution of the plan-wide claims will be dispositive of the interests of all participants in the plan, while independent actions by individual plan participants could result in rulings that set differing or incompatible standards of behavior for the fiduciaries. As for the settlement agreement itself, the court was satisfied that it was the result of serious, informed, arm’s-length negotiations between experienced attorneys. The $2 million settlement amount, representing approximately 43% of the maximum amount plaintiffs asserted they could potentially recover at trial, was also viewed favorably by the court. It saw this figure as not only within the range of reason, but as substantial relief to the class, especially considering the costs, risks, and delay of a trial and an appeal. The court also found that the requested one-third attorneys’ fee award satisfied the standards on preliminary approval. Finally, the court noted that the settlement treats all class members equitably. For these reasons, the court stated that there were no grounds to doubt the fairness of the proposed settlement agreement. The court then ended its decision by approving the content and allocation plan of the settlement notice, appointing the settlement administrator, and scheduling the fairness hearing for March 26, 2026.

Discovery

Tenth Circuit

Kramer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 2:25-cv-00327, 2025 WL 3171499 (D. Utah Nov. 13, 2025) (Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead). This case arises from a narcotic drug overdose death. The beneficiaries are seeking accidental death and dismemberment benefits from a MetLife policy and are arguing that MetLife improperly denied their claim for benefits because the decedent had a prescription for oxycodone and was taking the drug as prescribed. Before the court was plaintiffs’ motion to conduct limited discovery regarding MetLife’s inherent conflict of interest based on its role as both the payor of decedent’s benefits and as the entity determining their entitlement to those benefits. The court found that the request for limited, extra-record discovery was appropriate in this action. In particular, the court focused on the fact that this case involves conflicting medical reports, including newly raised medical claims that MetLife added at the last stage of the appeal, leaving the beneficiaries unable to challenge them. Thus, the court said that, “[w]hile the mere existence of a dual role conflict does not in and of itself function as ‘a green light’ for discovery, Plaintiffs have identified specific issues regarding Defendant’s policies, procedures and interpretations which support the propriety of limited discovery to understand the effect, if any, Defendant’s dual role may have played in its decision to deny Plaintiffs’ claims.” However, upon review of plaintiffs’ specific interrogatories and requests for production, the court concluded that a handful of them were overly broad, disproportionate, and outside the scope of Rule 26. The court permitted discovery about the individuals involved in the handling of the claim, including information about their compensation and bonuses, as well as production of copies of claim handling guidelines, training materials, policies, procedures and protocols relating to accidental death claims as relied upon in plaintiffs’ case. The court did not permit, though, information into the hiring, firing, and compensation of all MetLife employees, or production of any reports or investigations from any Insurance Commissioner or regulatory authority, nor allow plaintiff access to all complaints against MetLife from the past ten years, general statistical data, or spreadsheets and calculations. Accordingly, the court granted in part and denied in part the discovery motion.

Pension Benefit Claims

Sixth Circuit

United States v. Green, No. 13-50166, 2025 WL 3187292 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 2025) (Judge David M. Lawson). Defendant Tanaya Green was convicted of embezzlement. As part of her sentence she was ordered to pay restitution of $209,182. Ms. Green stopped remitting funds with about $164,000 worth of payments to go. In response, the government sought a writ of continuing garnishment against Ms. Green’s former employer, Principal Trust. It in turn filed an answer to the writ disclosing that it holds funds in the amount of $27,097.99 on behalf of Ms. Green in a qualified retirement plan. Ms. Green objected to the writ. In this decision the court ruled on the government’s request for an order for the garnishee to pay the entire amount of the retirement account, Ms. Green’s motion requesting to dissolve the lien on her retirement account, and on the parties’ dispute over arrangement of an ongoing payment plan. One of the principal issues was whether the provisions of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 constitute a Congressional exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation provision when it comes to the enforcement of a restitution order against a criminal defendant. The court held that it did, but with some caveats. Chief among these limitations is a spouse’s rights to any retirement payments. The court held, “[w]here a particular pension plan requires that a lump sum payment be made payable only with spousal consent, the government may not cash out these plans without such consent. The Court agrees with the Novak court’s conclusion ‘that criminal restitution orders can be enforced by garnishing retirement funds, but with the funds only payable when the defendant has a current, unilateral right to receive payments under the terms of the retirement plan.’” Here, it was not clear what current rights Ms. Green has to her account funds, what rights her husband may have to them, or whether a lump sum payment is even available under the plan terms. Without resolution of these issues the government’s right to enforce the restitution judgment under the retirement plan cannot be decided at this juncture. Accordingly, the court did not grant the government’s request for an order requiring Principal to pay over the entire amount of the ERISA retirement account, but also did not grant Ms. Green’s request to dissolve the lien on her retirement account either. Instead, the court ordered her to make a lump sum payment of $4,700 against her restitution obligation, and then to make continuing monthly payments of $100 against her restitution obligation. Finally, the court permitted the government to interview Ms. Green under oath to determine her ability to make higher restitution payments, and thereafter to apply to the court to modify the monthly restitution payment order should it feel that this is justified.

Pleading Issues & Procedure

Ninth Circuit

Civello v. Equinix Inc., No. CV-25-01028-PHX-KML, 2025 WL 3181668 (D. Ariz. Nov. 14, 2025) (Judge Krissa M. Lanham). Plaintiff Melissa Civello filed this action against her former employer, Equinix Incorporated, alleging that the company discriminated against her, created a hostile work environment, wrongfully terminated her, acted contrary to state and federal equal pay laws, and violated ERISA. In a previous decision the court granted Equinix’s motion to dismiss this lawsuit. Ms. Civello amended her complaint. In response, Equinix filed a renewed motion to dismiss. In this order the court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. It concluded that the complaint failed to state claims under California law because it did not sufficiently plead a connection to the state, that it failed to allege discrimination, reprisal, harassment, and wrongful termination within Title VII’s 300-day window, did not plead a willful violation of the federal Equal Pay Act sufficiently to invoke its three-year statute of limitations, and did not identify any basis for the ERISA claims. In fact, the complaint did not even note what ERISA plan it was referring to, and Ms. Civello refused to produce the written contract underlying the ERISA claims despite the court ordering her to do so. As the court had warned, this failure to plead the existence of the governing contract and to produce the plan resulted in dismissal of the ERISA causes of action. Thus, the ERISA claims were dismissed without leave to amend, just like Ms. Civello’s other causes of action.

Severance Benefit Claims

Seventh Circuit

Cella v. Lilly USA LLC, No. 1:24-cv-00814-TWP-MKK, 2025 WL 3134607 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 2025) (Judge Tanya Walton Pratt). Plaintiff Daniel Cella worked for Lilly USA LLC for twenty-two years. He was terminated in August 2022 following a work trip he had taken a few months earlier. Mr. Cella falsified his travel related expenses to his employer. Specifically, he claimed that a $405.25 hotel no-show fee was a business meal. When Lilly learned about Mr. Cella’s mischaracterization of the no-show fee it terminated his employment, stating that it was a direct violation of its employee expense reporting procedures, and by extension, an immediately separable offense. Subsequent to his termination Mr. Cella applied for benefits under Lilly’s ERISA-governed severance plan. His claim was denied by the benefits committee, which determined that he was not eligible for severance payments under the plan due to the nature of his firing. In this lawsuit Mr. Cella challenges that denial. Confident that its decision was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the plan, the Lilly defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Mr. Cella argued that summary judgment should be denied because a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the committee failed to afford him a full and fair review, that its decision was biased, and that the denial was arbitrary and capricious. In this order the court disagreed with Mr. Cella, and granted Lilly’s motion for judgment. To begin, the court considered the adequacy of the committee’s review. It determined that the committee had properly considered the evidence provided by Mr. Cella, communicated to him the reason for its denial, adequately explained its thinking, and reasonably based that decision on both evidence in the administrative record and on the plain language of the plan. Moreover, the court concluded that the committee had not denied Mr. Cella a full and fair review on appeal by denying his claim based only on the materials presented by Lilly USA and Mr. Cella. Given the undisputed facts undergirding the termination, the court disagreed with Mr. Cella that the committee was under any obligation to engage in further investigation into his claim for benefits. And as for the committee’s conflict of interest, the court held that it carried little weight here as this was no “borderline” case. Rather, the undisputed evidence made clear that Mr. Cella falsified his travel reimbursement request, that this falsified report was the reason for the termination, and that an employee terminated for falsifying a report is ineligible for benefits under the plan. Considering this, the court agreed with Lilly that the committee’s decision was not improperly biased. At bottom, the court concluded that the denial was not an abuse of discretion, and that the evidence clearly supported the benefit decision. As a result, the court ruled that Lilly was entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Cella’s claim for benefits.